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Abstract
Who are our friends and what is the nature of networks we make, can have macro-level impli-
cations on society.
There are relationship-based economies, and there are economies that rely on arm’s length
interactions. This thesis studies how relationship-based groups like merchant guilds and caste
can persist due to a lack of incentives and information, or because of salience of social identities.
It also explores the factors that can widen the social circle and give rise to impersonal and
cosmopolitan social systems.
In the second chapter, I develop a theoretical model to show how difficult it is for
relationship-based economies to be honest to and trusting of strangers and to transition into im-
personal economies. I find a narrow set of conditions under which generalized trust in strangers
can emerge and sustain in an impersonal economy.
In the third chapter, I explore the transition of guild-based economies of Northwestern Eu-
rope into market-based economies in the sixteenth century. I study the unique interaction of
economic and technological factors that drove such a change. I find that cities in the sixteenth
century, where monopolies of merchant guilds declined, were at the Atlantic coast and had
significantly higher levels of printing in the fifteenth century.
In the fourth chapter, with Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, I examine the effect of caste
censuses of 1901 in making the caste identity salient today. We study its impact on networking
and governance and find that in regions where district committees were formed to rank castes
in 1901, households have a smaller social circle as they have fewer out-of-caste networks with
professionals. They also have a poorer quality of government.
Overall, the thesis develops a detailed picture of how social structures historically evolve,
and how trust, access to information and social identity are the forces that shape them.
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Impact Statement
As business researchers, we are interested in helping businesses succeed. Much of the business-
related research1, uses business organizations from developed countries as subjects, where
strong formal institutions support businesses. But, business prescriptions that use management
theories that were developed in the context of the developed world can be insufficient for the
developing world. How much can the current business research inform us about business in
developing countries, where formal institutions are either not developed or are corrupt?
The key challenge in doing business in developing countries is going beyond the strict con-
fines of the networks one has. These networks are the reliable way of doing business in places
without credible formal institutions. But, this networked nature of business leads to an ineffi-
cient and unequal distribution of resources, as it is difficult for newcomers and especially small
businesses to enter a market without previous contacts. So, incumbents who have many con-
nections can seek rents at the cost of excluding potentially superior newcomers. Also, these
incumbents can bribe the rule enforcers, and inhibit the running of impartial formal institutions.
This thesis helps policymakers understand the economic and cultural conditions under which
doing business beyond networks is especially more difficult. It also helps them identify the
conditions that can favor the emergence of business beyond networks, where businesses can
genuinely enjoy a wide circle of opportunity.
Broadly, the thesis provides a synthesis of diverse literature about the fundamentals of or-
ganizing business in traditional and developing societies with weak institutions. By using 1) a
variety of historical, empirical and modeling techniques, and 2) theories from multiple fields
in strategy, organization studies, economics, political economy and history, the thesis takes a
holistic view of how business gets done in a variety of institutional, cultural and technological
settings.
1Among the highly cited recent management articles some notable exceptions that have a setting outside of the
United States or Europe include Mair, Martı´ & Ventresca (2012) that focused on inclusive markets in Bangladesh,
Marquis & Qian (2013) that studied corporate social responsibility in China, and Bloom et al. (2013) that studied the
impact of improving management practices on firms in India.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
For much of the human history, we have organized ourselves in close-knit groups. In India,
Jatis are the traditional occupational and ethnic units around which the society has organized.
In medieval Europe, people were members of craft and merchant guilds. These social groups
have been sources of security and identity to people, and have historically played an essential
role in the economy.
But in modern societies, people regularly go beyond their traditional groups and engage
in impersonal interactions with people of diverse backgrounds, in cosmopolitan markets and
cities. Such interactions in a wide circle in markets (De la Croix, Doepke & Mokyr 2017),
and in cities (Lucas Jr 2017), were crucial for rapid diffusion of knowledge (innovation) and
formation of productive partnerships (entrepreneurship). They ultimately helped in triggering
the “hockey stick” (CORE team 2017) of exponential economic growth since the industrial
revolution. Beyond economic growth, the nature of social interactions also influences the quality
of institutions and democracy (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1994, Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales
2016). Tocqueville (1862) when writing about the democracy in the nineteenth-century United
States observed:
In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the
progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.
If the nature of social interactions and its size and diversity is so central to progress, then
it is critical to understand 1) when do traditional social systems like Jatis and guilds persist,
and 2) when do modern impersonal and cosmopolitan social systems emerge? This thesis is
dedicated to understanding this “science of association”. I study the reasons why social systems
persist and change, and focus on two prominent historical, social systems of the world- the guild
system of Europe, and the caste system of India.
Academics have become interested in the historical trends that affect the social structure of
exchange (Polanyi 1944, Banfield 1967, Malone, Yates & Benjamin 1987, Putnam, Leonardi &
Nanetti 1994, Ogilvie 2011, Padgett & Powell 2012, Trivellato 2014). Yet, a tough question that
evades an answer is how does the circle of social exchange expand, and what factors inhibit its
expansion. Why are social and economic interactions in a wide circle - with strangers and with
people of diverse identities - so difficult?
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In this thesis, I study historical settings where economic agents decide to either stick to
their traditional groups such as guilds or Jatis, or else they conduct exchange in a wider circle
with strangers, in impersonal markets and with people of diverse backgrounds. These micro-
level decisions, about the friends they make and the networks they form can have macro-level
implications on the structure of society, and the emergent culture and institutions. The historical
settings in this thesis are scenarios where the social structure of exchange transformed rapidly
due to cultural, institutional and technological factors.
1.1 How honesty and trust evolves among strangers?
In the second chapter, I study the trade-off between relationship-based and impersonal ex-
changes, and ask: when do traders undertake risky impersonal exchange with strangers over
exchange through relationships? I model an impersonal economy where impersonal exchanges
are anonymous, there is no repetition, and traders derive no prosocial utility from honesty, in
contrast to previous models. Instead, in the economy norms about how to deal with strangers
are conceptualized as routines (Nelson & Winter 1982) that are sticky, and they evolutionarily
compete (Boyd & Richerson 1988, Mokyr 2016) and contagiously diffuse (Shiller 2017).
I find that exchange through relationships is persistent, and impersonal exchange can emerge
only under a narrow set of conditions. A threshold adoption of standardized routines that induce
impartial conduct can constrain cheating among strangers (threshold condition). But, these
routines can only sustain if the opportunities from impersonal exchanges are significantly more
beneficial when compared to opportunities through relationships (utility condition).
To discuss the results, I consider the case of sixteenth-century Europe, which was a critical
period when the circle of exchange expanded. I emphasize the role of horizontal communicators
(printing press) in mass diffusing standardized routines like double-entry bookkeeping. I also
discuss how identification to relationship-based groups like caste can influence the outcomes of
the model.
1.2 How merchant guild networks declined in Northwestern Eu-
rope?
In the third chapter, I focus on the persistence and change of a key form of social organization in
Europe- of merchant guilds. I study the impact of movable-type printing press on the decline of
merchant guilds in the sixteenth century. Merchant guilds were arguably the most notable form
of networked business organizations in medieval Europe (Ogilvie 2011). They began to decline
in Northwest European cities like Amsterdam, Hamburg, and London in the sixteenth century,
but not in other cities like Cologne, Lu¨beck, and Seville. As several institutional innovations,
like the stock market or the joint stock company, can trace their origin to Northwestern Europe,
the rise of the region has been a significant research theme (Weber 1905, North 1990, Cook
2007, Harris 2009, Padgett & Powell 2012, McCloskey 2016, Mokyr 1990, Rubin 2017). I be-
lieve that looking at this period through the lens of technological and organizational change can
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bring a novel perspective to the literature. So, I collected historical data to study the historical
puzzle.
I find that cities in the sixteenth century, where monopolies of merchant guilds declined,
had significantly higher levels of printing in the fifteenth century, as they were early adopters
of printing technology. Additionally, these cities were at the Atlantic coast, where traders had a
large incentive to form new connections with unfamiliar traders.
The combination of the printing press and Atlantic coast, allowed for horizontal transmission
of information - especially related to commerce - and under right conditions led to a decline of
merchant guilds.
1.3 How caste identity became salient in India and influenced net-
working and governance?
In the fourth chapter, in joint work with Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, I explore how social
identity gets transmitted, and how it can influence networking and governance. Firstly, drawing
from the classical work of Akerlof & Kranton (2000) and Bisin & Verdier (2001) we model
how the social identity of caste and cosmopolitanism can be intergenerationally transmitted,
and how institutions can influence this transmission in the long run by popularizing ideal caste
related prescriptions. Further, drawing from the ideas of Cohn (1984) and Dirks (2001), we
study if the colonial census of 1901 led to an increase in the salience of caste identity in India.
We find that the regions which formed district committees in 1901 to infamously rank castes,
were not different on a range of metrics before 1901. Using this 1901 shock to the salience of
identity as an experiment, we find that today these treated regions have a smaller social circle
as they have lower levels of out of caste networking with professionals. These regions also
have a lower quality of government and a higher presence of caste-based parties. We also find
that immediately after 1901, the treated regions had a higher level of caste-based petitioning in
subsequent censuses, often by organized caste groups.
1.4 Epistemology and Methodology
The three chapters focus on three key aspects of the social structure of exchange: trust, access
to information and social identity in different historical settings. The theories developed in the
thesis use mathematical models to highlight important tensions between different forces that
determine the size of social exchange. For example, the trust model in the second chapter high-
lights the tension between risk and opportunity of impersonal exchange. Similarly, the model
of social identity in the fourth chapter highlights the tension between individual preferences and
socially and state prescribed activities and their long-term impact. Also, the theories I develop
on trust and identity, borrow from fields like accounting, anthropology, law, network theory and
sociology (Fanon 1967, Anderson 1991, Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 1995, Macy & Skvoretz
1998, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998, Dirks 2001, Kadens 2014, Gong, McAfee &
Williams 2016, Burt & Luo 2017, Hail, Tahoun & Wang 2018), and embed these concepts in
socioeconomic utility models.
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I conduct empirical and historical analysis to test the validity of the theories. The historical
settings are such that the causal effects are identifiable. So in the third chapter, I use the unique
geographical features of Europe to test whether information diffusion and incentives to trade
played a role in the emergence of impersonal markets in the sixteenth century. Similarly, in
the fourth chapter, I use the heterogeneity in the application of the unique 1901 caste censuses
of India to study whether social identities can be made more salient by colonial prescriptions,
and influence modern networking and governance. Additionally, I develop historical accounts
to build a detailed picture of the historical periods I study. For example, I provide a historical
narrative of the evolution of the social construct of caste in India (chapter four) and write a
condensed account of the divergence between Hamburg and Lu¨beck in the fifteenth and the
sixteenth century (chapter three and appendix D).
Overall, I study these social organizations at periods of significant transformation. I show
how the emergence of impersonal exchange and markets requires incentives and norms that
support exchange in diverse and cosmopolitan settings. In contrast, even in cosmopolitan cities
like Calcutta and Madras, the popularization of prescriptions that draw distinctions between
different social groups can lead to hardening of social identities, and inhibit the emergence of
cosmopolitan cultures.
Chapter 2
How honesty and trust evolves among
strangers?
Go into the London Stock Exchange - a more respectable place than many a court
- and you will see representatives from all nations gathered together for the utility
of men. Here Jew, Mohammedan and Christian deal with each other as though
they were all of the same faith, and only apply the word infidel to people who go
bankrupt. Here the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist and the Anglican accepts a
promise from the Quaker. - Voltaire (1694-1778)
Business exchanges are embedded in social relations (Polanyi 1944, Granovetter 1973,
1985, Coleman 1988, Greif 1994, Burt 1995, 2001, Kranton 1996, Uzzi 1996, Uzzi & Lan-
caster 2003, Saxenian 1996, Tsai & Ghoshal 1998, Gulati 1998, Fernandez, Castilla & Moore
2000). These relations are built on trust, and in some societies it is easier to trust strangers than
in others. In societies where social exchanges are limited within familiar groups - like family,
clan or networks like jati, guanxi and guilds - the civic or “bourgeois” (McCloskey 2016) norms
of honest conduct with outsiders may not exist (Banfield 1967, Platteau 2000, Fafchamps 2011,
Alesina & Giuliano 2015). Whether the circle of honest conduct is limited or wide has im-
portant consequences (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1994), for individuals, businesses and the
economy1.
At the individual level, when the circle of honest conduct is small, tightly knit groups (dense
networks with high closure) are common and valuable, as such networks lower the risks associ-
ated with trust (Coleman 1988, Gargiulo & Benassi 2000, Burt 2001). In dense networks there
are fewer opportunities for brokerage (Burt 1995), as there are fewer structural holes which may
not only reduce the circle of opportunity (Gargiulo & Benassi 2000) but also the diversity of
information (Reagans & Zuckerman 2001). Similarly, at the level of individual businesses, in
India Bloom et al. (2013) found, little trust in non-family members by firm owners limits the
growth of firms as they do not expand beyond the size that could be managed by close family
members. At the level of the economy, Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2004) found that areas
in Italy where strangers are generally trusted more (generalized trust) has more financial devel-
1Delhey, Newton & Welzel (2011) provides a detailed analysis on the size of the radius of trust in different
countries.
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opment, and “households invest less in cash and more in stock, use more checks, have higher
access to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit”.
If a wide circle of trust is so central to the economy, we must know how does trust between
strangers emerge. In this chapter, I study how impersonal exchanges2 emerge in societies where
generalized trust in outsiders is limited, and trade happens through relationships. Older theoret-
ical models of generalized trust assumed that agents derive an intrinsic utility from honest be-
haviour (Tabellini 2008b), or a highly trusting environment does not attract opportunists (Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales 2008a). Alternatively, previous literature assumed that such trust exists
because agents can repeat their exchanges (e.g., Ghosh & Ray (1996) and Nowak & Sigmund
(2005)), punish the strangers (Sethi & Somanathan 1996, Bowles 2016), or sanction the entire
community of the opportunist (Greif 2006). These channels effectively eliminate all forms of
vulnerability associated with trusting strangers as cheaters are punished through some form of
individual or communal identification.
But, scholars such as Kadens (2014) have questioned economic theories that assume that
familiar traders act honestly to each other when threatened with a loss of reputation, or punish-
ment. Even in close-knit societies, cheating and reneging of promises was tolerated (Kadens
2014) as long as traders had confidence in their overall networks. Moreover, in large economies
with nascent institutions, cheaters cannot be perfectly identified, and exchanges with strangers
always involve a degree of vulnerability, as cheating is “central to commerce” and is not an
aberration (Kadens 2019 forthcoming). How does trust emerge in such cases when the possi-
bility of cheating cannot be eliminated? The theoretical models where agents enjoy a positive
utility from good behaviour (Tabellini 2008b, Greif & Tabellini 2017, Bisin & Verdier 2017),
argue that societies with such initial prosocial preferences have passed on these values intergen-
erationally. I develop a theory about the emergence of honesty and generalized trust, where we
do not need to assume that societies have intrinsically different preferences, nor do we need to
assume that the possibility of dishonest behaviour is eliminated.
Central to the theory I develop is the notion that trusting requires taking a risk (Kadens 2019
forthcoming), and self-interested traders need to show “willingness to be vulnerable” (Mayer,
Davis & Schoorman 1995, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998) when they trust strangers.
So, I consider a model impersonal economywhere traders trade with anonymous partners, where
their interactions cannot be repeated, and they enjoy no prosocial utility from good behaviour.
Traders have different norms about how to deal with strangers, and these norms are embedded in
their business routines (Nelson & Winter 1982). The first type of traders are dishonest towards
strangers, and they favor familiar partners, while the other type is uniformly honest towards
them. Traders become honest towards strangers if they adopt regular and predictable (Nelson
& Winter 1982) i.e., standardized routines that reduce partiality in conduct, and make them
honest and reliable uniformly, irrespective of familiarity with partners. Adopting processes that
promote uniform standards of quality like ISO and TQM standards (Benner & Tushman 2003),
or innovations like the adoption of double-entry bookkeeping for financial transparency can be
some of the standardized routines. Norms about how to deal with strangers are replicators, and
2Impersonal exchange is also called arm’s length exchange (Uzzi 1996, Rajan & Zingales 1998) or generalized
exchange (Ogilvie 2011).
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Figure 2.1: The figure represents an example network of individuals where an agent like A, has a trusted network.
Whenever agents need to make an outward exchange beyond the trusted network (for example A exchanging with B),
they can either do a relationship-based exchange, through trusted intermediaries (brokers) or else they can undertake
a risky and arm’s length exchange directly.
they are occasionally revised based on the average fitness of different ethical types.
Based on their past experiences with strangers, traders also decide whether to be impersonal
or relationship-based. Impersonal traders trust strangers (like if A trusts B in Figure 2.1) and
enter in a risky prisoner’s dilemma game with them, without demanding any guarantees, as
they are eager to make new deals (Kadens 2014). In contrast, relationship-based traders distrust
strangers and do not play the prisoner’s dilemma game. Instead, they get a steady payoff (like
through A’s trusted network of intermediaries in Figure 2.1), and if a stranger approaches them
for exchange, they demand guarantees. They only conduct a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma
exchange with these strangers if strangers are willing to be on the side that takes all the risk in
the exchange. In related literature (Dasgupta 2000, Gong, McAfee & Williams 2016, Kadens
2019 forthcoming), traders who do not trust strangers demand verification, which like a demand
for guarantees reduces the risk in impersonal exchange, but at the same time reduces the circle
of impersonal opportunities.
The setting models an impersonal economy with multiple types of impersonal exchanges,
including one-sided prisoner’s dilemma exchanges (also called the fundamental problem of ex-
change by Greif (2000)) between impersonal traders (who trust and are eager to make deals) and
relationship-based traders (who distrust and demand guarantees). Honest impersonal traders can
thrive in such one-sided exchanges by taking risks and making many successful impersonal ex-
changes (deals) if there are an ample fraction of honest relationship-based traders on the other
side who bring large gains. As embedded routines are only occasionally revised due to being
sticky3, this stickiness creates the possibility that there are honest relationship-based traders who
3These routines can also be viewed as heuristics whose significance in everyday decision-making is well studied.
Yamagishi et al. (2007) commented “Heuristics play a decisive role in the decision-making process that takes place
in experimental games as well as everyday life, and the use of heuristics is often more adaptive than deliberate
decision-making”. Kandori & Obayashi (2014) studied the community unions of Tokyo (Tokyo Managers’ Union)
and found that cooperation sustained in such loosely knit organizations through “simple heuristic reasoning”.
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follow standardized routines that do not cheat with vulnerable impersonal traders in one-sided
prisoner’s dilemma exchanges.
When traders trade, too many honest and impersonal traders who trust and are eager to
make deals, create space for dishonesty in trade. Too many dishonest traders give rise to dis-
trust among honest relationship-based traders. Too many honest relationship-based traders who
distrust, give rise to a demand for guarantees, which reduces cheating and gives rise to honest
impersonal traders. Such a cycle of trust, dishonesty, distrust, and honesty can give rise to an
impersonal equilibrium of exchange which co-exists with dishonest behaviour which is found
to be common in historical (Kadens 2014, 2019 forthcoming) and modern markets4 (Gong,
McAfee & Williams 2016, Hail, Tahoun & Wang 2018). This equilibrium exists under two
narrow conditions:
• Utility condition: the benefit from impersonal exchanges is significantly higher than the
loss from being cheated, and the benefit from relationship-based exchanges.
• Threshold condition: a threshold of agents adopts honest norms towards strangers, i.e.,
they adopt standardized routines that induce impartial business conduct.
In the absence of either of these conditions, only relationship-based exchange persists, and
the economy cannot transition to the impersonal equilibrium. I simulate these results to confirm
the intuition. In the absence of the possibility of the emergence of the impersonal equilibrium,
traditional institutions that cater to relationship-based exchanges are unwilling to reform. In
an extension, I show how generalized institutions that serve all parties impartially can endoge-
nously emerge when conditions are ripe for impersonal exchange.
The theory developed shows that incremental transmission of standardized routines cannot
push a relationship-based economy to transition into an economy driven by impersonal ex-
change. So, traditional economies where such routines were transmitted vertically from one
generation to another, could not develop sustainable forms of impersonal exchange. Instead, the
emergence of impersonal exchange required a mass horizontal transmission of such standardized
routines so that they diffused virally between peers5. I discuss the implications of the theory in
the context of the rise of impersonal markets in sixteenth-century Northwestern Europe, where
Atlantic trade increased the willingness to conduct trade with strangers, and horizontal transmis-
sion of practices like the double entry bookkeeping led to the adoption of standardized routines
that may have constrained partial conduct.
4Gong, McAfee & Williams (2016) develop an evolutionary model of fraud cycles, where investors decide
whether to verify the product sellers at a cost, and product sellers decide whether to produce low-quality products.
Risk, which is taken by investors, is one-sided in the model. Hail, Tahoun & Wang (2018) develop a dataset of
historical scandals and regulations from 1800. They find in the data “‘vicious cycle’ of scandals followed by bouts
of regulatory activism”.
5Rothstein (2011a) discusses the role of “big bang” reforms in fighting corruption, and provides a case-study of
how corruption was eradicated in 19th century Sweden.
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2.1 Modeling an Impersonal Economy
2.1.1 Relationship-based channels of exchange
Honest conduct in impersonal settings presents two challenges. Firstly, what enables diffusion of
“bourgeois” (McCloskey 2016) or “civic” (Bowles 2016, Bisin & Verdier 2017) values, beliefs,
norms, ideas or codes that make honest exchanges with strangers possible? Secondly, what
sustains honest conduct, and stops cheating from flourishing in trusting environments, like in an
impersonal market made up of unfamiliar traders?
Sociology literature has a long tradition of using agent-based modeling for studying the
diffusion of norms and conventions (Macy & Willer 2002, Bianchi & Squazzoni 2015).
Economists too have been interested in the formal modeling of diffusion and evolution of cul-
ture, and narratives (Boyd & Richerson 1988, Mokyr 2016, Shiller 2017)6. Using models of
(vertical) cultural transmission between generations (Bisin & Verdier 2001), a branch of lit-
erature has explored the transfer of civic values of good conduct between generations (vertical
transmission). In the literature that looks at values, values provide intrinsic benefits like the feel-
ing of “warm glow” (Tabellini 2008b) or having a “city orientation” (Greif & Tabellini 2017)
or “civic culture” (Bisin & Verdier 2017), beyond the pure monetary gains. The models show
that small differences in initial norms between two societies can lead to persistent and diverging
outcomes on how the societies are organized, and on the circle of honest or cooperative conduct
in them (showing institutional and cultural persistence). But, the theories do not explain, how do
societies develop different initial attitudes. One possible mechanism through which trust in oth-
ers can change is by temporary shocks to the return to being trusting towards strangers (Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales 2008a). Such a shock increases the beliefs regarding the trustworthiness
of others, which then persists. But, honest conduct is itself affected by the prevailing level of
trust. One can expect that an economy where people start trusting strangers would also attract
cheaters.
Another branch of literature has focused on how cheating can be contained from flourish-
ing in cooperative environments. Cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma settings can be sustained
if there is some possibility of a repeated exchange or reputation building (Ghosh & Ray 1996,
Nowak & Sigmund 2005), or if the cheaters are threatened by a vengeful and costly retalia-
tion (Sethi & Somanathan 1996, Fehr & Ga¨chter 2000, 2002)7. These methods are considered
private mechanisms that individuals can privately use to constrain a partner from cheating. Al-
ternatively, a third party (like ruler) can identify and punish cheaters by improving contract
enforcement (or rule of law) (North 1990, Milgrom, North & Weingast 1990, Bowles 2016).
Moreover, Greif (2006) proposed a community mechanism of community responsibility sys-
tem that enables impersonal exchange between traders, as long as their community identities
are known. In the community responsibility system, cheating by one member of a community
6Shiller (2017) discussed a formal epidemiological approach to study the diffusion of narratives, providing
a framework for mathematically modeling social contagion. Similarly, Mokyr (2016) proposed an evolutionary
“Market of Ideas”, where culture can be conceptualized as a menu to which entrepreneurs could add, and customers
could choose.
7Merchant guilds in Europe and kinship networks elsewhere (and Europe) were sustainable economic insti-
tutions as they provided an effective mechanism for monitoring and punishing opportunism (Greif, Milgrom &
Weingast 1994).
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follows sanctions on the entire community by the members of the community of the cheated
partner. Using agent-based modeling, Macy & Skvoretz (1998) developed a social network-
based mechanism, where strangers were embedded in a social network, and cooperation was
sustained by recognizing signals of trustworthiness, and exiting from an exchange if the signal
was fake. Similarly, Kadens (2011) emphasized the significance of locally and network em-
bedded customs that merchants followed to conduct business exchange, where merchants were
willing to tolerate dishonest behaviour or delayed payments as long as they had “confidence”
that the reciprocal nature of their networks will pay them off in the long run (Kadens 2014).
The private, third party, community or social network-based mechanisms restrict cheating
by identifying cheaters, and enforcing punishment on them (Axelrod 1984, Ghosh & Ray 1996,
Nowak & Sigmund 2005, Sethi & Somanathan 1996, Fehr & Ga¨chter 2000, 2002, North 1990,
Milgrom, North & Weingast 1990), their communities (Greif 2006), or by not engaging with
them in the first place (Macy & Skvoretz 1998, Bravo, Squazzoni & Boero 2012). Such identifi-
cation of cheating is imperfect, and even close-knit medieval networks had instances of cheating
and reneging of promises that was tolerated (Kadens 2014, 2019 forthcoming). This problem is
especially even greater in large economies, where cheating cannot be completely negated. For
example, the community responsibility system functioned particularly well in small medieval
markets of Europe. But, it began to falter as the markets grew, and identities of traders became
more difficult to assess (Greif 2006). Understanding impersonal exchange with a stranger in the
absence of repeated exchange, without the clear knowledge of their identity, and in the absence
of credible third-party enforcement becomes important, when we are interested in understanding
emergence of impersonal exchange in settings where impartial legal institutions that serve all
parties uniformly are not already well developed, and the economy does not have the prosocial
values needed for trust.
2.1.2 Ingredients of impersonal exchange
Voluntary Prisoner’s Dilemma
I now develop a model impersonal economy where traders face a dilemma, of whether to trust
and be honest towards unfamiliar traders, who may be potential partners in trade. Here, in any
given period traders are randomly paired with an unfamiliar trading partner, and the pair can
play a game similar to a prisoner’s dilemma, where both parties have incentives to cheat and
not honor promises. Modeling trade in prisoner’s dilemma-type settings has been common in
literature (Milgrom, North & Weingast 1990, Kandori 1992, Ellison 1994, Macy & Skvoretz
1998, Dixit 2003, Tabellini 2008b). For example, Milgrom, North & Weingast (1990) modeled
trade in cities and fairs of Medieval Europe, in a similar manner and wrote:
With the exception of barter transactions, in which physical commodities are ex-
changed on the spot, virtually all economic transactions leave open the possibility
of cheating. In the Champagne Fairs, where merchants brought samples of their
goods to trade, the quantities they brought were not always sufficient to supply all
the potential demand. Then, the merchants sometimes exchanged promises - to de-
liver goods of like quality at a particular time and place, or to make payment in a
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certain form. Promises, however, can be broken. To represent the idea that cheating
may be profitable in a simple exchange, we use the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game
as our model of a single exchange transaction.
Given the temptations to cheat, traders tend to be reluctant to partner with outsiders (like
traders until sixteenth century in Europe or business people in developing countries (Bloom et al.
2013)) and prefer the relationship-based channels like guild or kinship ties. So, I am interested
in incorporating the reluctance as well, and in understanding the mechanism of diffusion and
sustenance of impersonal honest exchange in such relationship-based economies. So, in the
economy, being matched in the prisoner’s dilemma game is voluntary, similar to the model by
Macy & Skvoretz (1998) which was a “prison with an option to exit”8. The key difference
between this model and the model by Macy & Skvoretz (1998) is that, in the Macy & Skvoretz
(1998) model agents decide to exchange with a stranger on the basis of the signal they receive
about that stranger, while in this model they decide whether to exchange with a stranger on the
basis of their experiences with other strangers in the past (Reputation of a stranger). Bowles
(2016) in his discussion on trust in market-exposed economies (Doux Commerce) wrote of this
past experience-based mechanism: “people learn from their market experiences that fair dealing
with strangers is often profitable”.
Norms as replicating routines
In the economy, traders can either have a norm of honesty or a dishonesty towards strangers
(unfamiliar traders). Traders who are dishonest towards strangers favor familiar partners. But
traders can become honest towards strangers if they adopt routines (Nelson & Winter 1982)
like ISO or TQM quality standards or double-entry bookkeeping rules that standardize business
practices in business, and reduce the scope for partiality. Introducing the notion of routines
being replicators, Nelson & Winter (1982) wrote:
In our evolutionary theory, these routines play the role that genes play in biological
evolutionary theory. They are a persistent feature of the organism and determine
its possible behaviour (though actual behaviour is determined also by the environ-
ment); they are heritable in the sense that tomorrow’s organisms generated from
today’s (for example, by building a new plant) have many of the same characteris-
tics, and they are selectable in the sense that organisms with certain routines may do
better than others, and, if so, their relative importance in the population (industry)
is augmented over time.
I would like to capture the idea that, norms regarding honesty towards strangers are replica-
tors, that grow or shrink at a rate proportional to their relative “fitness” in the market. A simple
8An addition to the literature of evolution of cooperation has been the aspect of voluntary participation (Hauert,
De Monte, Hofbauer & Sigmund 2002, Semmann, Krambeck & Milinski 2003), which can regulate free-riding
behaviour. When engaging in social interaction with strangers is a choice, trust can be shown to arise when agents
play public goods games in small groups. But, as group sizes increase, this cooperation falls as cheating rises. When
cheating rises, more agents choose not to play, and non-playing behaviour replaces cheating behaviour. When non-
players dominate the population, such a situation again creates a breeding ground for cooperation between small
groups.
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way to operationalize the idea is to assume that, traders occasionally review and compare the
norms they have adopted regarding honesty towards strangers, described in section 2.1.4, and
after the review adopt the norm that leads to better hard payoffs, i.e., payoffs that are earned and
not just perceived. Unlike models that consider values like “warm glow” to be of intrinsic utility
(Tabellini 2008b, Greif & Tabellini 2017, Bisin & Verdier 2017), in this impersonal economy
traders are interested only in economic utility. While traders are concerned about their hard
payoffs, they do not switch between norms in each period, i.e., norms of traders are sticky, and
they only review the norms occasionally.
So, consider a unit mass of traders, each of whom is either honest or dishonest towards
strangers, depending on whether they adopt the standardized routines or not. An honest (to
strangers) trader has invested in standardized routines and has a norm n = H , while a dishonest
(to strangers) trader has a norm n = D. The aggregate behaviour of the traders is described by
a population state p 2 P , where P = {p 2 Rn+ : pH + pD = 1} is a simplex and pH represents
the proportion of traders who adopt standardized routines and are honest to strangers. Similarly,
pD represents the proportion of traders who do not adopt such standardized routines and are
dishonest whenever they come across a stranger. Together honest and dishonest traders make
up the whole population.
Multiple Types of Exchange
Let in each period traders have the option to approach strangers, and engage in an impersonal
exchange with them. Such exchange has the potential for high reward, but also the risk of loss
because of being cheated9. Alternatively, traders can choose a less rewarding option where they
do not approach strangers, and so they are insulated from cheating by strangers. The safe but
less rewarding option could be to choose relationship-based exchange and to exchange with
familiar contacts like intermediaries of a merchant guild. But, relationship-based traders can
still be approached by strangers who conduct impersonal trade. As relationship-based traders
prefer safer but less rewarding option, they distrust approaching strangers. So, skepticism drives
relationship-based traders to demand a guarantee of assured return, from any stranger that ap-
proaches them. Traders that are honest can provide such guarantees (pre-commit to honest
conduct), and so they can approach and exchange with skeptical relationship-based traders. In
the setting, the relationship-based traders can turn out to be dishonest, and especially when there
are many honest impersonal traders, cheating becomes lucrative and thrives. So, along with the
norms regarding honesty (n 2 {H,D}), in each period the traders also choose an orientation,
of being trusting of strangers or not. Traders change their orientation based on their past expe-
riences, described in section 2.1.5.
Based on the model setup, in each period the traders have an orientation o 2 {R, I}, where
among the traders with norm n, pnR engage in relationship-based exchange (o = R) and pnI
engage in impersonal exchange (o = I). If relationship-based traders are not approached by
an honest impersonal trader who could offer them a guaranteed return, honest relationship-
based traders (HR-type) earn m, while dishonest relationship-based traders (DR-type) earn
9Impersonal exchange because of its inherent vulnerability and risk resembles the notion of trust as “willingness
to be vulnerable” (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 1995, Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer 1998).
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Table 2.1: Different types of exchange
Focal Trader (F) Partner Trader (P) Type of Exchange F’s Payoff P’s Payoff
HR-type not paired Relationship-based Exchange m
DR-type not paired Relationship-based Exchange m
HI-type HI-type Simultaneous Exchange c c
HI-type DI-type Simultaneous Exchange  h c+ h
HI-type HR-type Sequential Exchange c c
HI-type DR-type Sequential Exchange  h c+ h
DI-type HR-type Sequential / No Exchange 0 m
DI-type DR-type Sequential / No Exchange 0 m
g = m+ i. The value i represents the benefit an honest relationship-based trader forfeits when
they adopt the impersonal routine10. Impersonal traders exchange with strangers, and they
get randomly paired with one of the traders of the population, with uniform probability. Such
pairing leads to different types of exchanges summarized in Table 2.1.
A few notes on the different types of exchange that emerge will be helpful:
• In a relationship-based exchange, traders refuse to get paired and trade through relation-
ships and earnm.
• In a simultaneous exchange, paired traders play a prisoner’s dilemma with payoff c on
cooperation, c+ h on cheating, and  h on being cheated.
• In a sequential exchange paired traders play a prisoner’s dilemma where impersonal type
moves first, i.e., relationship-based type demands a guarantee from impersonal type.
If an honest impersonal trader (HI-type) gets paired with another honest impersonal trader,
both earn c > g > m in a simultaneous trade. If the honest impersonal trader (HI-type) gets
paired with an honest relationship-based trader, both earn c > g > m in a sequential trade,
where the impersonal trader moves first as the relationship-based trader demands a guarantee.
But, if the honest impersonal trader is paired with a dishonest trader, impersonal or relationship-
based, the honest trader loses h while the dishonest trader earns c + h11. Once again, the
trades with impersonal traders are simultaneous, while trades with relationship-based traders
are sequential.
If a dishonest impersonal trader (DI-type) gets paired with another impersonal trader it
earns 0 if the paired trader is dishonest (c + h if the trader is honest), while if it gets paired
with a relationship-based trader, it earns 0, as the relationship-based trader refuses to exchange
with the dishonest trader that cannot provide a credible guarantee of return. It is assumed that
i = 012, i.e., adopting standardized routines is costless (and similar to choosing a norm) and
10In the baseline case of the model i = 0, i.e., adopting impersonal routines of impartial conduct is costless, but i
in some settings can be high. For example, in parochial and fragmented societies if being partial and favoring towards
insiders is a prescribed behaviour in a social group, then the traders who nonetheless adopt impartial routines can
be penalized by the amount i for violating the prescriptions related to their social identity (see Akerlof & Kranton
(2000) for a theory on social identity, and Mair, Martı´ & Ventresca (2012) for an example of market inclusion of
women in Bangladesh.
11In section 2.3 a ruler sets the value of h, i.e., ruler can reduce cost/temptation of cheating h, by improving law
and order and probability of detection.
12In subsection 2.2.5 I briefly discuss the impact of a higher i, where due to a range of reasons (cost of social
identity or cost of actual adoption of standardized routines) honest traders forfeit a value i > 0.
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g = m13.
A few notes on the interpretation of the payoffs will be helpful:
• m is the payoff from relationship-based trading arrangements, and it is high if the ar-
rangements are efficient. This measure can proxy the economic power of intermediaries,
where a largerm implies more powerful intermediaries.
• c is the payoff from an impersonal exchange, and it is high when such opportunities are
large. This measure can proxy the size of potential economic opportunities.
• h is the temptation/loss from a dishonest exchange, and it decreases as general contract
enforcement improves. This measure can proxy the quality of public institutions, where a
larger h implies poorer public institutions.
2.1.3 Payoff of different types
At any given time t in an economy of population p = 1, pH(t) traders are of honest (n = H)
norm. The honest traders, alternate between orientations o 2 {R, I}. pHI(t) honest traders
behave as HI-type that exchange with strangers and they have impersonal orientation (and earn
c on being paired with H-type traders and lose h on being paired with D-type traders), and
pHR(t) honest traders behave as HR-type traders that have relationship-based orientation (and
earn c on being paired with HI-type traders and m otherwise). Among dishonest traders, the
model setup presents Lemma 1 on their choice of orientation.
Lemma 1 There are no dishonest traders of impersonal orientation (pDI = 0), because for a
dishonest trader, having a relationship-based orientation is always preferred over impersonal
orientation.
Lemma 1 emerges because the only scenario where dishonest impersonal traders earn is if
they are paired with honest impersonal traders. Dishonest impersonal traders are declined ex-
change when partnering with relationship-based traders, and they have no particular advantage
over dishonest relationship-based traders in an exchange with other impersonal traders, given
the uniform nature of random matching. Even if matching technology of impersonal traders
was not uniform and was skewed to favor other impersonal traders, dishonest traders would
still choose relationship-based orientation, unless the skew was too large14. In an extreme case
13Another way to interpret c and h is, h is the effort required to produce a result that benefits the partner by
c + h. If both partners put the effort h both earn c, but, if one of them does not put in the effort, the effort-maker
loses h, while the partner gains c + h. If neither put any effort, both earn 0. Pre-commitment or guaranteeing an
assured return, can mean that in a pairing of relationship-based and impersonal traders, the impersonal trader moves
first and puts effort h that benefits the relationship-based trader, and the relationship-based trader moves second and
depending on norm n 2 {H,D} either puts in effort (honest) or does not (dishonest). The exchange resembles
a prisoner’s dilemma when played simultaneously between two paired impersonal traders, while it resembles an
investment game when played sequentially between an impersonal trader and then a relationship-based trader.
14Skewed random matching: The payoff of a dishonest relationship-based trader is given as
P (HIpairsDR)(t)(c + h) + (1    P (HI   type)(t))m, where P (HIpairsDR) is its probability of being
paired by an HI-type trader. The payoff of a dishonest impersonal trader is given as P (HIpairsDI)(t)(c + h)
where P (HIpairsDI) is its probability of being paired by an HI-type trader. Now, in uniform random match-
ing, P (HIpairsDR) = P (HIpairsDI) = pHI . If there is a skew where impersonal traders are more likely
to be paired with other impersonal traders, then the condition under which impersonal orientation is favored over
relationship-based trade by a dishonest trader is if P (HIpairsDR) is quite low compared to P (HIpairsDI), i.e.
P (HIpairsDR)
P (HIpairsDI) <
c+h m/P (HIpairsDI)
c+h m .
CHAPTER 2. EVOLUTION OF HONESTY AND TRUST 28
Figure 2.2: A trader transitions to a different ethical type with a rate proportional to the difference in average payoff
(⇡e) between types and the size of population of the opposite population ⇢ij(t) = wpj(t)(⇡j(t)   ⇡i(t))+. An
honest impersonal trader becomes relationship-based with probability ks on encountering a cheater (with probability
pD). An honest relationship-based trader becomes impersonal with probability ko on encountering an impersonal
trader (with probability pHI ).
of skewing where impersonal traders were only paired with other impersonal traders, then that
would mimic a pure simultaneous prisoner’s dilemma game, and honest impersonal exchange
cannot sustain in that scenario. The importance of uniformity highlights the critical role of the
interaction between impersonal and relationship-based traders, which creates the sequential set-
tings for exchange. In such sequential settings, honest and impersonal traders can thrive, under
a limited set of conditions.
I consider the case of pure random matching where pairing is uniformly random, that does
not discriminate between impersonal and relationship-based orientation. So, pD(t) = 1 pH(t)
traders are of DR-type that are dishonest and choose relationship-based orientation (and earn
c+ h on being paired with HI-type traders and g = m otherwise). So, average utility earned by
honest (H-type) (⇡H(t)) and dishonest (D-type) (⇡D(t)) traders at time t is given as:
⇡H(t) =
pHI(t)
pH(t)
⇥ (pH(t)c  (1  pH(t))h)| {z }
HI earns c with prob. pH , and  h otherwise
+
pHR(t)
pH(t)
⇥ (pHI(t)c+ (1  pHI(t))m)| {z }
HR earns c with prob. pHI , andm otherwise
(2.1)
⇡D(t) = pHI(t)(c+ h) + (1  pHI(t))m| {z }
D earns c+ h with prob. pHI , andm otherwise
(2.2)
2.1.4 Evolution of norms (Honest vs Dishonest)
In each period t, a fraction w of the population review their norms regarding honesty towards
strangers, by randomly observing another trader from the population and comparing their payoff
with the payoff of the observed trader.The probability that the trader changes its norm i to the
norm j of the observed trader is proportional to the difference in the earned utilities of type j
and i traders, at time t, where if type i traders are better off than the observed type j traders,
type i traders never change their norm. Figure 2.2 illustrates this transition between D and H
types.
The evolutionary dynamics15 is given as:
15At the aggregate level the revision protocol can be written as: ⇢ij(t) = wpj(t)(⇡j(t)   ⇡i(t))+ where ⇢ij is
the probability that a trader with norm i revises to norm j(T = i! j), and ⇡i(t) and ⇡j(t) is the average payoff of
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Evolutionary dynamics:
dpH(t)
dt
=  dpD(t)
dt
= pD(t)⇢DH(t)  pH(t)⇢HD(t) = wpD(t)pH(t)(⇡H(t)  ⇡D(t))| {z }
H revises with prob. wpD⇥ diff. of avg. utilities
(2.3)
Equation 2.3 captures the idea that norm is a replicator, i.e., market selects the economically
“fitter” norm, unfiltered by any particular preferences of the traders.
2.1.5 Evolution of Orientation (Trust vs Distrust)
While traders revise their norms regarding honesty towards strangers, honest traders also revise
their orientation. Let at period t + 1 an impersonal honest trader become relationship-based
with probability ks on being cheated (paired with a U-type trader) in period t16. Similarly, let at
period t+1 a relationship-based honest trader become impersonal with probability ko on being
cooperated (paired with an HI-type trader) in period t17. Figure 2.2 illustrated this transition
between HI and HR-types. So behavioural dynamics is given as:
behavioural dynamics:
dpHI(t)
dt
= kopHR(t)pHI(t)| {z }
HR turns HI with prob. kopHI
  kspHI(t)pD(t)| {z }
HI turns HR with prob. kspD
+
pHI(t)
pH(t)
dpH(t)
dt| {z }
new H turns HI with prob. fHI =
pHI (t)
pH (t)
(2.4)
Note that in the economy, unlike norm that is replicated only occasionally, the orientation of
honest traders is a transient choice that traders make each period based on their experience. So
orientation is a behavioural rather than an evolutionary trait because honest traders would fre-
quently alternate between being impersonal and relationship-based on their on-the-go estimate
of the market environment.
2.1.6 The Relationship-Based and Impersonal Equilibria
The model developed has the following features that are suitable for studying impersonal ex-
changes:
• Firstly, being a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma between strangers, the model is more con-
servative and does not consider regulating mechanisms like reputation and punishment.
the traders with norm i and j at time t. When w is small it implies switching between honest and dishonest norms is
uncommon. The pairwise imitation protocol (Sandholm 2015) implies that rate of diffusion of norms is proportional
to relative payoff. The proportionality constant w > 0 can be interpreted to regulate the timescale of imitation.
16Skepticism: Among honest traders, impersonal (HI-type) traders become relationship-based (HR-type) traders
if they estimate that the number of dishonest traders in the population is large. Clearly in any learning protocol
that an honest impersonal trader has, an experience of dishonest exchange increases the estimate and may change
impersonal trader’s orientation.
17Optimism: Among honest traders, relationship-based (HR-type) traders become impersonal (HI-type) if they
estimate that the number of dishonest traders in population is small. Clearly, in any learning protocol that an honest
relationship-based trader has, an experience of honest exchange decreases the estimate and may change relationship-
based trader’s orientation.
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The model focuses on generalized trust in strangers- an important aspect of impersonal
market exchanges (Fafchamps 2011, Macy & Skvoretz 1998).
• Secondly, unlike existing models the model does not consider values of prosociality
(Tabellini 2008b, Greif & Tabellini 2017, Bisin & Verdier 2017) to be of intrinsic utility
that supports cooperation. Accordingly, all traders, with their norms, attempt to maximize
their material payoffs.
• Thirdly, the voluntary prisoner’s dilemma setup can study the choice between
the relationship-based and impersonal exchanges so highlighting the dynamics of
relationship-based vs. impersonal exchange, an important aspect in understanding struc-
tural transitions (Fafchamps 2011, Ogilvie 2011, Greif & Tabellini 2017, Macy &
Skvoretz 1998).
• Fourthly, by using an evolutionary model where traders make decision on-the-go as condi-
tions evolve, I can understand the evolution of norms in large population more realistically
where all traders operate in a market with competing norms. In the model, traders are cal-
ibrating both their norms as well as their orientation based on the conditions available
to them, and so we can understand their behaviour both in equilibrium and in phases of
transition.
Given the dynamics in Equations 2.3 and 2.4, we have Proposition 118.
Proposition 1 There exist two sets of stable equilibria:
1. Relationship-based Equilibrium: pH 2 [0, pcrH ) and pHI = 0, represents a non-
asymptotic equilibrium where pcrH =
ks
ks+ko
.
2. Impersonal Equilibrium: pH = 1  kohks(c m) kom and pHI = 1 
(ko+ks)h
ks(c m) kom represents
an asymptotic equilibrium if w < w¯ where w¯ = ksc (ks+ko)mh(c fHI(c m)) and fHI =
pHI
pH
; distinct
from (i) if ksko+ks >
h+m
c .
3. Condition for Transition: If system is close to equilibrium (1) i.e. pHI(0) ! 0, and
pH(0) > pcrH when p
cr
H >
h+m
c and w < wˆ the system converges to the asymptotic
equilibrium (2), and (1) otherwise.
Figure 2.3 plots the movement of population with given level of honesty (pH ) and trust
(pHI ). There are four regions that emerge from partitioning by curves dpHdt = 0 and
dpHI
dt = 0.
In region 1, the level of honesty in the population is high, but there is some level of distrust. Such
level of healthy distrust in an honest economy increases the levels of honesty (p0H > 0) and trust
(p0HI > 0). In region 2, the level of honesty and trust are both high, and there is little distrust or
caution in the population. A lack of healthy distrust in an honest economy decreases the levels
of honesty (p0H < 0) (while trust (p
0
HI > 0) increases) as instances of cheating increase. In
region 3, the level of honesty is low, and relatively the level of trust is high. A lack of distrust
18The proof of Proposition 1 is given in appendix C.1. Section B simulates the model impersonal economy,
showing a shift from relationship-based to impersonal equilibrium, when condition for transition is favorable (Figure
B.2).
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Figure 2.3: The graph plots the movement of population with given level of honesty (pH ) and trust (pHI ), as
described by Proposition 1, with the relationship-based equilibrium (pH 2 [0, pcrH ) and pHI = 0), and the impersonal
equilibrium (where curves dpHdt = 0 and
dpHI
dt = 0 intersect). In region 1,
dpH
dt ,
dpHI
dt > 0 (green); in region 2,
dpH
dt < 0,
dpHI
dt > 0 (mixed); in region 3,
dpH
dt ,
dpHI
dt < 0 (red); and in region 4,
dpH
dt > 0,
dpHI
dt < 0 (mixed). The
path curve plots a path through which relationship-based economy moves to an impersonal economy. For illustration
w < wˆ is large so that a spiral convergence to impersonal equilibrium is illustrated.
in a relatively dishonest economy creates instances of cheating, and both honesty (p0H < 0) and
trust (p0HI < 0) decrease as a result. In region 4, there are intermediate levels of honesty and
the level of trust is low. A presence of a healthy level of distrust in a relatively honest economy
increases the level of honesty (p0H > 0) (while trust (p
0
HI < 0) decreases). A population where
pHI ! 0 and pH(0) > pcrH (path curve), the population can move to the impersonal equilibrium,
under favorable conditions defined in Proposition 1 which will be discussed in greater detail in
next section 2.2.
As honest traders make on-the-go decisions regarding their choice of orientation (i.e., their
orientation is not sticky unlike norms), based on experience, common biases like anecdotal
thinking or aversion to risky exchanges, can affect the choice of orientation. The result of
Proposition 1 holds regardless of nature of ko and ks. I will motivate the theory using the
framework of risk aversion to highlight the importance of skepticism (a high ks) (i.e., preference
for non-risky relationship-based exchange) for sustaining impersonal exchange in the model
impersonal economy.
If H-type traders prefer steady income gained from relationship-based exchange over
the risks of impersonal exchange, they will be indifferent between being impersonal and
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relationship-based, if pHRpD =
(m+h)(1+ )
c m
19, where   > 0 for agents who dislike risk (or making
a loss). At the impersonal equilibrium (2), ksko =
pHR
pD
, and so equilibrium (2) is supported and
H-type traders are indifferent if ks = ↵(m + h)(1 +  ) and ko = ↵(c  m) (where ↵ is any
constant of proportionality). So,
pcrH =
(1 +  )(m+ h)
c+  m+ (1 +  )h
. (2.5)
2.2 Theory: The two conditions
The impersonal economy developed in section 2.1 can be viewed as a race between dishonest
and honest norms towards strangers. So, the norms evolutionarily compete (Mokyr 2016) and
attempt to contagiously diffuse (Shiller 2017) in a competitive market. How do norms of hon-
esty and dishonesty fare against each other? Proposition 1 shows that there exist two stable
equilibria. In the first equilibrium, the population is dominated by traders who are dishonest to
strangers, and all traders participate in the relationship-based exchange, and so the population
of impersonal traders is 0 (pHI = 0). Before the sixteenth century in Low Countries and Eng-
land and rest of Europe until later, socio-economic exchange resembled the relationship-based
equilibrium. Here exchange was confined within exclusionary and relationship-based networks,
dominated by merchant guilds that wielded considerable self-serving economic and political
power (Ogilvie 2011).
The second equilibrium is a polymorphic equilibrium where a positive population of imper-
sonal traders exists (pHI > 0) and honest traders alternate between impersonal and relationship-
based exchange and coexist with the dishonest relationship-based traders. The equilibrium can
be called the equilibrium of impersonal exchange. In impersonal equilibrium impersonal ex-
changes between strangers are possible, but dishonest traders invade an entirely honest and trust-
ing economy, and only a polymorphic equilibrium exists (see section 2.2.3). In post sixteenth-
century, traders in Low Countries and England began to exchange in impersonal markets outside
of their traditional networks, and this resembled the equilibrium of impersonal exchange.
2.2.1 Impersonal Exchange Sustains under Favorable Incentives and Institutions
Proposition 1 shows that the equilibrium of impersonal exchange would not exist, unless
the benefits from the impersonal exchange (c) considerably outweigh the benefits from non-
exchange (m), and the loss of being cheated (h). It was also found that:
• the polymorphic equilibrium will fail to sustain itself unless honest traders have a be-
havioural dislike (  > 0) for risky exchanges and so overreact to an experience of cheating
and withdraw from the impersonal exchange and turn skeptical and relationship-based.
• also, if the rate of revision of norms is large (w   wˆ) and norms change rapidly, then
Proposition 1 shows that impersonal equilibrium does not sustain itself.
19Honest traders are indifferent between being impersonal or relationship-based if their income from being im-
personal (pHc   pDh) equals the income from being relationship-based (pHIc + (1   pHI)m), where h denotes
loss payoff perceived by cautious traders.
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It is assumed from now on that rate of revision of norms is small enough (w < wˆ) so that
multiple equilibria exist.The conditions supporting impersonal equilibrium can be formalized as
Corollary 1 of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 If c > 1+   h+m (utility condition), then two equilibria exist. In relationship-based
equilibrium pHI = 0 and in impersonal equilibrium pHI > 0. Otherwise only relationship-
based equilibrium exists. Utility condition is never satisfied if   = 0, and the equilibrium does
not exist if w   wˆ.
For historical cases some observations from Corollary 1 are useful:
• If general contract enforcement in an economy is perfect such that h = 0 then, not sur-
prisingly, as long as the payoff from the impersonal exchange (c) is higher than from
traditional relationship-based exchange (m), such an impersonal exchange is sustainable.
• If payoff from impersonal exchange (c) is not highly lucrative compared to payoff through
traditional relationship-based arrangements (m) and/or potential loss because of cheating
in impersonal setting (h) was considerably high because of poor general contract enforce-
ment then impersonal equilibrium is not sustainable20.
For impersonal equilibrium to be sustainable (i) benefits from impersonal exchange (c)
should be highly lucrative (ii) payoff from traditional relationship-based arrangements (m)
should be relatively low and (iii) loss/temptation because of cheating in impersonal setting
(h) should be relatively low (but not necessarily 0) because of better contract enforcement or
because of significant gains from impersonal exchange.
2.2.2 Utility condition in Northwestern Europe
The North Italian city republics formed a unique form of non-kinship-based merchant networks,
called merchant guilds. The merchant guilds helped in the expansion commerce of in Europe
(Greif, Milgrom & Weingast 1994), but with time especially in beginning the of the fifteenth
century, they turned more exclusive and monopolistic (Gelderblom & Grafe 2010, Ogilvie
2011). In the sixteenth century, in the Northwestern region of Europe (Low Countries and Eng-
land), the merchant guild system began to decline, being replaced by impersonal markets with
more impartial and impersonal institutions (Gelderblom 2004, Gelderblom & Grafe 2010). In
the next chapter, I will discuss how the rise of these impersonal markets only happened in cities
on the Atlantic coast, in cities like Antwerp which were major entrepoˆts attracting outsiders
seeking business opportunities. There were significant benefits to trade with these relatively
unfamiliar traders (high c) at the Atlantic coast which helped in creating the utility conditions
needed for the emergence of impersonal markets.
While the sixteenth century Northwestern Europe may have had the favorable conditions for
the emergence of more impersonal exchange, some pertinent questions emerge: Why did not
impersonal trade emerge in the Iberian peninsula which also had access to the Atlantic coast?
20Consider the simulation exercise in Figure B.4 where a population dominated by honest and impersonal (HI-
type) traders, becomes distrusting and relationship-based, as c is not significantly larger thanm and h.
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Figure 2.4: The graph shows the movement of population across regions, such that under supporting utility con-
ditions too much trust gives rise to dishonesty (Region 2 to 3), which gives rise to distrust (Region 3 to 4), which
in return gives rise to honesty (Region 4 to 1) and eventually trust (Region 1 to 2). The X-axis represents level of
honesty (pH ) and the Y-axis represents level of trust (pHI ).
2.2.3 Relationship-Based Equilibrium Persists If Standardized Routines Do Not
Diffuse
When the utility conditions are supportive, a cyclic rise and fall of honesty and trust can emerge
in the modeled impersonal economy which is illustrated in Figure 2.4. This cyclic nature though
will be visible only for high levels of w < wˆ in the model.
The following is the cyclic nature of trust and honesty in the economy under supporting
utility conditions:
1. Rise of dishonesty: When many honest traders do impersonal exchange (Region 2 of
Figure 2.4), they trust, are willing to take risks, and are eager to make new deals (Kadens
2014). Such willingness to trust creates opportunities for traders to cheat. So, dishonest
traders increase (pD increases) and honest traders begin to get cheated.
2. Rise of distrust: As honest traders get cheated, they become skeptical and withdraw
from impersonal exchange, and they become relationship-based (pHR increases) (Region
3 of Figure 2.4). The skeptical relationship-based traders demand guarantees of assured
returns.
3. Rise of guarantees and trust: As the demand for guarantees rises, honest traders that en-
gage in impersonal exchange, and are eager to make new deals with them, can approach
the skeptical traders by providing them with guarantees. The dishonest traders cannot
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offer such guarantees to skeptical traders, and so they have fewer impersonal exchanges.
The demand for guarantees makes honest impersonal exchange lucrative (Region 4 of Fig-
ure 2.4), and skeptical traders also switch from being relationship-based to participating
in impersonal exchange (turn optimistic) (pHI increases) (Region 1 of Figure 2.4).
So, a contagion of skepticism and withdrawal21 if coupled with a reverse contagion of opti-
mism and participation22 under favorable utility conditions keeps cheating in check.
Cyclic nature of trust and honesty has been recently reported in the literature (Singleton &
Singleton 2010, Stevenson & Wolfers 2011, Gong, McAfee & Williams 2016). For example, a
textbook in fraud auditing by Singleton & Singleton (2010) describes the fraud environment as
a “swinging pendulum”. It describes how after the Enron and the WorldCom frauds, in 2002 the
pendulum was close to the extreme end of caution on the part of US companies, and auditors that
applied the stiffest requirements. But, the housing and the real-estate boom of the decade led to
increased fraud, leading up to the financial crisis of 2008-09, and a return of caution in markets.
Gong, McAfee & Williams (2016) develop a related model (where buyers need to trust sellers)
explaining this cyclic nature of fraud, along with providing additional empirical evidence. They
find that fraudulent offenses like counterfeiting/forgery and false-pretenses/swindle/confidence-
game have a non-annual cyclic pattern, unlike nonfraudulent offenses like assault and burglary
that have a distinct annual cyclic pattern. Similarly, Stevenson & Wolfers (2011) find a cyclic
pattern in trust in business institutions (based on Gallup polls) which follows business cycles,
which is consistent with the Financial trust survey by Sapienza & Zingales (2012) that reported
a decline in trust following the 2008 financial crisis.
But, rising skepticism does not always pave the way for rising optimism and honesty, even
if the utility conditions are favorable. Critically, in our impersonal economy if there are too few
honest traders in the economy, then the positive contagion of optimism gets dominated by the
negative contagion of withdrawal. This leads to a permanent decline in honesty and trust as the
economy does not (re)enter the virtuous Region 1 of Figure 2.4. So, for any transition from
the relationship-based equilibrium to the impersonal equilibrium to be feasible, there needs to
be a minimum threshold of traders who adopt standardized routines that reduce partiality in
conduct23. The result can be formalized in the Corollary 2 of Proposition 1.
21Contagious Equilibrium (Kandori 1992) is an equilibrium notion that sustains cooperation in iterated randomly
matched prisoner’s dilemma games where agents start to defect on coming across an agent with a strategy of de-
fection. Such a switching has a contagious effect on the population, and the threat of such contagious outbreak of
opportunism defers players from not acting dishonestly. While contagious equilibrium could provide a possible res-
olution to cooperation, but it is too vulnerable to break down. Extensions (Ellison 1994) that focus on the resolution
of such vulnerability rely on simultaneity, i.e., players stop defecting (a form of collective punishment), and start
cooperating in tandem. But, here again, achieving such a high level of coordination may not be practical in large
populations.
22Upstream Reciprocity: A growing literature has pointed towards upstream indirect reciprocity or generalized
reciprocity as one of the mechanisms through which individuals interact with strangers (Fowler & Christakis 2010,
Nowak & Sigmund 2005). Individuals are willing to cooperate with strangers if they have experienced cooperation
in the past (contagion of optimism). Similarly, they do not cooperate when they have been deceived in the past
(contagion of skepticism). This behaviour has been explained using behavioural-imitation (Fowler & Christakis
2010, Tsvetkova & Macy 2014) and gratitude or gossip (Nowak & Sigmund 2005). When expectations can be
observed, Reuben, Sapienza & Zingales (2009) found people reciprocated expectations and an expectation to be
honest increased honest conduct. Even when the reputation of individuals can be visible, compared to reputation
rewarding mechanism (downstream reciprocity) the mechanism of paying it forward (upstream reciprocity) has been
found to have stronger and more lasting effects in sustaining generalized reciprocity (Baker & Bulkley 2014).
23Consider the simulation in Figures B.1 and B.2 where in a population dominated by distrusting relationship-
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Corollary 2 Conditions for transition are given as:
• When utility condition of Corollary 1 is satisfied, and number of initial adoptees of stan-
dardized routines that reduce partiality in conduct pH(0) is greater than a critical thresh-
old pcrH ( , c,m, h) given in Equation 2.5 (threshold condition), then the economy transi-
tions from relationship-based equilibrium to impersonal equilibrium and pHI > 0. Fac-
tors that trigger the initial adoption will be called horizontal communicators.
• System stays in a punctuated and relationship-based equilibrium otherwise.
So, regardless of the external conditions, there is a necessity of mass adoption of stan-
dardized routines, and in the absence of such mass adoption, economies stay in the punctuated
equilibrium of relationship-based exchange. Punctuated equilibria are resistant to incremental
changes, and so are persistent (Gould 1972, Mokyr 1990, Romanelli & Tushman 1994). For
the sixteenth century Europe the theory implies that relationship-based guild centric economic
organization of much of Europe was persistent, and transition to impersonal equilibrium was
possible only if there was mass adoption of standardized routines that supported impersonal
trade.
2.2.4 Horizontal transmission and Mass Adoption of Standardized Routines
Mass adoption of new norms, ideas, and routines requires greater horizontal transmission be-
tween horizontal contacts like peers and intellectual/cultural leaders, and lesser reliance on ver-
tical transmission by parents, teachers, and superiors. Here, horizontal connected agents like
opinion leaders, focal institutions or peer-to-peer groups can act as horizontal communicators.
But, note that Corollary 1 suggests that horizontal communicators can only be persuasive in the
presence of enabling utility conditions.
When enabling utility conditions exist, significant advances in information technology -
that can enable a rapid horizontal transmission and adoption of new norms, ideas, and routines
- can catalyze transition out of punctuated equilibrium. During the sixteenth century, did Low
countries and England develop unique characteristics, that made such horizontal transmission
of standardized routines possible? In the next chapter, I argue that the high penetration of Print-
ing helped in the mass diffusion of information. Such information transmission helped in the
diffusion of practices promoting standardized routines, like the double-entry bookkeeping in the
region, that could have helped in the transition away from relationship-based guild equilibrium
to impersonal market equilibrium.
An important feature of the theory developed is that the norms should be sticky (w < wˆ).
Adopting and implementing a system of double-entry bookkeeping had some unique features
that made them sticky:
1. Training in Ars Mercatoria: Implementing systems like the double-entry bookkeeping
required training of traders in doing business with a set of rules and standards which were
to be generally applied in all business transactions
based agents, honest and impersonal agents emerge (pHI > 0), because the initial population of honest agents is
above the critical threshold. Additionally, Figure B.3 shows the cycles of trust and distrust, where the population of
impersonal agents rises and follows as discussed in the previous paragraph.
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2. Emphasis on Measurement: Implementing systems like the double-entry bookkeeping
increased emphasis on keeping records and measuring transactions (McCloskey (2016),
Chapter 29 and 34), which was especially true after the adoption of the Hindu-Arabic
number system in the late fifteenth century Europe (Durham 1992).
3. Increasing formalization: Trade before the emergence of impersonal markets occurred
through guilds that were informal organizations (Kieser 1989). Adoption of routines such
as the double-entry bookkeeping after the late fifteenth century helped in the formalization
of business.
4. Hurdles in bending formal rules: Traders who adopted double-entry bookkeeping could
conduct fraud nonetheless, yet, the existence of an overarching system of record keeping
process meant that a fraudulent trader was met with a greater procedural complexity as it
involved altering many “regular and predictable” formal organizational routines. This is
much like a businessman of an ISO certified firm nonetheless producing a lower quality
product, by not following the prescribed procedures.
These features of recordkeeping and adoption of accounting rules imply that the decision
of implementing double-entry bookkeeping introduced organizational routines that were sticky.
So, a trader who had implemented double-entry bookkeeping but also wanted to commit fraud
towards selective customers (which was common in the sixteenth century period, and something
the polymorphic impersonal equilibrium will allow), could not switch between the two modes
of doing business seamlessly (implying w is small). So, double-entry bookkeeping could reduce
partiality in doing business by embedding standardized routines that induced (most) traders to
conduct a standards-based business that maintained records.
Corollary 2 thus implies that two economies (Atlantic coastal regions: Spain and Portugal
vs. Low countries and England) with similar initial conditions can have divergent outcomes,
because of the ability or disability of a critical fraction of traders to adopt standardized routines
supporting impersonal trade. This could be due to higher levels of information diffusion in one
region (Northwestern Europe) over another (like Spain and Portugal) due to better information
technology (like printing press), that popularizes better business practices (like double-entry
bookkeeping).
In the past and elsewhere for much later, technologies that could mass diffuse business
practices did not exist. This limited the possibility of a sustained emergence of impersonal
exchange from relationship-based exchange.
2.2.5 Identity, parochialism and honesty
The model has assumed that social groups are meshes of relationships that are sources of steady
income (m), and agents make a choice between earning this steady income or conducting a risky
exchange with strangers. But, groups are also sources of social identity (Akerlof & Kranton
2000) and leisure. Chapter four of the thesis will discuss the significance of social identity in
greater detail, describing how social and state-sanctioned prescriptions about social categories,
can induce conformity to social prescriptions, and deviation from individual tastes.
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In the model economy, traders who conduct or are interested in conducting honest exchanges
with strangers may be perceived by their existing relationships and groups to be less committed
towards them (for not exhibiting prescriptions of in-group favoritism (Balliet, Wu & De Dreu
2014)) and more cosmopolitan. So, such impartial and cosmopolitan traders may risk being
excluded from specific group benefits by identity-based traders. One of the ways in which these
traders - who are honest to strangers, and form bridges with outsiders - may be punished is
through character assassination (Burt & Luo 2017).
A historical example of such exclusion in parts of India was the notion of kala paani or
“black waters”. Traveling to foreign lands across seas was feared by members of some Jatis and
communities, as they feared that travellers might deviate from prescribed community norms
such as about diet and lifestyle and get ritually polluted. So, reentry into the community re-
quired ritual purification, if not excommunication. In the model economy, this implies that the
traders who are identity-based and partial towards familiar contacts and stick to existing mesh
of relationships, may have access to extra benefits i and earn a utilitym+ i as a steady income,
higher than the steady incomem earned by honest relationship-based traders who are honest to
strangers and willing to conduct impersonal exchanges (and hence risk ritual pollution).
In the model economy, if i increases, it increases the population of dishonest traders, because
dishonest traders are earning extra utility i not enjoyed by honest relationship-based traders24.
This implies the following corollary:
Corollary 3 Increasing i, i.e., increasing identity benefits available exclusively to identity-
based and partial (D-type) relationship-based traders, reduces the scope in which impersonal
exchange can emerge.
2.3 Endogenous Emergence of Impersonal Institutions
Now that we have explored the micro-foundation of honest exchange in impersonal setting, we
can consider how powerful actors (rulers and elites) would react to it. We saw how relationship-
based equilibrium is a persistent equilibrium. So, conditions before the transition to an imper-
sonal equilibrium can be considered to be a stasis. In the absence of the possible conditions sup-
porting a transition out of the stasis, would rulers/governments support impersonal and impartial
institutions like impersonal marketplaces, networking venues, and impartial courts? Such open
marketplaces and institutions were developed in Northwestern European cities like Amsterdam,
Antwerp (Gelderblom 2013) and Hamburg (Dollinger 1970); while in cities like Lu¨beck open-
ing of markets faced significant resistance from incumbents (Dollinger 1970, Lindberg 2009).
Can the model impersonal economy help us explain this divergence?
I consider the specific setting of medieval and early modern Europe and introduce a ruler and
merchant guild elites as actors in the model economy. These actors (rulers and elites) could alter
the value of payoffs (m,h), observing population’s initial levels of adoption of standardized rou-
tines (pH(0)), and the payoff available in impersonal exchange (c). The ruler was interested in
24When i = 0, in the neighborhood of stable equilibrium where pD = kohks(c m) kom the relative benefit of being
an honest trader is increasing in pD . When i increases the relative benefit reduces as ⇡D increases while ⇡H stays
constant. This shifts the relative benefit curve in the neighborhood rightwards, and the equilibrium pD increases with
increasing i.
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maximizing its tax revenue, while the guild elites were interested in maintaining their monopoly,
granted to them by the ruler in exchange for revenue.
A ruler of a relationship-based system had a choice of removing monopolies of merchant
guilds and establishing institutions that supported impersonal markets, or of maintaining them.
If the ruler maintained merchant guild monopolies, then if at all any impersonal trade occurred,
it occurred in informal (unsanctioned) markets. In impersonal markets sanctioned by ruler the
ruler will improve law and order (reduce h), while in an unsanctioned informal market the ruler
would attempt to make it worse by punishing those who conduct such impersonal exchanges
despite the monopoly restriction (increase h). So, loss from cheating in the informal markets
(hi) was higher than the loss in ruler sanctioned impersonal markets (hi =  h > h).
At the same time, the merchant guild elites were the beneficiaries of the relationship-based
system, as merchant guilds were at the center of commerce in the relationship-based econ-
omy. Merchant guilds were the intermediaries/brokers in many business exchanges, and elites
could endogenously influence the payoff (m) from the relationship-based channels. If brokerage
charges of the merchant guilds controlled by elites were expensive, the payoff from relationship-
based channel was lower. I assume elites could set relationship-based payoff within a range
m 2 [mmin,mmax]. Under what observed conditions (impersonal payoff (c) and initial adop-
tion (pcrH )) would ruler choose to remove monopolies, given that merchant guild elites would
alter relationship-based payoff (m) to block such a transition?
To remove the monopolies granted to merchant guilds, the ruler must have anticipated that
impersonal trade beyond relationship-based networks would be feasible. As impersonal trade
was only supported under special utility conditions (Corollary 1) and in the presence of hor-
izontal communicators (Corollary 2), the satisfaction of the two conditions was a necessary
requirement for the ruler to remove monopoly privileges of merchant guilds. In the absence ei-
ther of the two conditions, 1) all traders preferred relationship-based exchange, which merchant
guilds dominated, and 2) ruler and merchant guilds elites continued their mutually beneficial
nexus, where a) the ruler provided monopolies to the merchant guilds while in return b) the
merchant guild elites provided ruler with revenue.
Merchant guilds elites would alter relationship-based payoff (m), to block the possibility of
transition to impersonal equilibrium in which merchant guilds lost all power. Also, the merchant
guild elites would prefer to keep a low relationship-based payoff for others, so that they did not
have to part away with their share of wealth. How much payoff would guild elites set to block
the transition to impersonal equilibrium?
When payoffs are endogenized, Proposition 2 emerges (see Proof in appendix C.2).
Proposition 2 Choices of ruler and merchant guild elites are:
• A necessary condition for ruler to remove merchant guild monopolies is when merchant
guild elites have increased relationship-based payoff to the maximum (m = mmax) and
if pH(0) >
(1+ )(mmax+h)
c+ mmax+(1+ )h and c >
(1+ )
  h + m
max. Otherwise ruler maintains
monopoly.
• If ruler maintains monopoly, merchant guild elites set minimum relationship-based payoff
m = mmin if pH(0)  (1+ )(m
min+ h)
c+ mmin+(1+ ) h or c  (1+ )   h+mmin. Otherwise merchant
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Figure 2.5: The figure describes conditions in which different systems of exchange emerge. The X-axis represents
the level of impersonal opportunity c, while the Y-axis represents the level of initial adoption of standardized routines
of impartial conduct pH(0).
guild elites setm 2 (mmin,mmax).
Figure 2.5 represents the different conditions. Proposition 2 and Figure 2.5 implies the
following.
• Monopoly and no reform: If, the number of traders who initially adopted standardized
routines of impartial conduct, was small (pmH is small), then unless impersonal exchange
(c) was exceptionally lucrative, traders were unable to trigger a transition to impersonal
equilibrium. So, merchant guilds could set relationship-based payoffs (m) to the min-
imum (exploit by setting m = mmin in Region 3 of Figure 2.5), as regardless of the
payoff traders would continue to rely on relationship-based channels dominated by mer-
chant guilds.
• Monopoly and reform: If payoff from impersonal exchange was high, and there was a
large population of initial adopters of standardized routines (pmH is high), conditions could
be favourable for transition even if ruler had not removed monopolies, as trade could occur
in suitable informal settings25. Under the above conditions elites would attempt to make
impersonal exchange relatively less lucrative, by raising the payoffs from relationship-
based exchange (reform traditional institutions by setting m > mmin in Region 2 of
Figure 2.5) such that conditions became unfavorable to transition once again. But, there
were limits to how much elites could raise the relationship-based payoffs.
25It could be that informal markets were risky and loss from being cheated hi was high, in which case impersonal
exchange is not feasible without ruler removing monopoly.
CHAPTER 2. EVOLUTION OF HONESTY AND TRUST 41
• Impersonal market: If (i) impersonal exchange became highly lucrative, and (ii) there
was large population of initial adoptees of standardized routines, such that the elites did
not have the resources to reform and raise relationship-based payoff high enough, then the
relationship-based institutions could be said to have become inefficient, and the economy
could then transition to the equilibrium of impersonal exchange (Impersonal market in
Region 1 of Figure 2.5).
In the sixteenth century Europe, closeness to the sea in cities like Antwerp, Amsterdam, and
Hamburg was favorable for long-distance trade, which made impersonal exchange lucrative, and
so closeness to sea could proxy for higher payoffs from impersonal exchange (c). Additionally,
the booming long-distance trade of the sixteenth century at the Atlantic coast could be the dis-
ruptive opportunity for such cities, that rendered guilds inefficient for reforms. In contrast, a
city like Lu¨beck did not enjoy the disruptive opportunity of the Atlantic coast and had power-
ful local elites who profited from the Baltic trade, who were willing to block any transition to
impersonal markets (Dollinger 1970, Lindberg 2009). Similarly, penetration of printed books
increased horizontal transmission of new norms, ideas and standardized business practices like
double-entry bookkeeping in cities like Antwerp and Amsterdam, and high printing penetra-
tion could proxy for high initial adoption of standardized routines (pcrH )
26. In such cities, there
was scope for impersonal exchange between “footloose” traders (Gelderblom 2013), and rulers
began to attract them by establishing more impersonal institutions, often ignoring the requests
of merchant guild elites for new monopolies. The next chapter will discuss these dynamics in
greater detail.
The insight provided in Figure 2.5 is not limited to medieval and early modern Europe
alone, and can be abstracted to modern economies as well, where economies trapped in punctu-
ated equilibrium of relationship-based exchange could also have exploitative elites/brokers (like
Mafia), in nexus with politicians. It’s only when suitable conditions exist that enable sustained
impersonal exchange to occur (presence of favorable utility conditions and horizontal commu-
nicators), that politicians improve impersonal and impartial institutions, and stop favoring elite
brokers who lose dominance in such an impersonal environment27.
2.4 Conclusion: Persistence and Change
In this chapter, I developed a theory of diffusion and sustenance of trust between strangers and
attempted to answer the following questions. Firstly, under what conditions do the norms that
26In the next chapter I plot in Figure 3.9 the 50 largest cities of fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe
(81 in total). On the X-axis, a city’s closeness to sea (which is measured as the inverse distance from the sea (Oppa))
is plotted. On the Y-axis Printing Penetration in the fifteenth century (which is measured as (PrintPentra)) is
plotted. The cities had varying types of economic institutions in the sixteenth century. Impersonal cities were
those where rulers no longer were granting guild monopolies. Cities undergoing reform were those where guilds
were giving concessions to locals. Relationship-based cities were those where guilds or other feudal arrangements
continued to hold dominance. One observes in appendix Figure 3.9, as expected in Proposition 2 and Figure 2.5, that
impersonal markets emerged in places close to the sea and with high printing penetration.
27A relevant paper considering nexus between economic elites and politicians is Rajan & Zingales (2003) that dis-
cussed the political economy of financial development, and provided a mechanism for opening of financial markets
where financial and business elites resisted such development as they would lose their dominance.
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enable impersonal exchange diffuse? I found that, when the impersonal opportunities are lucra-
tive (utility condition in Corollary 1), a critical threshold of initial adopters follow standardized
routines that reduce partiality in conduct (popularized by a horizontal communicator in corol-
lary 2), and identity specific benefits for partial traders are not too large (Corollary 3) then the
norms that enable impersonal exchange can diffuse.
Secondly, what stops cheating from flourishing in trusting environments? I found that cheat-
ing can be contained in trusting impersonal environments, even without private, third party,
community or social network-based monitoring and enforcement. This happens if the honest
impersonal traders turn skeptical and distrusting of strangers, and become relationship-based
on being cheated. As honest impersonal traders turn relationship-based, cheating becomes less
lucrative. With more relationship-based traders, the demand for guarantees increases, making
being honest and impersonal lucrative once again. So, contagions of skepticism and optimism
- that reflect the general reputation of a stranger - can keep cheating in a trusting environment
under control.
In the literature related to trust among strangers, papers that consider the evolution of gen-
eralized trust (Tabellini 2008b, Greif & Tabellini 2017) consider traders to be gaining special
utility (“warm glow”,“city orientation”) from honest conduct. In the theory I develop, traders
gain no special utility from being honest or trusting. Instead of prosocial preferences, in the
model, honest traders should be cautious and prudent (  > 0) in their market exchanges. When
  increases the number of trusting traders reduce, but, there is a broader range of utility condi-
tions (lower c) for which transition is possible. By not giving prosocial preferences to traders,
the evolution of generalized trust does not depend on changing intrinsic preferences, i.e., indi-
vidual traders across different equilibria have same intrinsic preferences.
Also, in the model trust is endogenously generated, in contrast to Guiso, Sapienza & Zin-
gales (2008a) model of transmission of trust between generations, and honest and dishonest
traders coexist in a polymorphic equilibrium. This polymorphic coexistence is dependent on the
degree of stickiness of norms, where if norms were revised very frequently (w   w¯) then this
equilibrium would not exist. Like in the models by Tabellini (2008b), Greif & Tabellini (2017)
and Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2008a), the presence of strong traditional relationship-based
institutions, which make the need for impersonal exchange less lucrative, makes a transition to
impersonal equilibrium less likely. When considering the evolution of cooperation, in contrast
to Sethi & Somanathan (1996) where cooperation is sustained through punishment, or to Ghosh
& Ray (1996) and Nowak & Sigmund (2005) where it is sustained by repeated exchange, here
trust is sustained by temporary withdrawal from trusting strangers when cheaters begin to domi-
nate the system. The mechanism is in the spirit of the voluntary public goods game literature by
Hauert, De Monte, Hofbauer & Sigmund (2002) and Semmann, Krambeck & Milinski (2003),
and to model by Macy & Skvoretz (1998) where agents maintain trust by having an exit option.
But, compared to Macy & Skvoretz (1998) in this model, the decision to engage in a prisoner’s
dilemma is dependent on the general trust traders have on strangers (reputation of a stranger),
based on their experiences in the past.
So, trust developed in the model is not an outcome of intrinsic or educated prosociality,
nor of private, third party, community or social network-based regulation. Here honest conduct
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competes with dishonest conduct, and the equilibria are an outcome of the competition. Also,
because of the set up of the model, it can capture the intragenerational transmission of norms,
ideas, and routines within a generation, which is as important to cultural evolution as diffusion
(Mokyr 2016) between generations.
Moreover, in this chapter, I developed an endogenous model of the emergence of impersonal
institutions. I found that, as long as the elites of relationship-based institutions were efficient,
they could block the emergence of impersonal exchange by reforming themselves. So, under
such conditions, rulers would prefer to be in a nexus with relationship-based elites, and the
economy will have a relationship-based system of exchange with inadequate provision of im-
personal and impartial (generalized) institutions. But, if elites started losing dominance, because
(i) impersonal exchange became highly lucrative, and (ii) standardized routines inducing im-
partial conduct became popular, the ruler could promote impersonal and impartial institutions
by opening markets, impartial court systems and improving law and order.
The model I develop relaxes assumptions such as a preference for prosociality, yet a limita-
tion of the model is that it assumes an anonymous nature of impersonal trade. In reality, social
interactions are indeed expected to be repeated, although it is reasonable to assume that there
are only a limited number of interactions that two strangers will have with each other. If inter-
actions are not one shot, but limited, the potential benefit c from impersonal exchange can be
considered to proxy the expected benefit from repeated interactions between two strangers. So,
the model I develop complements the existing work on trust and cooperation (Macy & Skvoretz
1998, Tabellini 2008b, Greif & Tabellini 2017, Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2008a, Sethi &
Somanathan 1996, Ghosh & Ray 1996, Nowak & Sigmund 2005), where relaxation of some
critical assumptions about vulnerability (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman 1995, Rousseau, Sitkin,
Burt & Camerer 1998) illuminates some previously unexplored facets about the evolution of
generalized trust and honesty.
Impersonal exchanges help broaden business exchanges and hinge on trust that others will
fulfill promises. If people’s attitudes and sources of information are tightly controlled, the mass
diffusion of new norms supporting impersonal exchanges may be less feasible, irrespective of
the quality of outside opportunities or law and order. In the presence of horizontal communica-
tors that help people mass adopt new norms, ideas, and routines of impersonal honest conduct,
change and reform are possible, where old less efficient institutions are dismantled, and new
impersonal ones are created. The historical evidence suggests that mere existence of right util-
ity conditions (like lucrative opportunities from trade through the Atlantic coast) is not enough
for impersonal exchange to emerge and sustain. There is also a need to support institutions
that can act as horizontal communicators of routines/norms/practices that promote impartial-
ity in social conduct. So, media (e.g., fifteenth-sixteenth century printing press (Eisenstein
1980, Dittmar 2011)), religious institutions (e.g., Bishops in twelfth-century North Italy (Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales 2008b)), opinion leaders (e.g., Muhammad in the seventh-century (Mont-
gomery 1961)), etc. all become critical players in building and sustaining impersonal economies
built on trust.
Also, the world today is once again undergoing an information revolution. Such a powerful
technology that helps in the mass diffusion of new norms, ideas, and routines (like blockchains)
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is not enough for the emergence of impersonal exchanges. Just like the adoption of ISO sys-
tems, or accounting standards are no panacea for deceptive behaviour in the market, the same
way adoption a modern ledger like blockchain may not suppress cheating behaviour in the mar-
ket unless such adoption of trust enhancing practices is supported by the right economic and
institutional (utility) conditions. The central question that we should consider with regards to
new internet technologies is, do the economic conditions provide businesspeople the right in-
centives to have uniform standards of behaviour, or are businesspeople incentivized to devise
ways to target and cheat vulnerable partners selectively? When the economy provides little in-
centives to conduct business with strangers, these technologies may merely become a front for
deceptive behaviour. In contrast, when businesses are incentivized to cast a wide net to attract
strangers, they are also incentivized to invest in standard practices of ethical conduct.
Chapter 3
How merchant guild networks declined
in Northwestern Europe?
[In the sixteenth century,] the guild-dominated societies of Italy, Iberia, and
German-speaking central Europe were unable to adjust to rapid institutional, com-
mercial and demographic changes of the sixteenth century. They lost out to the
market-oriented civic culture of the Low Countries and England with their increas-
ingly impersonal markets and impartial states, which encouraged forms of general-
ized trust that favoured adaptation and growth. The weakening of the particularized
trust generated by associative institutions such as merchant guilds created inter-
stices in English and Dutch society within which people could experiment with
generalized trust in strangers mediated by impersonal markets and impartial states.
This cannot be regarded as an accident. - Ogilvie (2011)
In the previous chapter, I developed a theoretical model, to exhibit how impersonal
economies do not emerge spontaneously, and that embedded relationship-based institutions are
resistant to change in a wide range of condition. As in tightly knit networks, the sources of
information and opportunity may be limited (Burt 1995) it may limit the growth of commerce1.
In this chapter, I explore how impersonal exchange emerged in the deeply embedded economies
of medieval and early modern Europe which were organized around the multiplex ties of the
merchant guild networks (Greif, Milgrom & Weingast 1994, Ogilvie 2011).
Understanding why do business organizations and networks look the way they do remains
an open puzzle (Stuart & Sorenson 2007). The period of the late fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
tury is appropriate for answering the puzzle as it was a period of significant changes in the
socioeconomic organization of Europe. In the late fifteenth and sixteenth century the Iberian
1For example in India, a lack of trust in outsiders may limit the growth of family firms, as they grow proportional
to the number of male family members (Bloom et al. 2013). Across Europe, lower regional trust is associated with
lower external sourcing, which leads to poorer firm performance (Vanneste & Gulati 2018). In Italian regions that
have lower social capital, households may make fewer investments in stocks or receive less credit (Guiso, Sapienza
& Zingales 2004), and firms may do less innovation (Laursen, Masciarelli & Prencipe 2012). In New York, embed-
dedness may increase the survival chances of apparel firms, but only until a threshold, and the highly embedded firms
may have a low chance of survival (Uzzi 1996). Similarly, in the Silicon Valley, a loosely linked team structure of
firms may have encouraged communication across divisions and organizations, giving them a competitive advantage
over the “autarkic” corporations of the Route 128 region, that had rigid boundaries and hierarchies (Saxenian 1996).
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Peninsula pioneered the discovery of new sea routes to Asia and the Americas; the Germanic
regions developed a printing culture that influenced knowledge production, religion, and cul-
ture; and the Renaissance ideas of Italy diffused elsewhere promoting rationalism and scientific
inquiry. But of all the places, it was the Northwest European region of the Low Countries and
England that underwent transformational change. In the region merchant guild monopolies de-
clined (Ogilvie 2011) and a bourgeois culture emerged (McCloskey (2016), Chapter 54), which
respected both profit and innovation (Mokyr (2016), p. 17) and conducted trade with relative
strangers (Gelderblom 2004). Cities like Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London became the cen-
ters of institutional and business innovation that facilitated impersonal exchange (Gelderblom
2013, Puttevils 2015) and these innovations have gone onto influence the modern world2. The
sixteenth-century transformation was followed by the seventeenth-century Dutch Golden Age
and the eighteenth-century English Industrial Revolution. What made the Northwestern Region
of Europe so different? The question remains a central concern in the social sciences, with
scholars from diverse fields (Weber 1905, North 1990, Harris 2009, Padgett & Powell 2012,
McCloskey 2016, Mokyr 2016, Rubin 2017, Jones 2017) researching the subject.
Several institutional and cultural factors helped in facilitating impersonal exchange in the
Northwest European region. The inclusive political institutions of the region limited coercive
powers of the rulers (North (1990), p. 130; Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2005)), and the
impartial market-based institutions of its cities began to serve the interests of all businessmen
instead of a particular few (Ogilvie (2011), p. 33; Gelderblom (2013)). The bourgeois intel-
lectual culture of the region promoted discovery, entrepreneurship and innovation (McCloskey
(2016), Chapter 58; Mokyr (2016), p. 17), and due to its cosmopolitan business friendly popular
culture, profit making ceased to be a taboo (McCloskey (2016), Chapter 58).
Why did the Northwest European region develop these unique institutional and cultural char-
acteristics? Until the end of the fifteenth century, impartial institutions like courts and the police
that serve all parties generally - so ubiquitous today in the developed world - were not well de-
veloped in Europe (Ogilvie (2011), p. 187). In such a world without impartial institutions, trade
often was (is) relationship-based, customary (Kadens 2011), and conducted through networks
like guilds (Greif, Milgrom & Weingast 1994). A relationship-based trade through networks
of high closure reduced the concerns of information access and reliability (Uzzi & Lancaster
2003, Burt 2001). Merchant guilds were non-kinship-based multiplex networks that dominated
the European trade for a significant portion of the second-millennium (Ogilvie 2011). But, in
the sixteenth century, the merchant guild system began to lose its significance as more imper-
sonal markets, where traders could directly trade without the need of a guild affiliation, began to
emerge and the local authorities stopped granting monopoly privileges to merchant guilds. The
traders began to rely less on the networked and collective institutions like merchant guilds, and
directly initiated partnerships with traders whom they may not have known well. For example,
in Antwerp, the domination of intermediaries (called hostellers), who would connect the foreign
traders, declined. Instead, the foreign traders began to conduct such trades directly with each
2For example, one of the first permanent commodity bourses was established in Antwerp in 1531, the first
modern stock exchange emerged in Amsterdam in 1602, and the joint stock companies that pooled capital from a
large base of investors became a promising form of organizing business in London and Amsterdam by the end of the
sixteenth century and early seventeenth century.
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other in facilities like bourses (Gelderblom (2013), p. 58).
In this chapter, I study the emergence of impersonal markets and the decline of merchant
guilds in Europe during the sixteenth century. I survey the fifty largest European cities during
the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth century and codify the nature of the sixteenth-century
economic institutions in each of the cities. In the survey, I find that the merchant guilds were
declining in the Northwestern region of Europe. Elsewhere in Europe, guilds continued to dom-
inate commerce until much later3, although there were some reforms underway in the Milanese
and Venetian regions of Italy. What explains the observed pattern of the emergence of imper-
sonal markets in Europe, in the sixteenth century? Any explanation that I develop should explain
three trends.
1. Firstly, why did the decline of merchant guilds only occur in the Northwestern region.
2. Secondly, why did this decline only occur in the sixteenth century.
3. Thirdly, why did other parts of Europe not benefit from the same benefits that were trans-
forming Northwestern Europe.
I focus on the interaction between the commercial and communication revolutions of the
late fifteenth century Europe and argue that the Northwest European region uniquely benefited
from both the revolutions, because of its unique geography. I also collect data on fifteenth and
sixteenth-century factors like the level of urban clustering, the prevalence of medieval fairs, and
level of population growth.
3.1 The Great Enrichment of Northwestern Europe
3.1.1 The commercial revolution and the value of strangers
What can motivate a trader to seek risky opportunities beyond its close networks? Consider two
agents A and B in Figure 2.1, whose networks do not overlap. For agent A to be interested in
engaging in a risky impersonal exchange with B, the utility from such a direct exchange should
be high relative to the other possible exchanges through relationships4. Traders in cities that
were geographically suitable for long-distance trade, like entrepoˆts, would find impersonal trade
opportunities attractive, as these cities would attract unfamiliar traders who would come to the
city looking for business opportunity. Entrepoˆts across Eurasia, fromAntwerp to Venice to Aden
to Malacca, have been cosmopolitan hubs with diasporic communities of foreign merchants
(Harris 2009). The Atlantic coast was undergoing a commercial revolution with the discovery
of new sea routes to Asia and the Americas. Cities at the Atlantic coast became attractive
commercial centers enjoying high population growth, including in Northwestern Europe that
also conducted trade with the Baltic region. I find that all the cities where guild privileges
3Outside of Europe, business in India, China, and Arabian Peninsula continue to be based on kinship-based
networks of Jati (caste), guanxi (clan relationships) and qabila (tribe).
4Such an impersonal opportunity can be viewed as a form of structural-hole opportunity (Burt 1995) between
two unconnected agents. In long-distance trade, the trusted network of traders resembles the multiplex ties of a
merchant guild. If a trader A found a direct partnership with unfamiliar traders (like B) beyond the guild networks to
be highly beneficial, that would motivate A to engage in an impersonal exchange with B instead of exchange through
guilds.
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declined were at the sea and along the Atlantic and the North Sea coast. Moreover, all cities that
underwent reform (but did not decline) were within 150km from the sea port, with their average
distance being 67km. The average sea port distance of cities that did not undergo reform was
almost double at 125km.
While commercial cities close to the sea were natural meeting points for traders with rich
impersonal opportunities, not all commercial cities close to the sea developed extensive systems
of impersonal exchange5. Long-distance trade would involve trade in regions and markets with
limited information, and with partners/agents who could not be easily monitored. So, infor-
mational asymmetry and moral hazard made such impersonal long-distance trade difficult, and
guild system being a socially embedded system of exchange was suitable for mitigating the asso-
ciated risks6. So, for impersonal exchange to emerge, search costs needed to be low and traders
needed to feel confident about the reliability of risky impersonal partnerships. Improvements in
the availability of information could help in increasing such reliability.
3.1.2 The communication revolution and the value of information
Improvements in the information technology can reduce search costs and increase standard-
ization which can reduce high coordination costs of impersonal market-based (and non-
hierarchical) exchange (Yates 1986, Malone, Yates & Benjamin 1987)7. In the sixteenth century,
the postal system improved across Europe (Figure E.2). The postal system made communica-
tion between distant traders easier, helping in long-distance trade across Europe. The Northwest
European region did not have a particular advantage over other regions in postal communica-
tion. But, it had an advantage in early diffusion of printed books. The Northwest European
region was close to Mainz, the city where Johannes Gutenberg invented the movable time print-
ing press in the mid-fifteenth century8. Dittmar (2011) showed how the cities closer to Mainz
adopted printing sooner than many other regions of Europe in the first few decades of its intro-
duction. Compared to previous methods of information diffusion, printing press was a disruptive
technology that enabled horizontal diffusion of information beyond vertical transmission from
parents, teachers and other authority figures. So, trade-related books and new (or unknown)
business practices like double-entry bookkeeping diffused early and rapidly in the region (Put-
tevils 2015). Most saliently, printing accelerated the adoption of Hindu-Arabic numeral system,
which helped in the rise and popularization of more sophisticated commercial, accounting, and
5If merely the opportunity for impersonal exchange was enough for impersonal exchange, then the major ports
of the Indian Ocean should have also evolved the kind of trade that the Northwest European region developed in
the sixteenth century (Harris 2009). At the Atlantic coast, among eight major Early Modern port cities of Antwerp,
Amsterdam, Bordeaux, Hamburg, Lisbon, London, Rouen, and Seville, in only four cities (Antwerp, Amsterdam,
Hamburg, and London) merchant guilds declined. To understand the reasons behind the divergence, it is important
to appreciate the risky nature of impersonal exchange and the effectiveness of merchant guilds as a solution.
6Embedded businesses create more trust and enable rich information transfer between partners (Uzzi 1996, Uzzi
& Lancaster 2003).
7Such a reduction in coordination costs, like during the expansion of telegraph and railroads in the nineteenth
century, led to the rise of commodities markets in the United States (Yates 1986). So, if the information technology
improved in the sixteenth century, it could increase the confidence traders had in unfamiliar partnerships and could
reduce their reliance on the merchant guilds (or intermediaries), by improving their trade-related information and by
standardizing their and their potential partners’ business practices.
8Harlem resident Laurens Janszoon Coster is credited to have simultaneously invented the printing press with
Gutenberg, even though it was the printing press invented by Gutenberg in Mainz, that got successfully adopted
elsewhere in Europe.
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financial techniques (Durham 1992, Chatfield & Vangermeersch 2014).
A high penetration of the printed material in Europe reduced information barriers erected
by “guild mysteries” (Ogilvie (2011), p. 378)9, and improved business practices. I find that all
cities where guild monopoly privileges declined or that underwent reform in the sixteenth cen-
tury, enjoyed high penetration of printed material in the fifteenth century. Among cities within a
150km distance from the sea, the cities where guilds declined or reformed had more than twice
the number of diffused books per capita than cities where guilds continued to dominate. A city
at the Atlantic coast with about four times more per capita printing penetration in the fifteenth
century was one degree higher in the level of market impersonalization10 in the sixteenth cen-
tury11. Moreover, I find that in the Northwest European cities like London and Antwerp (where
guilds declined) there was production of many books related to Economics and related subjects,
which were being written in the local language. So, commercial centers of the Northwest Eu-
ropean region did not just benefit from the diffusion of commercial, mathematical and financial
techniques, but they also created a local demand for it.
The combination of both the commercial revolution along the sea coast, especially the At-
lantic coast, and the communication revolution, especially near Mainz, uniquely benefited the
Northwestern Europe (see Region 1 of the map in Figure 3.1). It began to attract traders who fa-
vored an impersonal market-based exchange over exchange conducted through guild networks.
Local authorities began to disfavor privileged monopolies (Ogilvie (2011), p. 187) when im-
personal exchange became more feasible and they started to provide facilities for impersonal
exchange. In the region, trade democratized (Puttevils 2015), as more people could participate
in business, and such participation eventually led to the rise of the first joint stock companies
like the Dutch East India Company (Gelderblom 2004).
Regions like Spain and Portugal that benefited only from the commercial revolution of trade
through the sea to Asia and the Americas had low levels of printing penetration in the fifteenth
century, in part because they were distant from Mainz and thus were late in adopting printing.
In contrast, inland regions of Germany and France benefited from the print revolution due to
their central location and closeness to Mainz, but they did not enjoy a bustling Atlantic coast
that attracted traders. Italy partially enjoyed the benefits of both- a dynamic commercial coast,
and high printing penetration. But, the commercial revolution at the Atlantic coast did not
disruptively improve prospects of impersonal trade for Italy (see Region 2 of the map in Figure
3.1). One reason for the failure of the Italian cities to tap opportunities through the Atlantic
was the region’s historical investments in Mediterranean trade and land trade with Asia. For
example, Venice enjoyed a monopoly over trade with Asia, especially in the spice trade (Tracy
(1993), pp. 26-28). In fact, one of the reasons for the interest of the Portuguese in an alternate
9Publication of such guild mysteries was “regarded as a violation of the censorship of guild mysteries’ vis-a‘-
vis non-members... As late as 1558, when the German merchant Lorenz Meder published his merchant manual, he
clearly acknowledged in the preface that he was breaking the taboo against making public strictly protected merchant
secrets’.” (Ogilvie (2011), p. 378)
10Market impersonalization: 0=Relationship-based, 1=Undergoing Reform, 2=Impersonal (Footnote 33).
11Atlantic coast and Printing: There were four impersonal cities- Hamburg, London, Antwerp and Amsterdam,
while there were four relationship-based cities- Lisbon, Seville, Rouen and Bordeaux as the major Atlantic ports in
the sixteenth century. The fifteenth century per capita printing penetration of these cities would stack as- Lisbon
(0.81 books per 1000 population (bptp)), Bordeaux (1.44 bptp), Hamburg (3.69 bptp), Seville (4.57 bptp), Rouen
(8.11 bptp), London (9.33 bptp), Amsterdam (14.29 bptp) and Antwerp (24.92 bptp).
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Figure 3.1: Map of 50 largest cities of Europe in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth-century (Bairoch, Batou &
Chevre 1988) based on the type of institutions. The figure describes the different conditions in the different regions in
Europe. The Region 1 in Northwestern Europe is the area that is closer to Mainz and also close to the Atlantic Ports.
So, it was uniquely situated at the heart of the commercial and communication revolutions. In Region 1, all the cities
with emerging impersonal markets were found. No other region won the double lottery of high printing penetration
and trade at the Atlantic coast like the Low Countries and England and winning of both the lotteries, I argue, was
necessary for the transition to happen. The Region 2 in North Italy is the area that is closer to Mainz and also close
to the sea. In Region 2, the cities undergoing reform were found where elites reformed to ensure impersonal markets
would not develop. Rest of Europe (Region 3) is made up of Relationship-based cities.The Label- Green: I1 & I2
(impersonal), Yellow: U1, U2 & U3 (undergoing reforming), Red: R1, R2 & R3 (relationship-based). Table E.4 in
appendix E.2 details the nature of economic institutions in each city based on historical sources. See section 3.4.2
for more details.
sea route to Asia (that led to the discovery of the Americas) was the domination of Venice over
land-trade with Asia. Existing maritime cities of North Italy and Venice in specific were so
invested and locked in the more traditional patterns of trade, that they didn’t participate in trade
through the newly discovered Atlantic routes. The Baltic entrepoˆt of Lu¨beck provided a similar
case of being locked in the historical trade with the Baltic region (Dollinger 1970), which in the
long run resulted in Lu¨beck losing out to its Atlantic neighbour Hamburg in trade through the
Atlantic (see case of the two cities in appendix D).
The above examples of the Iberian Peninsula, Italy, and North Germany show that regions
other than Northwestern Europe did not enjoy the unique combination of the full benefits of
both the commercial and communication revolutions.
3.2 Guilds and Markets of Europe
The craft and merchant guild system emerged in Europe, beginning around the twelfth cen-
tury. Guilds were dense non-kinship-based networks of organized and specialized artisans and
traders. Craft guilds engaged in secondary activities like manufacturing, while merchant guilds
engaged in tertiary retail and wholesale trade12.
12While merchant guilds began to decline in the sixteenth century in Northwestern Europe (Gelderblom & Grafe
2010, Ogilvie 2011), craft guilds began to decline in the later centuries (Epstein 2008). So, the sixteenth century
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3.2.1 Why are embedded institutions like merchant guilds so powerful?
Management literature has reported several benefits of embeddedness to businesses (Coleman
1988, Uzzi 1996, Gulati 1998, Fernandez, Castilla & Moore 2000, Kilduff & Brass 2010). Mer-
chant guilds also used to bring several benefits to the merchants in an era that was lacking in
formal legal institutions. Merchant guilds helped in the close monitoring of partners through
repeated interaction, and by the collective assertion of their rights (Greif, Milgrom & Weingast
1994, Gelderblom & Grafe 2010). A wide range of relationship-based mechanisms (private,
third party and community-based) could be applied by guild members to reduce cheating by
traders.
• Individual merchants could privately constrain a partner from cheating using reputation
and repetition-based mechanisms.
• Alternatively, a third party (like guild court) could identify and punish cheaters by im-
proving contract enforcement (or law and order) (North 1990, Milgrom, North & Wein-
gast 1990).
• Moreover, entire communities could enable impersonal exchange through the community
mechanism of community responsibility system (Greif 2006), as long as their community
identities were known13.
Guild networks also were valuable conduits of information for guild members, and merchants
would use their “guild mysteries” to maintain competitive advantage (Greif, Milgrom & Wein-
gast (1994); Ogilvie (2011), Chapter 9). Merchant guilds also helped in the development of
public goods such as warehousing and protective convoys that helped in trade (Gelderblom &
Grafe 2010).
Not surprisingly, because the merchant guild system functioned efficiently (for the mem-
bers) in the absence of reliable formal institutions, it sustained in Europe for several centuries.
In developing countries like India lacking in developed formal institutions, networked institu-
tions like caste still play an important role in business. Before the fourteenth-century merchant
guilds were probably non-hierarchical, voluntary and inclusive. But, with time merchant guilds
started to become exclusive monopolies, placing high barriers of entry for outsiders (Ogilvie
(2011), Chapter 5). There are two reasons for the high barriers to entry.
• Firstly, as repeated committed interaction was the key to the effectiveness of guilds (Greif,
Milgrom &Weingast 1994), uncommitted newcomers could behave opportunistically and
undermine the system. So, newcomers faced restrictions.
• Secondly, the newcomers also threatened the position of existing businessmen by increas-
ing competition. So, even the genuinely committed newcomers could be restricted to
enter the guilds as they threatened the domination of existing members.
factors (like the printing press) that could lead to the decline of merchant guilds in the sixteenth century, were not
causing the immediate decline of craft guilds as well.
13In the community responsibility system, cheating behaviour by one member of a community was followed by
sanctions on the entire community by the members of the community of the cheated partner.
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An example of anti-competitive restrictions was reported by Gelderblom & Grafe (2010)
who classified merchant guilds (in Amsterdam, Antwerp, Bilbao, and Bruges) on the basis of
the control they could extend over individual merchants. Their classification showed that up to,
and especially in the fifteenth-century, merchant guilds were no longer voluntary institutions,
and they began to resemble almost like cartels14. Given the influence of merchant guilds, au-
thors such as Ogilvie (2011) have looked at the redistributive role of merchant guilds, and have
provided an account of the close relationship (nexus) that developed between merchant guilds
and the local authorities. Gelderblom & Grafe (2010) in their analysis argued that the potential
to obtain rents through monopoly was one reason why the individual members were interested
in delegating more control to the merchant guilds.
Given the dominance of guilds in the market, merchant guilds were also a favored channel
for local authorities to raise taxes (Dessı´ & Ogilvie 2004). But, such exclusionary guild mo-
nopolies meant that large fraction of potential traders was left out. European cities, over time,
got divided into the prosperous merchant guild members and the non-members (Ogilvie (2011),
Chapter 3, 4).
The merchant guild system started to decline from the sixteenth century in the Low Coun-
tries and England. The direct reason for the decline was the change in preferences of the local
authorities. Local authorities of cities like Amsterdam or London in the sixteenth century would
no longer approve requests for monopolies by local or overseas merchant guilds (Ogilvie (2011),
p. 187). As monopolies of guilds were removed, trade opened up for other individuals interested
in trading. What motivated local authorities to stop favoring merchant guilds remains a puzzle
(Ogilvie (2011), p. 187). Moreover, why did the shift happen only in the sixteenth century and
especially in the Low Countries and England?
3.2.2 When is impersonal exchange a viable alternative to guilds?
In the sixteenth century, the Low Countries and England started to move towards impersonal and
impartial institutions. Traders conducted trade in impersonal markets, which were supported by
institutions like courts that served all parties. So, the period around sixteenth century saw two
systems of economic organization. First was the prevailing relationship-based system dominated
by merchant guilds where business interactions were limited to dense networks. Even when
guilds interacted with outsiders, they did so with the members of other guilds, such that if there
was any conflict, it was resolved between guilds collectively.
The second form of economic organization was the emerging impersonal system, where
the traders sought partnerships with unfamiliar traders beyond their existing networks. How
did impersonal exchanges occur reliably? Could local authorities, by establishing impersonal
and impartial institutions like courts, unilaterally develop impersonal markets? In other words,
were the two systems of economic organization just a matter of choice of institutions? Even if a
local authority could provide for impersonal and impartial institutions, it would not eliminate the
risks and temptations of cheating in impersonal business transactions, and the costs associated
with resolution of conflicts. Moreover, because these impersonal exchanges would be a greater
14Analysis of Gelderblom & Grafe (2010) showed a clear reduction in the control of guilds over individual
merchants after (not during) the sixteenth-century.
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concern among traders of different locations, it is not clear if a local authority could enforce
effective contracts between them.
Given the risks in partnership with unfamiliar traders, the partnerships would need to ful-
fill two conditions- Firstly these impersonal partnerships will need to be highly beneficial to
motivate traders to go beyond their familiar and reliable networks. Secondly, regardless of the
potential benefits of such a partnership, traders would also need to have confidence in entering
in exchange with unfamiliar partners15.
Utility condition
Social structure and networks are receptive to utility gained from networks (Kilduff & Brass
2010). Considering agents A and B in Figure 2.1, when will A be interested in approaching B
for a risky arm’s length exchange? Ogilvie (2011) (pp. 319, 320) pointed at the tradeoff between
benefits and limitations of guild-based exchange and wrote:
To be effective in detecting and punishing deviant agents, a merchant guild had
to be a non-anonymous closed network with multiplex internal relationships. For
a merchant network to solve agency problems through internal social capital, its
members would have to refrain from entering into agency relationships with out-
siders, against whom social sanctions could not be exercised. But closure imposes
costs by excluding commercial ties outside the network. Members of the network
would limit their agency relationships, forming links only with other network mem-
bers, even when profitable relationships could be concluded with outsiders.
If the agent A steadily gainsm = $10 from a relationship-based exchange (with familiar ties
or with B through brokers or guild networks), and gains $c from a risky impersonal exchange
with B (where there is a risk of losing, say, h = $5 if B cheats A), which of the two options does
A choose? If c is less than $10, A has little motivation to enter in an impersonal exchange with
B (ceteris paribus). This will also be true even for a utility c that is only slightly higher than
$10 as there is a risk of being cheated. So, for an alternative impersonal system of exchange
to emerge, and for a guild like systems to decline, the utility from the impersonal exchange (c)
should be significantly larger than the utility from the relationship-based exchange (m).
Reliability condition
A large utility difference between impersonal and relationship-based exchange can motivate
agent A to seek impersonal exchanges. But, the sustainability of impersonal exchanges also
15Market-oriented and Bourgeois values: Ogilvie (2005) pointed at the challenges and argued that markets in
regions like the Low Countries were supported by a “market oriented civic culture”, where traders could trade with
each other reliably. McCloskey (2016) looked at cultural attitudes of early modern English texts (although after the
1600s) and discussed how the meaning of the word “honest” changed from being a noble to being truthful (Chapter
25). She wrote “In English our bourgeois word “honest” once meant not mainly “committed to telling the truth” or
“paying one’s debts” or even “upright in dealing,” but mainly “noble, aristocratic,” or sometimes “dignified,” in a
society in which only the noble were truly dignified.”. Similarly, Sahle (2015) looked at merchant advice manuals
and argued that ethics were an important part of both Quaker and non-Quaker merchant advice manuals (Quakers are
a religious group that were credited to have high standards of ethics in business dealings) and emphasized “virtues
of honesty, reliability and risk adversity and warn of the same vices, particularly covetousness.”
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rests on the reliability of B. If Bs are driven by amoral familist norms (Banfield 1967, Putnam,
Leonardi & Nanetti 1994) such that they cheat outsiders, then even motivated merchants like
A that seek impersonal relationships may eventually stop approaching Bs after experiencing
episodes of cheating. So, a sustainable impersonal exchange requires A to trust in B despite the
vulnerability of being cheated, and for B to reciprocate A’s trust by acting trustworthily. This
principle of trust is succinctly described by Mayer, Davis & Schoorman (1995) and Rousseau,
Sitkin, Burt & Camerer (1998) definition of trust- “willingness to be vulnerable”, and was
discussed in the previous chapter.
What remedies can improve the willingness of A to be vulnerable to B? Firstly, access
to credible information about B can help A make more informed decision about whether to
enter in an exchange with B. Secondly, adoption of standardized procedures, like the double-
entry bookkeeping, can limit the frequency with which B can behave opportunistically, as such
standards can increase transparency and compliance. Malone, Yates & Benjamin (1987) showed
how improvements in information technology could reduce coordination cost in industries like
airline travel, by reducing search costs and increasing standardization across markets. Such an
information access and standardization can make activities like making an airline reservation
more impersonal and market-based, as they begin to rely less on intermediaries.
Given the challenges associated with the emergence of an impersonal system of trade, the
following conditions must hold true16. When impersonal exchanges are not highly beneficial
compared to exchanges with familiar contacts, impersonal exchanges do not occur because of
lack of incentives (utility condition). Similarly, if reliable trade-related information is not avail-
able and business practices that make trade more reliable do not get adopted, an impersonal
exchange does not occur because of high coordination costs (Malone, Yates & Benjamin 1987),
and lack of confidence in impersonal partnerships (reliability condition). This draws me towards
the first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 In the absence of utility OR reliability conditions, relationship-based (R) systems
like guilds are more efficient, as impersonal exchanges are not sustainable.
When impersonal exchanges are beneficial compared to exchange with familiar contacts
(utility condition) AND information access is improved, which makes trade more reliable
through better information and improvements in business procedures (reliability condition),
then an impersonal exchange is possible. But, the mere possibility of impersonal exchange
does not suffice its emergence. Embedded institutions like merchant guilds are responsive to
changing external conditions. When threatened with competition from impersonal exchanges,
intermediaries in relationship-based institutions like guilds may reform and make themselves
more competitive and efficient. To understand this, let’s consider Figure 2.1 again. Consider
a case when steady utility from relationship-based exchange through brokers or guild like net-
works were m = $10, while risky utility for A from direct impersonal exchange with B was
c = $30. If such a utility difference motivated rise of impersonal exchange, then in such a
case brokers in the relationship-based exchange may start offering a higher steady utility m
16In the previous chapter, I undertook a modeling approach to test this argument, exploring the conditions under
which impersonal exchange can evolve in the absence of formal legal institutions, and it studies cases where people
began to rely on partners beyond tribe, family or guilds.
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Table 3.1: The table shows the conditions under which different economic systems sustain and emerge. Low utility
condition refers to the case when difference between utility of impersonal and relationship-based exchange is low,
while disruptive utility condition is the case when such utility difference is too high for a relationship-based institu-
tion to match. Low reliability condition refers to the case when absence of information makes impersonal exchanges
costly and unreliable. Under low utility or low reliability conditions, only relationship-based (R) exchanges are suit-
able, while in presence of high utility and reliability conditions, relationship-based systems undergo reform (U), and
impersonal systems (I) emerge if the impersonal opportunities are disruptive (disruptive utility).
Conditions Low Utility High Utility Disruptive Utility
Low Reliability Relationship-based (R) Relationship-based (R) Relationship-based (R)
High Reliability Relationship-based (R) Undergoing Reform (U) Impersonal (I)
(if they could) to make the relationship-based channel of trade competitive. In other words,
the relationship-based institutions that benefit from lack of impersonal exchange (like merchant
guilds) may reform themselves, if in case the benefits from impersonal exchanges are not disrup-
tive enough to offset the potential utility from relationship-based exchange. One would expect
to see such reforms if the existing relationship-based institutions are already efficient and well
positioned in trade. This will be true if the steady utility they can potentially offer (m) is not too
low compared to that offered by impersonal exchange (c). This draws me towards the second
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 If the impersonal opportunities are large but NOT disruptively beneficial AND
reliability condition is satisfied, relationship-based institutions like guilds may undergo reform
(U) and make themselves more competitive.
There are limits to how much the relationship-based institutions can reform, and stay com-
petitive as an alternative to impersonal exchange. If relationship-based institutions could reform
themselves without limits, then impersonal institutions will never emerge, because relationship-
based institutions could always offer a service that was competitive to impersonal exchange.
But, under certain conditions impersonal opportunities are disruptive. Under such conditions
relationship-based institutions can no longer reform enough to keep themselves competitive in
to impersonal exchange. For example, the traditional taxi or travel industry can reduce their
prices to compete against crowd sharing based taxi or travel companies, but only till a certain
limit . If the utility difference is disruptively large (c >> m), relationship-based institutions
may make way for more impersonal institutions17. This draws me towards the third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 If the impersonal opportunities are disruptively beneficial and there is an avail-
ability of trade-related information and adoption of standardized business practices (reliability
condition), the relationship-based system becomes less efficient. So, impersonal (I) institutions
may emerge as a dominant alternative to relationship-based systems like guilds.
The different conditions and hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1. Did the commercial
and communication revolutions of Europe create the conditions in the sixteenth century that mo-
tivated the local authorities in Northwestern Europe to disband the merchant guilds and establish
impersonal institutions?
17The above discussion on the emergence of impersonal institutions follows the theory (Proposition 2) developed
in the section 2.3 on endogenous institutions of the previous chapter, and illustrated in Figure 2.5.
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3.3 Decline of Guilds in Northwestern Europe
The medieval European merchant guilds traded in temporary fairs, of which the Champagne
fairs of Northern France were the most prominent. In the thirteenth century, the Champagne
fairs declined as a trading place, when the local authorities began to exploit the visiting traders.
After the decline, the neighboring regions of the Low Countries began to attract the international
merchants who traded at Champagne (Gelderblom (2013), p. 14). The international merchants
eventually began to cluster in the emerging cities of Low Countries like Bruges and Antwerp.
The visiting traders began to trade with the help of local hostellers and brokers, who acted as
intermediaries between unfamiliar traders (Gelderblom (2013), p. 43).
3.3.1 The changing Atlantic coast
In the late fifteenth century, the discovery of the new sea routes to Asia and the Americas during
commercial age opened up the Atlantic shores for beneficial long-distance trade (Davis (1973),
Chapter 2). As the Low Countries shared a coastline with the Atlantic, the already booming
inland trade of the region grew further with long-distance sea trade, bolstering the region’s
(including England) position as the leading cluster of international trade in Europe. One of
the markets that soared in the early sixteenth century in Antwerp was of spice trade with Asia
and Africa by Portuguese merchants who would trade through Antwerp with merchants from
the Aachen area and South Germany (Tracy (1993), p. 28). As the region began to emerge as a
major center for trade of commodities such as spices, the footloose international merchants, who
would previously visit the cities for short durations, began to settle in the cities (Gelderblom
(2013), p. 58). This led to a large increase in the city populations as reflected in historical
population estimates. The new population would like to enjoy greater freedom and not rely on
local and increasingly influential brokers and hostellers as intermediaries for networking and
trade (Gelderblom (2013), p. 58). Moreover, observing the newly found opportunities in long-
distance trade, middle-class non-merchants in the Low Countries and England began to aspire
to enter the profession. But, they found the guild monopolies enjoyed by some merchants to
be restrictive for their aspirations to build new business networks (Ogilvie (2011), p. 188).
If the non-guild members wanted to trade with long-distance traders, they needed alternative
impersonal channels other than guilds.
But, the participation in impersonal markets was not only limited by the monopolized
guild networks but also by market frictions like information access and moral hazard. The fif-
teenth century was a period of underdeveloped impartial legal systems and contract enforcement
(Ogilvie (2011), p. 33). Economic information was opaquely available to aspirational traders,
as it was tightly controlled by merchant guilds (Ogilvie (2011), Chapter 9). Moreover, there was
uncertainty regarding the reliability of other traders, which was the prime reason why hostellers
and other intermediaries were so dominant18. The frictions of information and transparency
18Some of the long-distance relationships could be repeated which resolved moral hazard problems by creating
ample incentives for partners to trade with each other again. A repeated exchange was the classic way in which
long-distance trade has been described to have been organized by “individualist” Genoese merchants in contrast
to “collectivist” Maghrib merchants (Greif 1994). But, several transactions did not involve such long sustained
interactions. For example, new unestablished traders did not have well developed long-term relationships they could
leverage on to enter in long-distance exchange. So, many traders would have liked to build new networks, which was
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made making a large shift to impersonal interaction not feasible. So, the economy stayed in
a relationship-based equilibrium where traders lacked the confidence in unfamiliar partners, as
markets were of unknown reliability.
3.3.2 The development of postal network
During the end of the fifteenth century, just as Europe was undergoing a commercial revolu-
tion, it was also undergoing a communication revolution. The postal system was connecting the
major trading cities of Europe, including the Northwestern region by the end of the fifteenth
and the start of the sixteenth century. The development of postal networks at the end of the
fifteenth and sixteenth century was useful in expanding the circle of contacts, as it helped estab-
lish lines of long-distance communication. A look at the map of early modern postal network
in Europe, based on Giovanni da L’Herba’s 1563 travelogue (see appendix Figure E.2), shows
that the postal system was already well developed by the middle of the sixteenth century in
Western Europe, extending between Italy, Low Countries and the Iberian Peninsula, and criss-
crossing France and Germany. The map does not include important centers like London, where
there were private arrangements for letter communication19. While, individual post offices may
not have been established in every major city in Europe, but the already existing postal net-
work ensured that the service could be arranged for traders and cities in need for long-distance
communication.
In previous centuries an integrated European postal network did not exist, and it made com-
munication difficult20. So, the development of a pan-European (and international) postal net-
work enabled traders across Europe to seek and communicate with other long-distance partners.
Such a correspondence through letters was considered to be an important aspect of trade since
medieval times. Merchants not only wrote about “mutual business dealings but also ... infor-
mation about the wider commercial environment: sales successes, market opportunities, prices
of major commodities, exchange rates, commercially relevant political events, news of person-
alities and occurrences in merchant circles” (Ogilvie (2011), p. 372). Written evidence like
merchant letters became increasingly acceptable as proof in courts, including in the Low Coun-
tries (Gelderblom (2013), p. 83; Puttevils (2015), p. 101).
3.3.3 The horizontal diffusion of printed material
At the end of the fifteenth century, another significant breakthrough in information diffusion
was the invention of movable-type printing press. Printing diffused contagiously across Europe.
High levels of diffusion of books in London, Antwerp, and other cities in the Low Countries,
that got triggered in the fifteenth century, made best practices like the double-entry bookkeeping
and new information regarding trade available with the availability of printed books (Puttevils
2015, Chatfield & Vangermeersch 2014). The unique aspect of the diffusion of information in
the printing era was that the commercial information would mass-diffuse horizontally amongst
difficult in the absence of confidence in other unknown traders.
19In 1496 Henry VII granted the liberty to establish private postal service in London (Daybell (2012), p. 137).
20See Schobesberger et al. (2016) for a more detailed look at European postal networks in the early modern
period.
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peers, and not just vertically by parents, teachers and other authorities.
It is important to note here that Europe was not the first region to invent the printing press.
China developed a movable-type printing press at the beginning of the second millennium (the
1040s), yet despite the early start, printing did not become as popular as it did in Europe and its
effects on China were marginal. Angeles (2017) argues that this lack of adoption of the movable-
type printing technology was due to the differences between the European and the Chinese
script, as European script was alphabetic and its limited number of characters was suitable for
the movable-type printing press, unlike the logographic script in China. Moreover, printing
in Indian languages (which had a non-alphabetic Abugida script) only became popular in the
nineteenth century after the invention of lithography (in 1796), which did not require alphabetic
woodblocks (Orsini 2016). In fact, when the movable-type printing press was introduced in Goa,
India in the late sixteenth century by the Portuguese, Konkani texts (the local language) began
to be written in the Roman script as the Roman script was easier to print (Saradesa¯ya 2000).
Given these observations, it is important to consider the significance of the Roman Alphabetic
Script in helping the spread of Printing in Europe. But, printing did not diffuse equally in all
regions of Europe, and it diffused more in some cities than others.
Why did London, Antwerp, and other cities in the Low Countries adopt printing early?
These cities were some of the geographically closest non-German cities to Mainz, the city where
the movable-type printing press was invented by Gutenberg (Dittmar 2011). Dittmar (2011)
argued that the movable-type printing press was heavy to transport and difficult to build without
the small group of apprentices who knew how it was built. So, the cities closer to Mainz got
the printing press earlier than others in the first few decades of the introduction of printing (the
1450s to 1500s), and such cities were early to print books that appealed to merchants.
Diffusion of “Economics” books and Hindu-Arabic numbers
A look at the Universal Short Title Catalogue (USTC) curated at University of St. Andrews,
for books categorized as “Economics”, shows the Mainz centric diffusion pattern in the early
decades of printing (see Figure 3.2:
• The first book related to Economics according to the USTC catalog, De contractibus mer-
catorum or “On the contracts of Merchants” was printed in 1468 in Cologne by Johannes
Nider. For the next ten years, all the economics related books were printed in the German
speaking regions of Cologne, Strasbourg (1493), Basel (1475) and Esslingen (1475) (each
of which were close to Mainz), with Rome (1473) being the only exception.
• In the subsequent decades, cities in the Low Countries also began to print books related to
Economics in Bruges (1477), Brussels (1485), Louvain (1485), Antwerp (1487), Zwolle
(1488) and Gouda (1489).
• The French cities of Lyon (1488), Paris (1493) and Provins (1496) also began to print such
books, eventually. In the early sixteenth century London (1504) emerged as a printing
center for economics-related books.
• The economics-related books began to get printed in Italian cities of Venice (1503), Pavia
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Figure 3.2: The two way plot of cities between variables Year of first Economics book (source: USTC catalogue),
and distance from Mainz
(1505) and Bologna (1507) in the early sixteenth century according to the USTC catalog.
But, even if economics as a special category emerged only later in Italy, the volume of
printing of books in related categories like mathematics was large in the region, with
notably the book on double-entry bookkeeping by Luca Pacioli being printed in 1494 in
Venice. In fact, many of the commercial techniques being printed elsewhere in Europe,
found their origins in Italy, including commercial arithmetic based on the Hindu-Arabic
number system.
• While Polish and Czech cities eventually began to print economics-related books from
1522 in Wroclaw and 1525 in Prague, Spanish cities do not find a mention in the USTC
catalog.
Of all the European cities, Antwerp (107 books till 1550) and London (72 books till 1550)
emerged as the two major cities in the printing of books categorized as “Economics” (Paris
being the third with 53 books till 1550). The Northwestern Region had other important centers
for printing of economics-related books other than Antwerp and London, including Cologne
(50 books till 1550), Ghent (41 books till 1550) and Amsterdam (10 books till 1550). The
German, French and Italian cities like Strasbourg, Augsburg, Lyon, and Venice continued to be
important cities for production of Economics related books as well. In Antwerp, adapted works
of Luca Pacioli by Jan Christoffels, where he illustrated bookkeeping, were printed in Dutch
(Nieuwe instructie) and French in 1543 (Nouvelle instructie), and in English (A notable and
very excellente woorke) in London in 1547.
Just as the commercial ideas and business techniques were diffusing across Europe through
books related to Economics and bookkeeping by writers like Pacioli and Christoffels, another
fundamental change was occurring across Europe at the end of the fifteenth and sixteenth
century- the adoption of the Hindu-Arabic number system. Once again, printing press played a
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central role in the diffusion of the Hindu-Arabic numerals and the standardization of the Arabic
notation, especially of numbers 4, 5 and 7 (Smith & Karpinski 1911). Appendix Figure E.3
from Hill (1915) (p. 92) illustrates this standardization in German printing and woodcuts at the
end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth century, where numerals 4, 5 and
7 took on the modern forms that were already popular in Italy in the medieval period.
The commercial techniques and the Hindu-Arabic number system were also blending to
increase the analytical abilities of merchants. In the bookkeeping records before the fifteenth
century, there is little evidence of the use of the Hindu-Arabic number system outside of Pisa
(Durham 1992), home to mathematician Fibonacci, who popularized the Hindu-Arabic system
in Europe and wrote Liber Abaci in 1202 after learning it in Algeria. But, with the advent of the
printing press, the Hindu-Arabic number system began to get adopted in account books outside
of Pisa and Italy, and across Europe (Durham 1992). Luca Pacioli’s 1494 masterpiece, Summa
de arithmetica, also played a role in the popularization of the Hindu-Arabic numbers (Devlin
2011). Before the usage of Hindu-Arabic numbers, Roman numerals were the standard method
of representing numbers, and such a non-positional system restricted the range of arithmetic
operations that the merchants could perform. Even a simple operation like division was difficult
and involved usage of the abacus. In other words, the usage of the Hindu Arabic numbers and
arithmetic, especially in commercial settings, represented a significant (yet underappreciated)
leap in commerce21.
Effect on commercial culture
Trade-related information diffused through merchant manuals (Dittmar (2011)), and the new
techniques in commerce and arithmetic diffused through books. Such a horizontal diffusion of
information and new techniques through the printing press had a profound effect on European
businesses and culture in general (see Eisenstein (1980)). The effect of printing on the business
culture of Antwerp was described by Puttevils (2015) as:
Sixteenth-century Antwerp served as a training ground and test site for commer-
cial techniques and know-how as a result of the concentration of representatives
of all European traders in one city. Low Countries merchants showed themselves
eager students: they were trained by foreign merchants in Antwerp and abroad
(either Low Countries expats or citizens of particular cities), and Antwerp’s print-
ing presses - Antwerp was one of the most important book production centres in
sixteenth-century Europe - produced so-called Ars Mercatoria guides or ‘Doing
21Craft vs. Merchant guilds: Liberti & Petersen (2017) present a range of benefits of “hard” information, which
they call “information reduced to numbers”, when compared to “soft” information (see Uzzi & Lancaster (2003)).
These benefits in contemporary finance include a lower cost in information processing due to automation, and stan-
dardization, expansion of the market due to lowering of entry barriers, and increased transparency of durable infor-
mation. While printing press could help in the diffusion of such commercially useful hard information, its impact
could only be indirect on the diffusion of softer and more tacit knowledge. Such transfer of soft or tacit knowledge
required person-to-person transmission and was important for the effectiveness of craft guilds (De la Croix, Doepke
& Mokyr 2017). So, the disruptive impact of the printing press on craft guilds could only be limited in comparison
to its impact on merchant guilds. So, the introduction of the printing press in the late fifteenth century, cannot be
expected to cause a decline of craft guilds, unlike the decline of merchant guilds in the sixteenth century. Not sur-
prisingly, craft guilds did not a decline in the same period as the merchant guilds, and they began to decline after the
sixteenth century (Epstein 2008).
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business for dummies’. So, merchants from the Low Countries could easily pick up
information on Italian-style accounting, letter writing, mathematics, business tech-
niques such as the bill of exchange and languages. This training allowed them to
catch up with the most recent techniques, but it did not give them an advantage over
their competitors who were familiar with the same techniques.
Similarly Van der Wee (2013) described how double-entry bookkeeping was popularized
and taught in Antwerp and elsewhere (p. 331):
...the printing press made the considerable distribution of commercial manuals pos-
sible. Even amongst ordinary merchants, training in Italy or elsewhere abroad be-
came an established practice. So far double-entry bookkeeping had been limited to
Italian firms. During the sixteenth century mainly under the influence of Antwerp,
this technique was popularized and conquered commercial circles in Germany, the
Low Countries, France, England and even in the Hansa centres. P. Savonne, Fr.
Flory, and J. Ympyn were famous Antwerp teachers of the practice of double-entry
bookkeeping and published important manuals on the subject there.
Another manner in which printing impacted commerce was by affecting business corre-
spondences. Trivellato (2014) wrote about the role of business correspondence22 in the rise of
business between strangers in a cross-cultural context. She wrote (p. 17) that as “the etiquette
of business letters became ever more standardized in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
it facilitated fiduciary relations among strangers.” Describing the effects of the printing press on
the standardization of the etiquette, she wrote (p.185):
Generally speaking, if the invention of the printing press had a direct impact on
business correspondence it was primarily on the codification of the rules according
to which merchants ought to compose their letters... In the mid-sixteenth century,
instructions for writing business correspondence began to appear among the large
body of literature that goes under the rubric of Ars Mercatoria, which comprised
dictionaries, tables for converting weights and currencies, treatises about book-
keeping and other practical instructions for merchants, as well as more elaborate
introductions to the principles of merchants’ law, sweeping histories of European
commerce since antiquity, and a variety of eclectic pamphlets... The first such man-
uals were published in Antwerp, at the time when the city was Europe’s greatest
colonial emporium. Among these were Jean Bourlier’s Lettres communes et fam-
ilieres, a compilation of letters in French and Flemish published in octavo format
1576. Multilingualism and the small format were to become standard features of
this genre.
A notable aspect of early modern printing was the increasing usage of the local language,
especially in the commerce-related books. For a topic such as religion, Latin was the over-
whelming language of choice (more than 50 percent of all books categorized as religious by
22Trivellato (2004) discussed the role of business correspondence as an important means of private information
dissemination in Early Modern Europe.
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the USTC catalog were in Latin until 1550). Printing in Latin was starkly not the case in Eco-
nomics related books, where many books were printed in German, French, Dutch, and English,
and only about 13 percent of the books (mostly in Italy and France) were written in Latin. The
“Economics” books in England, Germany, and Low Countries were overwhelmingly written in
the local language. Luca Pacioli’s book Summa de arithmetica was written in Italian, while Jan
Ympyn Christoffels’ books on accounting were written in Dutch, French, and English. Such a
vernacular usage in the printed books highlights that the intended audience of these commer-
cially minded books were not just the highly educated elites, but also the common merchants.
Techniques of trade were no longer secrets as guild mysteries, because they were printed in
books and manuals on topics related to economics and other related subjects, often in the local
languages. There was greater learning on the art of trade, including in the teaching of standard
skills like double-entry bookkeeping. With a better availability of information, and with the
adoption of practices like bookkeeping, the reliability of traders increased, as courts also began
to accept paper proof as evidence. Gelderblom (2013) wrote about the role of double-entry
bookkeeping for monitoring of agents, especially in long-distance trade (p. 86):
Periodic comparison of the accounts of both parties made it very difficult for agents
to hide manipulations from their principals. This was obviously true for accounts
kept in the Italian style, that is, with double entries, but merchants from Augsburg
and Nuremberg, who applied their own, slightly different rules, were also able to
keep tabs on their partners and employees. Before 1500 the accounts of merchants
in the Northern Germany, France, England, and the Low Countries probably were
too rudimentary to keep track of more complex credit transactions and substantiate
financial claims in case of disputes. They started collaborating in specific purpose
partnerships only in second quarter of the sixteenth century- about the same they
adopted double-entry bookkeeping.
Highlighting the significance of specific purpose partnerships in sixteenth-century trade,
Gelderblom, de Jong & Jonker (2011) (pp. 32-33) wrote:
During the second half of the sixteenth century, merchants in Britain and the Hab-
sburg Netherlands began to explore new markets in Russia, the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, and the coast of West Africa. These ventures carried considerable risk be-
cause of violence at sea, stark fluctuations in supply and demand, and the difficult
monitoring of partners and employees trading in the distant markets. To manage
these risks, British and Dutch merchants amended existing partnership contracts
with additional clauses about the purpose and duration of the venture, the capital
invested by the partners, the division of work between them, and, for those who
contributed labor rather than capital, their share in profits and losses... This emen-
dation of the general partnership’s rules had become accepted practice in Antwerp
as early as 1537, for an accounting manual published in that year [Hoecke, 1537]
stated that “there is no difference between the rule of a partnership with specified
duration and without specified duration, except that shares are taken for a certain
period, and the revenue is calculated according to this share”.
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The printing press brought more transparency in information and diffusion of business prac-
tices and etiquette, refined by the arithmetic based on the Hindu-Arabic system. Such trans-
parency motivated a new class of traders to join trading in an impersonal setting. Increasing
pressure from footloose merchants and the rising influence of a middle class that was not part of
guilds, bolstered by (i) large benefits of trade at the Atlantic coast, (ii) learning of trade-related
information and new business practices, and (iii) more frequent long-distance postal contacts,
provided the favorable utility and reliability conditions for impersonal exchange to emerge and
be sustained. These favorable conditions motivated the local authorities to disfavour privileged
monopolies, and they began to build institutions for supporting impersonal exchange, including
development of impartial legal institutions that significantly reduced the risks of such a trade23.
In London, the livery companies found it increasingly difficult to enforce their economic priv-
ileges as the sixteenth century progressed (Ogilvie (2011), pp. 32-33), while alternate forms
of partnerships were emerging, like the joint stock company of Merchant Adventurers to New
Lands was chartered in 1553 with 250 shareholders. Similarly, in Antwerp24 merchant guilds
began to decline right around 1500 (Ogilvie (2011), p. 32), in Bruges only until mid sixteenth
century (Ogilvie (2011), p. 12), and in Amsterdam (as it was emerging as a major city only in
the sixteenth century) it never had merchant guilds barring in some specific areas of commerce
(Ogilvie (2011), p. 32).
3.3.4 Iberian Peninsula: Trade by Elites
Other regions of Europe did not have the conditions as favorable as in Low Countries and Eng-
land. Spain and Portugal had a long Atlantic coast and commercially advanced cities with postal
networks. Cities like Seville grew rapidly in the sixteenth century due to their position on the
Atlantic coast. But, printing did not penetrate deep into the region early on. Being distant from
Mainz, the region was not an early adopter of printing. So, the diffusion of printed books was
low with limited availability of trade-related information (guild mysteries) and business prac-
tices. For example, the first book on double-entry bookkeeping in Spanish was published in
Madrid in 1590 by Seville based Bartolom Salvador (Edwards (2013), p. 68), when such ac-
counting books in Dutch, French, and English were written much earlier by 1540s by Ympyn,
and the original book by Pacioli in Latin in 1494.
Given the traditional information barriers and reliability issues, guilds continued to be an
effective system. So, the local authorities continued to favor merchant guilds that held onto
their privileged positions in the economy, because impersonal exchange could not emerge as a
credible alternative to challenge the guild-based system of the region. In fact, many Spanish
cities competed to receive guild privileges in late medieval period (Smith 1940), and cities like
Sevilla further tightened their requirements (20 years residence) on who could undertake trade
in the city (Ogilvie (2011), p. 54).
23Fiscal health in some regions (England and Netherlands) further (through confiscation of church land in newly
Protestant areas (Ogilvie (2011), p. 188) ensured that they had enough coffers to risk the shift.
24In a relevant book by Padgett & Powell (2012), authors explore the various processes that produce novelty in
organization forms, and in Chapter 7 study how migration of Protestant merchants of Antwerp to Amsterdam led to
the blending of the commercial and shipping skills of the two cities to create new organization form of the joint stock
company.
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Figure 3.1 shows the geographic advantage cities in the Northwestern Europe (Region 1)
had over other cities because of their proximity to the Atlantic coast, as well as from the city of
Mainz. The Spanish and Portuguese cities, on the other hand, were close to the Atlantic coast
but were distant from Mainz (Region 3).
3.3.5 Northern Italy: Absence of Incentives
Northern Italy provides another relevant case in contrast to Spain and Portugal. The region had
a well developed postal network (Schobesberger et al. 2016) and it also had a high penetration
of printed books by the late fifteenth century, and several commercial books were being printed
in its cities. Standardized business practices like bookkeeping were well known, and these prac-
tices were being popularized elsewhere by the printing of books and sharing by merchant letters.
In fact, revolutionary financial innovations like double-entry bookkeeping were developed in the
region and diffused in the rest of Europe from there. For example, Luca Pacioli’s 1494 book
on bookkeeping was written in Venice and was adopted by Jan Ympyn Christoffels later in
Antwerp.
But, the opportunity for impersonal exchange in Northern Italy was not disruptive enough
(Hypothesis 2), as the region was already at the center of the Mediterranean trade and of land
trade to Asia. For the merchants in the Iberian cities, the Atlantic route to Asia (and to the
Americas) was an alternative route to undercut the domination of the Venetians in the trade
with Asia (Tracy (1993), pp. 26-28). In the region, trade-related information and standardized
business practices were widespread, but impersonal trading opportunities were large but not
disruptive enough (Region 2 of Figure 3.1). Existing elites could initiate reform that made
opportunities from the existing system more beneficial and averted the potential challenge of
the emergence of impersonal exchange. In the North Italian region, especially in Venetian and
Milanese clusters, reforms were going on during the sixteenth century (Epstein (2004), pp. 301,
308). Existing elites held onto their power in the regions (Ogilvie (2011), p. 53), but traders and
producers from the countryside, like the silk producers of village areas of Milanese Lombardy,
got more concessions from urban elites (Epstein (2004), p. 308)25
3.3.6 Hamburg and Lu¨beck: A diverging tale
In North Germany26, the relevance of sea coast on institutional outcomes is starker to observe.
Lu¨beck and Hamburg were the two prominent cities of North Germany. The two cities are
situated close to each other around the Jutland peninsula (see Figure 3.3), and both of these
cities were part of the Hanseatic league of prominent German trading cities. One key geographic
difference between the two closely situated cities was, while Lu¨beck was on the Baltic coast and
a Baltic entrepoˆt, Hamburg was on the Atlantic coast and would receive ships from the Atlantic.
Both the cities had established printing presses, although it was Lu¨beck which emerged as the
larger trading and printing hub. In the sixteenth century, the Atlantic-facing Hamburg (located
25Genoa, a Mediterranean entrepoˆt, which benefited from several medieval financial and commercial innovations
of Italy, was always a city without guilds with liberal requirements for earning a citizenship, unlike Venice which
although did not have guilds but imposed restrictions on who could trade using tough citizenship requirements
(Ogilvie (2011), p. 53).
26Appendix D provides a case study based on the divergence between Hamburg and Lu¨beck.
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Figure 3.3: Lu¨beck and Hamburg are located close to each other in the Jutland peninsula, and they acted as important
junctions of the traditional trade route of North Europe. In the fifteenth century, a competing trade route around the
Jutland peninsula, and through the Sound (Øresund) emerged, which threatened the traditional domination of these
two cities.
in Region 1 of Figure 3.1) became more impersonal and dismantled the monopoly privileges
merchant guilds enjoyed. In contrast, the Baltic facing Lu¨beck in the sixteenth century not only
continued with the merchant guild privileges, it further made them more entrenched (Dollinger
1970, Lindberg 2009, Ogilvie 2011).
What deterred Lu¨beck from becoming an Atlantic trading city like Hamburg? Due to the
location of Lu¨beck in the Jutland peninsula, it acted as a gatekeeper of Baltic trade and its
dominance came from the staples it extracted through land trade between Lu¨beck and Hamburg
(Bes, Frankot & Brand 2007). Lu¨beck was locked in Baltic trade like Venice was locked in
Mediterranean trade. To undermine Lu¨beck’s domination, Dutch merchants (like Portuguese
in the Atlantic) found an alternate route to reach the Baltic Sea by circumnavigating around
the Jutland peninsula and through the Sound (Øresund) (Bes, Frankot & Brand 2007). Given
the domination Lu¨beck had enjoyed in the now faltering Hanseatic trade system with the Baltic,
Lu¨beck tried to defend its dominant position in Baltic trade against the emerging Atlantic trading
system. In contrast, Hamburg became a participant of the emerging Atlantic trading system,
and like other cities of the North Sea (like Amsterdam), it attempted to attract the free moving
traders, who in the early sixteenth century were flocking the Low Countries, especially Antwerp
(Puttevils (2015), p. 46).
Rest of the German cities, as well as major towns in French inland, also continued to have
dominant merchant guilds despite high levels of printing penetration, as they were distant to
the beneficial long-distance sea trade, especially the Atlantic coast. Even Hanseatic cities like
Cologne that were at the forefront of trade in previous centuries due to the presence of navigable
rivers could not compete with cities like Antwerp or Amsterdam (and eventually Hamburg)
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which were better located geographically and acted as entrepoˆts for the whole North European
region. In the city of Augsburg (a major center of printing, and commerce), there was some anti-
monopoly dissent which was decided in favor of the merchant companies, arguing that private
interest and common good were compatible (Ha¨berlein 2012).
Considering Figure 3.1, in the sixteenth century; the Northwestern Europe with a high print-
ing penetration and an Atlantic coast fell in Region 1, which was favorable for emergence of
impersonal markets; Northern Italy with high printing penetration but no Atlantic coast fell in
Region 2, which was favorable for relationship-based systems undergoing reform; and Spain
and Portugal, and most of Europe, because of having either low rates of printing penetration or
poorer opportunities for long-distance trade, fell in Region 3, which had persistent relationship-
based systems. So, considering different regions of Europe, historical evidence suggests that
different intensities of trade opportunity and printing penetration led to different outcomes in
different regions of Europe.
Can we observe such patterns in the data collected from medieval and early modern Europe?
3.4 Empirical Study: Why impersonal markets emerged?
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
In the sixteenth century, different regions of Europe developed different types of economic
institutions. The story developed in section 3.2.2 and 3.3 and summarized in Table 3.1 and
Figure 3.1 suggests that an area was better placed to have impersonal markets or to undergo re-
form in the sixteenth century if the area enjoyed both, large benefits from impersonal exchange,
and high information access and diffusion of new business practices. Otherwise, the area had
relationship-based institutions.
So,the basic hypothesis can be expressed as an OLS model:
Inst1600a = ↵+  1Oppa +  2Informationa +  3OppaXInformationa + ✏a (3.1)
where Inst1600a is the nature of economic institutions in the sixteenth century in a given area
a, Oppa is the size of benefit from impersonal exchange, Informationa is the size of diffusion
of trade-related information and business practices. I expect coefficient  3 (the interaction) to
be the only sizable and significantly positive coefficient (Hypothesis 2). If in an area impersonal
exchange was disruptively beneficial (code it as a dummy dDisrupta = 1), then we expect that
area had a higher probability of having impersonal markets. So, we expect to observe a larger
effect of Informationa on Inst1600a in areas with dDisrupt = 1 (Hypothesis 3).
To understand the puzzle of transition, we first need to identify the nature of economic
institutions in the different parts of Europe in the sixteenth century. Secondly, we need to find
good proxies that can measure the size of the benefit of impersonal exchange and the level of
information access and adoption of standardized practices. We can then explore the relationship
between the proxies and nature of economic institutions.
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Table 3.2: The table explains the scheme adopted for classifying cities as impersonal (I), undergoing reform (U), or
relationship-based (R) in the 16th century.
Code Description
I1 A city that never gave monopoly privilege to particular traders/groups.
I2 Sixteenth-century impersonal city where monopolies over trade were removed
at least partially.
U1 Sixteenth-century city undergoing reform where while urban elites enjoyed
monopoly privileges, but they gave concessions to rural or non-guild produc-
ers/traders.
U2 Sixteenth-century auxiliary city close to an impersonal city, where rural or non-
guild producers/traders were not coerced to trade through the auxiliary city.
U3 Sixteenth-century city undergoing reform where specific details regarding
guild reforms are not documented at the city level, but region has been identi-
fied as undergoing reform.
R1 Sixteenth-century relationship-based city where merchant guilds have been
documented to enjoy monopoly privileges.
R2 Sixteenth-century relationship-based city where merchant guilds were nonex-
istent as the social institution in the region was documented to be was feudal.
R3 Sixteenth-century relationship-based city where specific details regarding guild
privileges are not documented at the city level, but their monopolistic nature
can be inferred based on other descriptions.
3.4.2 Nature of economic institutions, impersonal or not?
Merchant guilds in Europe were associated with particular cities. The German Hansa was an
example of a regional association between merchants, but even the Hansa was a federation of
different cities. What was the nature of economic institutions in the sixteenth century in the
largest cities that dominated Europe between the fourteenth and sixteenth century? Did they
allow for impersonal marketplaces?27 The largest cities of Europe provide a good snapshot of
the commercial life of Europe, as the largest cities would also be the business or political centers.
Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3 in appendix E.1 list down the largest cities of Europe in the fourteenth,
fifteenth and sixteenth century as listed in Bairoch, Batou & Chevre (1988), a historical data
source on city level population of European cities.
Looking at secondary historical information on each of the 81 cities, I coded the nature
of economic institutions of the cities, with cities coded as relationship-based (R), Undergoing
Reform (U) and Impersonal (I) depending upon whether a city restricted trade to particular
groups. The coding criteria are detailed in Table 3.2. I code a city as relationship-based (R)
if it provided monopoly privileges to merchant guilds, or if guilds did not exist at all, and
trade was restricted using other methods. I code a city as undergoing reform if a city was giving
concessions to locals and other merchants who were not part of the restrictive group that enjoyed
the monopoly privileges. Finally, I code a city as impersonal if it began to remove monopoly
privileges in trade in the sixteenth century and opened up trade for a wider demographic.
Genoa (coded as I1) was an exceptional city28, as throughout history the city allowed all
citizens to trade freely, with liberal requirements for citizenship (Ogilvie (2011), p. 53). All
27See Gelderblom & Grafe (2010) for a detailed discussion of guild institutions in cities of Amsterdam, Antwerp,
Bilbao, and Bruges.
28Greif (1994) modeled the impersonal nature of trade in Genoa as a repeated one-sided prisoner’s dilemma
game.
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Figure 3.4: Map of 50 largest cities of Europe during the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth century (Bairoch, Batou
& Chevre 1988) based on type of institutions. Label- Green: I1 & I2 (impersonal), Yellow: U1, U2&U3 (undergoing
reform), Red: R1, R2 & R3 (relationship-based).
other cities restricted who could trade in the city, and just a handful of cities in Northwestern
Europe were impersonal during the sixteenth century period (coded as I2). The cities undergoing
reform were found in North Italy and the Low Countries (coded as U1, U2 or U3), where guilds
eased restrictions on trade for locals without losing their monopolies. In rest of the cities (coded
as R1, R2, and R3) guilds either enjoyed monopoly privileges or else the system of trade was
feudal. Some special cases may be mentioned, for example, Nuremberg, which was called a
“city without guilds”, but was in practice an oligarchy that restricted formation of new guilds
(Soly 2008) (thus not being an impersonal but rather a relationship-based city according to the
coding in Table 3.2). Another interesting city was Venice, which although did not have guilds,
yet imposed several restrictions on who could be a citizen and thus trade (Ogilvie (2011), p. 53).
But, as Epstein (2004) (p. 301) recounts, Venice was giving concessions to rural representatives
in trade (so, being coded as a reforming city in the sixteenth century). French cities continued
to enjoy guild monopolies until the eighteenth century (Horn (2015), p. 224), and the partial
abolition of guilds in cities of Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon, and Paris happened only in 1776,
while other cities rebuffed these reforms. Based on the coding criteria in Table 3.2, Table E.4 in
appendix E.2 details the nature of economic institutions in each of the 81 cities in the sample,
based on secondary sources. Figure 3.4 maps the cities based on their coded type. Genoa was
always an impersonal city, and so I do not include it in the dataset.
Variable Inst1600a measures the level of market impersonalization in the sixteenth century in
a given city. I code Inst1600a = 2 for all impersonal cities with coding I2, and cities undergoing
reform with code U1, U2 and U3 have Inst1600a = 1. Other cities coded as relationship-based
(R1, R2, and R3) have Inst1600a = 0.
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3.4.3 Utility Condition: Sea distance as a proxy for impersonal opportunity
Closeness to the sea is a geographical characteristic where cities closer to the sea have natu-
ral advantages for long-distance trade. Being a long-distance trader in the relationship-based
system required extensive networks, which was especially difficult for immigrants, small and
aspirational traders. In such a scenario, if impersonal exchange could be developed, i.e., if unfa-
miliar partners could be trusted and relied upon, the benefits from such an impersonal exchange
was large as immigrants, small and non-traders could enter into partnerships with each other
and conduct long-distance trade. So, European cities that were close to the sea were suitable
for long-distance trade and can be expected to find a partnership with unfamiliar traders more
beneficial (Utility condition).
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2005) listed down 166 cities that acted as the Atlantic and
Mediterranean ports of Europe. I calculate the distance of each city a in the database to the
nearest Atlantic or Mediterranean port (PortDista) (see Figure 3.5). I also calculate the closest
distance from the sea (SeaDista), and for cities which were closer to Baltic Sea (Plovdiv,
Poznan, Prague, and Wroclaw) or were Baltic Ports (Lu¨beck, Gdansk, and Copenhagen) I use
the distance from the sea as a measure instead of the closest distance from an Atlantic Port. I
square root transform the combined variable SeaPortDista and invert to make it an increasing
positive variable (SeaPortClosenessa = constant  
p
SeaPortDista   0) representing
closeness to Atlantic or Mediterranean port or Baltic sea, to be used as a proxy for Oppa.
Mediterranean sea acted at the center of European long-distance trade until the discovery of
new Atlantic routes to Asia and the Americas, during the fifteenth century. For early modern
Europe, the discovery was disruptive as it opened trade in newer lands and of newer commodities
(Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2005). Cities that were Atlantic ports can thus be expected
to enjoy a disruptive opportunity for long-distance trade and be more likely to impersonalize
(Hypothesis 3 and Table 3.1) compared to other cities close to the sea like Venice and Lu¨beck
that were already dominant in their respective Mediterranean and Baltic trades. If a city was an
Atlantic port or it was close to an Atlantic Port (PortDista < 50km), I label such a city as
enjoying disruptive opportunity, and code dNearAtlantica = dDisrupta = 1.
3.4.4 Reliability Condition: Printing penetration as a proxy for diffusion of new
information
Impersonal exchange was not just limited by lack of beneficial opportunities. Information was
opaquely available, and there existed a general doubt about the reliability of unfamiliar traders.
Better information diffusion technologies could have helped as discussed extensively in section
3.3.
Printing was a disruptive technology (Dittmar 2011) as it reduced the cost of acquiring
information and triggered the rise of horizontal information diffusion. Unlike the postal system
that could easily diffuse (thanks to the extensive network) and be served by formal (the Taxis of
Europe) and informal (like the arrangement in London) arrangements, the printing technology
was not as easily diffusable. Commissioning of a movable-type printing press required experts
that were not abundantly available (Dittmar 2011). So, the cities that got an early head start in the
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availability of printed books could affect the access traders had to trade-related information and
new business practices. So, a city that had higher printing penetration in the fifteenth century can
be expected to have been better availability of information regarding trading practices among
its residents. To estimate penetration of printed material in the 81 cities in the database, I
use a database on early printing in Europe. There are several printing databases, with minor
differences. I rely on Gesamtkatalog der wiegendrucke (GW) database to build the database of
early printing cities and the penetration of printing material.
I would characterize a city in the GW database as a printing city if it printed more than ten
books until 1500 (see Figure 3.6). As books were not geographically bounded, books printed in
one city b were being read in another. For example, the book called Summa de arithmetica by
Luca Pacioli that gave the first printed description of double-entry bookkeeping was printed in
Venice in 1494, but it quickly became popular across Europe. But, one can assume that more
populous cities and closer cities would have better availability of books from a city b than others.
Could it be that some printing hubs were printing books with a target audience in a geo-
graphically distant region? Like German books being printed in Venice? Universal Short Title
Catalogue curated by the University of St. Andrews lists the language of printed books. I find
that a negligent proportion of books printed until 1500 were being printed in a language that was
neither local nor Latin. For example out of 3692 books printed in Paris until 1500 (according to
USTC) only six were printed in Dutch, the maximum for a non-local language. Similarly out of
3570 books printed in Venice until 1500 (according to USTC), five were printed in German, the
maximum for a non-local language.
I use a gravity model to estimate printing penetration in the 81 cities of interest. If one of
the 81 cities a with population Pop1500a and one of the 121 printing cities b printingBb books,
were having a distance dab, then per capita printing penetration in the city a by books from city
b, PrintIndexab = Bb
d2ab(
P81
i=1
Pop1500i
d2
ib
)
, where Pop1500c
d2cb
/
P81
i=1
Pop1500i
d2ib
represents the relative
influence (mass) of a city a relative to b. When the printing city was the city itself (b=a), I
normalise dab = 1. So, the total printing penetration in the city a because of all printing cities
(121 in total) was PrintIndexa =
P121
j=1
Bj
d2aj(
P81
i=1
Pop1500i
d2ij
)
books per 10000 population (bptp).
I log transform the variable to PrintPentra = const + ln(PrintIndexa)   0, to use it as a
proxy for trade-related information access and diffusion of business practices (Informationa)
(see Figure 3.7). I also count number of print cities in a 50km radius PrintCity50kma, for a
city a, and use it as an alternative measure of printing penetration.
3.4.5 Preliminary Observations
A two-way plot in Figure 3.9 between printing penetration (PrintPentra) and closeness to the
sea (SeaPortClosenessa), supports the basic arguments developed in this chapter.
1. Cities away from the sea: In cities that are away from the sea (closer to zero on the X-
axis in Figure 3.9) guilds continued to be dominant in the sixteenth century. Cities close to
the sea were the ones most likely to attract outsiders, and become cosmopolitan hubs. So,
in an inland city like Wroclaw, there was little benefit for traders to seek out impersonal
relationships, and the merchant guild system was an effective system already. In other
CHAPTER 3. EUROPEAN MERCHANT GUILDS 71
Figure 3.5: Map of the 166 Atlantic and Mediterranean
Ports of Early Modern Europe (Acemoglu, Johnson &
Robinson 2005).
Figure 3.6: Map of the 121 cities that printed more than
10 books in the 15th century in the GW catalogue. Size of
the circle represents the number of books being printed.
Figure 3.7: The PrintPentra measure of the 81 largest
cities in the sample. Size of the circle represents the degree
of printing penetration.
Figure 3.8: Map of 335 largest cities of Europe during the
fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth century (Bairoch, Batou
& Chevre 1988) with population greater than or equal to
10,000.
CHAPTER 3. EUROPEAN MERCHANT GUILDS 72
ALMERIA
ANGERS
AQUILA
ATHINAI
AUGSBURG
AVIGNON
BARCELONA
BELGRADE
BOLOGNA
BORDEAUX
BOURGES
BURGOS
CAEN
CORDOBA
ERFURT
FERRARA
FIRENZE
GDANSK
GRANADA
JEREZ−DE−LA−FRONTERA
KOBENHAVN
KOELN
LILLE
LISBOA
LUCCA
LUEBECK
LYON
MADRID
MAGDEBURG
MALAGA
MANTUA
MARSEILLEES INA
METZ
MURCIA
NAPOLI
NUERNBERG
ORLEANS
PALERMO
PARIS
PIACENZA PISA
PLASENCIA
PLOVDIV
POZNAN
PRAHA
RENNES
ROMA
ROUEN
SALONIKA
SARAJEVO
SEVILLA
SKOPJE
TIRGOVISTE
TOLEDO, Spain
TOULOUSE
TOURS
VALENCIAVALENCIENNESVALLADOLID
WIEN
WROCLAW
BRESCIA
BRUXELLES
CREMONA GENT
HAARLEM
LEIDEN
LIEGE
MECHELEN
MILANO
PADOVA
TOUR AI
VENEZIA
VERONA
AMSTERDAM
ANTWERPEN
BRUGGE
HAMBURG
LONDON
0
2
4
6
Pr
in
tin
g 
Pe
ne
tra
tio
n
0 5 10 15 20 25
Closeness to Sea
Relationship−based Undergoing Reform
Impersonalizing
Figure 3.9: The two way plot of cities between variables PrintPentra and SeaPortClosenessa for different
types of institutions.
words, the only cities where traders could potentially have benefited from impersonal
exchange, were those close to the sea, so that they could attract unfamiliar outsiders and
motivate traders to seek partnerships with those they did not know too well.
2. Cities with low printing penetration in the fifteenth century: Among cities that were
closer to the sea (on the right side of the X-axis in Figure 3.9), the cities that were having
low levels of printing penetration in the fifteenth century (closer to zero on the Y-axis
in Figure 3.9) continued to have dominant guilds in the sixteenth century. These cities
primarily included major port cities of the Iberian peninsula like Lisbon.
3. Cities not on the Atlantic coast: Among cities that were close to the sea and had high
levels of printing penetration in the fifteenth century (on the upper right corner of Figure
3.9), several cities loosened monopoly privileges (in the Low Countries and North Italy),
but only a few actually saw removal of guild monopolies. While both the Atlantic and
non-Atlantic cities with high levels of printing could be argued to have the conditions
that favored the decline of guilds, it was only the Atlantic coast where guilds actually
declined as the opportunities found in these cities was disruptive29. All impersonal cities
(green squares in Figure 3.9), except Bruges, were Atlantic port cities, and Bruges was
only 20km away from the Atlantic Port of Vlissingen (in previous centuries Bruges itself
29Growth of Mediterranean and Atlantic ports: Mediterranean cities especially of North Italy (where printing
was high) were more established commercial centers and arguably enjoyed more powerful guilds. This meant that
they were more likely to resist opening of markets and instead undergo reforms when they faced the new commercial
revolution at the Atlantic coast. One proxy that highlights the differences between the power of the Atlantic and
Mediterranean cities is that Mediterranean cities in the sample were having an average population of around 48,000
on an average in 1400, while the Atlantic cities were having an average population of around 38,000 (See appendix
Figure E.4). As guilds at the Atlantic coast held a lower clout in previous centuries, they were more likely to
decline than Mediterranean cities, and give way to impersonal markets as these cities found the changes due to the
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was a major port, but the port silted).
Moreover, I code the cities based on whether they had a postal service as per Giovanni da
L’Herba’s travelogue in 1563 (the earliest compilation of such a data), and find a small corre-
lation of 0.0099 between the postal dummy and the type of institution, which is expected given
that the postal network (formal and informal) had already developed extensively across Europe
(not all of them listed in Giovanni’s travelogue) by the middle of the sixteenth century and had
especially reached most of the large cities (especially Western cities) that have been considered
in the database. From the Figure E.2 itself the evidence is clear that the network for postal com-
munication in Europe existed already, so now I would focus on the printing penetration as the
city-specific heterogeneous variable for horizontal information diffusion.
3.4.6 Other Factors
Urban Agglomeration and Population
North Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands enjoyed high levels of urban agglomeration. It was
argued by Gelderblom (2013) that the Low Countries were able to evolve institutionally because
of competition between close competing cities. Is high level of urban agglomeration a mediating
factor that attracted higher rates of printing in regions close to the sea?
To measure the level of urban agglomeration, from Bairoch, Batou & Chevre (1988) popu-
lation dataset I consider 335 cities that had a population greater than or equal to 10,000 in the
fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth century (including the 81 largest cities, see Figure 3.8). I clus-
ter the cities using hierarchical clustering method based on average city distance (UPGMA)30.
The procedure produces a dendrogram (given in Figure E.1 in appendix E.3) which can be cut
off at a given threshold. For a given threshold, if a city a is part of a cluster made up of n cities,
then the city has clustering index Clusta = log(n). I cut the dendrogram at different thresholds
for robustness and use the clustering in Table E.5 in appendix E.3 for the standard regressions.
I consider the log of population in the fifteenth century (Log(Pop1500a)), and growth in
population during the fifteenth century (Growth1500a = log(Pop1500aPop1400a )), as basic controls
that may affect nature of economic institutions. Data related to population (total and growth)
estimates not only demographic characteristics but also the economic characteristics at the city
level, as historically the largest cities were also the most prosperous ones. Large cities with
high population being economically dominant could attract more traders. Similarly, growing
cities were attracting traders because of greater availability of opportunities. I also consider the
square root of elevation (
p
Elevationa for each city a), as cities at higher altitude may be more
difficult to reach in the medieval and early modern period, and thus they may be unsuitable as
commercial towns, and more suitable as political and administrative centers. The three factors
could affect impersonal nature of cities.
30Hierarchical clustering: The UPGMA algorithm constructs a rooted tree (dendrogram) that reflects the struc-
ture present in a pairwise similarity matrix (or a dissimilarity matrix). At each step, the nearest two clusters are
combined into a higher-level cluster. The distance between any two clusters A and B, each of size (i.e., cardinality)
|A| and |B|, is taken to be the average of all distances d(x,y) between pairs of objects x in A and y in B, that is, the
mean distance between elements of each cluster: 1|A|·|B|
P
x2A
P
y2B d(x, y).
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Medieval Fairs
Medieval cities that hosted temporary fairs, where European traders (affiliated to guilds) would
gather, could be good precursors for emerging impersonal markets. One of the most promi-
nent medieval fairs in Europe was the Champagne fairs in Northern France. Gelderblom (2013)
wrote how the decline of the medieval fairs gave rise to markets in the Low Countries, as foot-
loose merchants trading in Champagne moved away to the North. But, it is noteworthy that
cities in the Champagne region did not themselves impersonalize. So, it is possible that fair
cities could themselves evolve into impersonal cities. But, it is also alternatively possible that
the traditional institutions in established medieval fair cities resisted evolution of impersonal
economic institutions.
Regardless of the direction of causality, if any, medieval fairs reflected an important aspect
of the medieval commercial system of Europe. I borrow data on the location of fairs during
1450-1500 in Europe, from the University of Iowa Library’s Atlas of Printing31 which builds its
data from a variety of sources. I label a city a as a fair city if the city is listed to host fairs in the
Atlas of Printing and I code dFaira = 1. The following cities in the sample were fair cities in
Europe according to the Atlas of Printing:
• Angers, Bordeaux, Caen, Lille, Lyon, Orleans, Paris, Rennes, Rouen, Toulouse and Tours
in France,
• Antwerp, Bruges, and Ghent in Belgium,
• Bologna, Ferrara, Florence, Milan, Rome and Venice in Italy,
• Cordoba, Plasencia, Sevilla, and Valladolid in Spain, and
• London (Westminster) in England.
3.4.7 Empirical Results
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics of the data, part of which has already been described in
Figure 3.9 where non-relationship-based cities have higher levels of printing and are closer to
the sea. But, note that aggregate population growth in 1500 of the impersonal cities is higher
than that of the reforming cities whose growth is higher than that of the relationship-based
cities. Such high levels of population growth in the medieval and early modern period highlights
how impersonal (and relationship-based) cities were attracting people because of the economic
opportunities. Moreover, impersonal and reforming cities were more clustered and at a lower
altitude from the sea on average than an average relationship-based city. Population level in the
fourteenth and fifteen century does not show any distinct pattern- cities undergoing reform were
more populated than the general sample in the fifteenth century while impersonal cities were less
populated. More impersonal cities on an average were holding medieval fairs than relationship-
based cities. But, fewer cities undergoing reform on an average were holding medieval fairs.
31The library’s data can be accessed at http://atlas.lib.uiowa.edu
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Table 3.3: The table presents the summary statistics of key variables for the whole sample of 81 cities, and further
decomposes the statistics based on the type of the 16th century economic institution (see section 3.4.2).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Whole Sample
VARIABLES N mean min max
# cities in cluster 81 7.852 1 22
Print Index 81 9.250 0.217 63.14
# Print Cities in 50km 81 1.309 0 6
Population 1400 75 36.99 3 275
Population 1500 81 37.37 5 225
Population 1600 81 52.94 7 300
Population 1850 81 122.1 4 2,236
Distance from Port 81 106.4 0 453.4
Growth 1500 75 0.114 -1.273 2.079
Medieval Fair 81 0.309 0 1
Elevation from sea 81 127.1 1 862
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inst = 0
VARIABLES N mean min max
# cities in cluster 62 6.258 1 22
Print Index 62 8.381 0.217 63.14
# Print Cities in 50km 62 0.758 0 3
Population 1400 56 35.25 4 275
Population 1500 62 36.48 5 225
Population 1600 62 51.79 7 300
Population 1850 62 97.97 4 1,053
Distance from Port 62 124.5 0 453.4
Growth 1500 56 0.0828 -1.253 2.079
Medieval Fair 62 0.306 0 1
Elevation from sea 62 156.0 5 862
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inst = 1
VARIABLES N mean min max
# cities in cluster 13 13.54 4 22
Print Index 13 13.04 3.807 47.20
# Print Cities in 50km 13 3.462 0 6
Population 1400 13 38.46 6 100
Population 1500 13 43.23 12 100
Population 1600 13 49.69 11 151
Population 1850 13 72.62 26 209
Distance from Port 13 67.57 0 143.6
Growth 1500 13 0.202 -0.405 0.847
Medieval Fair 13 0.231 0 1
Elevation from sea 13 43.46 1 150
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Inst = 2
VARIABLES N mean min max
# cities in cluster 5 12.40 2 22
Print Index 5 11.43 3.692 24.92
# Print Cities in 50km 5 2.800 0 5
Population 1400 5 40 3 125
Population 1500 5 29 15 50
Population 1600 5 73.60 27 200
Population 1850 5 549.6 50 2,236
Distance from Port 5 4.114 0 20.57
Growth 1500 5 0.370 -1.273 1.792
Medieval Fair 5 0.600 0 1
Elevation from sea 5 11 3 21
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Table 3.4: The table reports results of regression between the 16th century economic institutions and the 15th century
diffusion of printing with additional variables especially closeness to the sea. Dependent variable is the 16th century
nature of economic institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2. Printing Penetration is a measure of
level of diffusion of printed books in the 15th century in a given city, from the 121 printing cities in the GW database
(see section 3.4.4). Closeness Port is the square root of constant - Distance of the city from a sea port (see section
3.4.3). The independent variables of interest are Print Penetration, Closeness to Port and their interaction. Columns 4
has additional controls described in section 3.4.6. Column 2a additionally reports the results without the interaction
effect between Print Penetration and Closeness to Port.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (2a)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Print Penetration 0.127*** 0.153*** -0.0762* -0.0617 0.123***
(0.0369) (0.0356) (0.0407) (0.0427) (0.0357)
Closeness Port 0.0336*** -0.0208** -0.0119 0.0342**
(0.0102) (0.00967) (0.0123) (0.0130)
Print Pentr X Closeness Port 0.0179*** 0.0151***
(0.00439) (0.00469)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.161* 0.195**
(0.0825) (0.0801)
Growth 1500 0.0651 0.0991
(0.132) (0.139)
log(Population 1500) -0.0552 -0.0651
(0.0838) (0.0898)p
Elevation 0.00140 0.00160
(0.00898) (0.00942)
Medieval Fair -0.0975 -0.0478
(0.139) (0.142)
Constant -0.0799 -0.593*** 0.133 0.0127 -0.630*
(0.0749) (0.171) (0.108) (0.352) (0.354)
Observations 80 80 80 74 74
R-squared 0.099 0.228 0.312 0.360 0.307
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interaction between Printing and Closeness to the sea
Table 3.4 reports the OLS regression of the dependent variable Inst1600a with covariates for the
whole sample.
Inst1600a = ↵+ 1SeaPortClosenessa+ 2PrintPentra+ 3SeaPortClosenessaXPrintPentra+ Xa+✏a
(3.2)
where Inst1600a measures the level of market impersonalization in the sixteenth century of a city
and Xa is a vector of control variables.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.4 show that an interaction between the transformed vari-
ables Printing Penetration and Closeness to Port had a sizable and significant positive effect
on the level of market impersonalization in the sixteenth century (Inst1600a ). The individ-
ual effects of Printing Penetration and the Closeness to Port (Columns 1-3) lose significance
when controls on clustering (Clusta), population growth (Growth1500a), population in 1500
(log(Population1500)), medieval fair and elevation are added (Column 4). As printing pen-
etration and opportunities independently do not directly affect market impersonalization, the
hypothesis developed in section 3.2.2 passes a key test that it is the interaction of the two factors
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that mattered for market impersonalization.
Many cities had little or no printing, so any establishment of printing in and around the
city increased the per capita printing penetration of the region several times. For example,
London (with PrintIndexa = 9.33 bptp) which with Westminster printed several hundred
books in the fifteenth century, had ten times more printing penetration per capita than Lisbon
(with PrintIndexa = 0.81 bptp) where according to the GW database only 28 books were
printed in the fifteenth century. If a relationship-based city was at the sea (Oppa = 21.29
p
km),
and its per capita printing penetration in the fifteenth century doubled, it was about 0.18 steps
closer to undergo reform in the sixteenth century.
The fact that high printing penetration does not independently affect market impersonaliza-
tion shows that a large shock in the number of printed books alone even in large commercial
European cities did not make it easier for traders to trade in an impersonal manner, in the ab-
sence of clear incentives to initiate trade beyond familiar networks. If the interaction between
printing and closeness to port is not considered (Columns 1, 2 & 2a), then both the factors ap-
pear individually significant, which further strengthens the argument that an interaction between
the two sizable and significant factors was important to consider to understand the nature of the
effect of these two factors. Clustering appears to have a large positive effect (Column 4) but
only at a 10 percent significance level, and it would have been attributed a larger and more sig-
nificant positive effect (Columns 2a) had interaction between printing and closeness to port not
been considered.
The regression results strengthen the argument that more cities close to a port and enjoying
higher levels of printing activity in the fifteenth century, were reforming and turning impersonal
in the sixteenth century, and cities that enjoyed none or only one of the two factors stayed
relationship-based.
Instrumental Variable- Distance from Mainz
Is it reasonable to assume that printing was exogenous? Maybe, cities like Antwerp that were
already more commercially oriented attracted more printing. Such endogeneity may upward
bias the results. But, many cities that were adopting printing, like Paris or Rome were traditional
economic and political centers that might have been resistant to institutional change, which may
downward bias the results. To allay endogeneity concerns, I use a geographic instrumental
variable. One of the geographic reasons that determined the level of early printing adoption in
Europe was its distance from Mainz, Germany. The printing press was invented in Mainz by
Johannes Gutenberg, and most know-how regarding printing press technology was based in the
city (held by Gutenberg and his apprentices) during the fifteenth century Europe. The printing
press diffused slowly, with cities closer to Mainz getting the technology sooner (Dittmar 2011),
and distance from Mainz has been used an instrument by Dittmar (2011) for the level of print
adoption. Mainz was not a distinct city in the fifteenth century, such that the distance from
Mainz would affect cities in ways other than the adoption of printing. Figure 3.10 plots the
logarithm of distance from Mainz on the X-axis, and PrintPentra on the Y-axis.
Columns 2 and 4 of Panel A of Table 3.5 report results of the second stage of the 2SLS
regressions and the results of 2SLS regression seem to confirm that the interaction between
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Figure 3.10: The two way plot of cities between variables PrintPentra and log(DistancefromMainz) for
different types of institutions.
printing and closeness to port were having a sizable and significant positive effect of level of
market impersonalization (Inst1600a ). Distance from Mainz and its interaction to the distance
from a port is a strong instrument with large and highly significant relation to printing as shown
in Panel B, with a large F statistic greater than 10. The 2SLS estimate of the effect of interaction
between printing and closeness to port (Column 4), is around double the size of the OLS estimate
(Column 3). While in the OLS specification, a two-fold increase in the fifteenth century per
capita printing penetration led to 0.18 unit increase in the level of market impersonalization in
the sixteenth century at cities close to the sea; in the 2SLS specification, a two times increase
in the fifteenth century per capita printing penetration led to 0.39 unit increase in the level of
market impersonalization in the sixteenth century in cities at the sea. Alternatively, about a six-
fold increase in the fifteenth century per capita printing penetration led to a unit increase in the
level of market impersonalization in the sixteenth century in the cities at the sea32.
As the distance from Mainz is a strong instrument, and it is argued that it is reasonable to
assume that it followed the exclusivity restriction, the larger estimate can be interpreted as the
effect of higher printing and its interaction for cities that adopted printing primarily because
of closeness to Mainz. Other factors affected printing adoption, one of which is medieval fair
in the city (Column 4a) which had a significant and positive effect on printing adoption, and
the 2SLS estimate would exclude the impact of other covariates. Medieval fair in a city seems
to negatively affect market impersonalization (Column 4), which hints towards the possibility
that medieval traditional trade institutions, that must be more established in medieval fair cities,
impeded reform and market impersonalization.
32 Inst1600a = ( 0.111 + 0.0317 ⇤ (Oppa = 21.29)) ⇤ ln(# of X increase in PrintIndexa) (Column 4 of
Table 3.5).
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Table 3.5: Columns 2 and 4 of Panel A report results of second stage IV regression between the 16th century
economic institutions and the 15th century diffusion of printing of cities at a given distance from the sea. The
coefficients are contrasted with results of the OLS regressions reported in Columns 1 and 3. Dependent variable is
the 16th century nature of economic institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2. Printing Penetration is
a measure of level of diffusion of printed books in the 15th century in a given city, from the 121 printing cities in the
GW database (see section 3.4.4). Closeness Port is the square root of constant - Distance of the city from a sea port
(see section 3.4.3). Additional controls are described in section 3.4.6. Panel B reports the coefficients of the first
stage regression between endogenous variable Printing Penetration and IV which is log (constant - Distance from
Mainz). Columns 2a (4a) and 2b (4b) of Panel B, are the first stage of Column 2 (4) regression of Panel A.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Institution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Print Penetration -0.0762* -0.0933 -0.0617 -0.111
(0.0407) (0.0748) (0.0427) (0.0770)
Closeness Port -0.0208** -0.0539** -0.0119 -0.0522**
(0.00967) (0.0232) (0.0123) (0.0261)
Print Pentr X Closeness Port 0.0179*** 0.0308*** 0.0151*** 0.0317***
(0.00439) (0.00797) (0.00469) (0.00971)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.161* 0.0717
(0.0825) (0.0906)
Growth 1500 0.0651 0.00859
(0.132) (0.132)
log(Population 1500) -0.0552 -0.0294
(0.0838) (0.0940)p
Elevation 0.00140 0.00491
(0.00898) (0.0112)
Medieval Fair -0.0975 -0.251*
(0.139) (0.150)
Constant 0.133 0.149 0.0127 0.157
(0.108) (0.240) (0.352) (0.455)
Observations 80 80 74 74
R-squared 0.312 0.138 0.360 0.175
Panel B: First Stage Regression
(2a) (2b) (4a) (4b)
Dependent Variable: Print Penetration Print Penetration X Print Penetration Print Penetration X
VARIABLES Closeness Port Closeness Port
Distance from Mainz 1.544*** -2.114 1.971*** 1.065
(0.373) (5.389) (0.418) (6.206)
Mainz Dist X Closeness Port 0.00481 1.814*** -0.0101 1.739***
(0.0271) (0.391) (0.0306) (0.455)
Closeness Port -0.00941 1.118** 0.0516 1.597**
(0.0332) (0.478) (0.0436) (0.648)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.0191 0.298
(0.152) (2.261)
Growth 1500 -0.0415 -1.229
(0.207) (3.075)
log(Population 1500) 0.241 5.177
(0.217) (3.221)p
Elevation 0.0583* 0.541
(0.0292) (0.434)
Medieval Fair 0.572** 6.331
(0.281) (4.176)
Constant 1.402*** 1.468 -1.191 -31.87*
(0.501) (7.225) (1.127) (16.72)
Observations 80 80 74 74
R-squared 0.523 0.693 0.591 0.723
F stat 39.02 39.29 34.51 27.67
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Studying cities nearer to the sea
As Figure 3.9 showed and the OLS and 2SLS regressions in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 confirmed, there
is evidence for a strong relationship between the level of market impersonalization (Inst1600a )
in the sixteenth century and the interaction between printing and closeness to the sea. I now turn
my attention to cities close to the sea. The most distant non-relationship-based city from a port
(Brescia, Italy) had a distance of 143km from the port (Table 3.3). I thus now focus on cities
that were within a distance of 150km from the sea.
Table 3.6 reports the regression results for the limited sample. Among cities close to the
sea, PrintPentra continues to have a large and significant positive effect on market imperson-
alization in the sixteenth century. When the dummy variable dNearAtlantica = dDisrupta
is added to regression, to specifically account for the cities that were closer than 50km from
an Atlantic Port, the variable also has a large and significant effect (Column 3). The addition
also increases the R square of the regression from 0.268 to 0.444. When an interaction between
printing and nearness to an Atlantic Port is considered (Column 4), the interaction has a sizable
and significant positive effect, and the R square further increases to 0.503. Among cities close
to the sea and on the Atlantic coast a two times increase in the fifteenth century per capita print
penetration, increased the level of market impersonalization by 0.3 units in the sixteenth century.
The isolated effect of printing continues to be sizable and significantly positive in the limited
sample, but cities near an Atlantic Port did not individually have higher levels of market imper-
sonalization if not enjoying higher print penetration. Also, it is noteworthy that in the restricted
sample of cities close to the sea, the effect of urban clustering is insignificant. But, the dummy
for medieval fair in a city continues to have a significant negative effect (Column 4), further
hinting that established trading institutions in cities with medieval fairs probably impeded the
emergence of impersonal economic institutions.
Columns 2 and 4 of Panel A of Table 3.7 report result of the 2SLS regressions with distance
from Mainz acting as an instrument for printing penetration. The estimates for the limited
sample like in case of whole sample (Table 3.5) show a large and significant effect of printing.
The interaction between closeness to Atlantic Port and printing is large but is significant only
at 10 percent level. In the 2SLS specification, a two-fold increase in the fifteenth century per
capita printing penetration among cities close to the sea and at the Atlantic coast led to a 0.48
unit increase in the level of market impersonalization in the sixteenth century (unlike the 0.3
unit increase in the OLS specification). In other words, about a four-fold increase in the fifteenth
century per capita printing penetration among cities at the Atlantic coast led to a unit increase
in the level of market impersonalization in the sixteenth century33.
The instrument is strong (Panel B) and has high F statistic. Once again like in Table 3.5, the
higher 2SLS in Table 3.7 estimates can be interpreted as estimating the isolated effect of printing
in cities that had high printing penetration primarily because of closeness to Mainz, excluding
the effect of covariates like medieval fairs. Like in previous regressions, medieval fairs seem to
have a large negative effect on the market impersonalization in the sixteenth century (Column
4).
33 Inst1600a = (0.289 + 0.407 ⇤ (dNearAtlantica = 1)) ⇤ ln(# of X increase in PrintIndexa) (Column 4
of Table 3.7) .
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Table 3.6: The table reports results of regression between the 16th century economic institutions and the 15th century
diffusion of printing for cities within 150km of sea port. Dependent variable is the 16th century nature of economic
institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2. Printing Penetration is a measure of level of diffusion of
printed books in the 15th century in a given city, from the 121 printing cities in the GW database (see section 3.4.4).
Additional controls are described in section 3.4.6 and Near Atlantic is a dummy variable denoting whether the closest
port to the observed city was an Atlantic Port.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
Print Penetration 0.209*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.123***
(0.0473) (0.0450) (0.0438) (0.0417)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.132 0.118 0.0731
(0.105) (0.0870) (0.0825)
Growth 1500 0.105 0.0153 -0.0873
(0.213) (0.174) (0.165)
log(Population 1500) -0.104 0.0270 0.110
(0.109) (0.113) (0.110)p
Elevation -0.0139 -0.00187 -0.00267
(0.0121) (0.00858) (0.00845)
Near Atlantic 0.688*** -0.235
(0.227) (0.318)
Near Atlantic X Print Penetration 0.318**
(0.131)
Medieval Fair -0.106 -0.292* -0.289**
(0.178) (0.150) (0.139)
Constant -0.191** 0.121 -0.490 -0.531
(0.0919) (0.368) (0.372) (0.343)
Observations 59 56 56 56
R-squared 0.201 0.268 0.444 0.503
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robustness: Alternate variables and specifications
As different factors may drive the rise of impersonal and reforming cities, I also run a multino-
mial logit regression, and the results are reported in appendix Table E.6. There are two promi-
nent observations to be made. Firstly Columns 2a and 2b show that an interaction between
printing penetration and closeness to port is significant in predicting whether a city reforms or
turned impersonal when considering the entire sample. If cities close to the sea (within 150km
from the sea) are considered (Column 4a), printing increased the chances of a city reforming,
while nearness to an Atlantic Port had no significant effect. The observation is in line with the
expectation as the North Italian cities reformed, and enjoyed high printing penetration, but they
were not close to the Atlantic. In contrast, closeness to the Atlantic exponentially increased the
chances that a city impersonalized (Column 4b) (because there are no non-Atlantic cities that
impersonal in the sixteenth century), and the effect of printing on market impersonalization of a
city was large and positive (which is expected) but not statistically significant at 10 percent level
in cities that were close to an Atlantic Port. The loss of significance may be attributed to the
small sample of impersonal (Inst1600a = 2) cities. Secondly, urban clustering had a large and
significant effect on increasing the chances of reform in a city (Column 2a and 4a), which is not
surprising given that all reforming cities were parts of dense urban clusters of Belgium, Nether-
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Table 3.7: Columns 2 and 4 of Panel A report results of second stage IV regression between the 16th century
economic institutions and the 15th century diffusion of printing for cities within 150 km of sea port. The coefficients
are contrasted with results of the OLS regressions reported in Columns 1 and 3. Dependent variable is the 16th
century nature of economic institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2. Printing Penetration is a measure
of level of diffusion of printed books in the 15th century in a given city, from the 121 printing cities in the GW
database (see section 3.4.4). Additional controls are described in section 3.4.6 and Near Atlantic is a dummy variable
denoting whether the closest port to the observed city was an Atlantic Port. Panel B reports the coefficients of the
first stage regression between endogenous variable Printing Penetration and IV which is log (constant - Distance
from Mainz). Column 2 (4a and 4b) of Panel B, is the first stage of Column 2 (4) regression of Panel A.
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Institutions in cities within 150km of port
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Print Penetration 0.209*** 0.424*** 0.123*** 0.289***
(0.0473) (0.0848) (0.0417) (0.0879)
Near Atlantic -0.235 -0.494
(0.318) (0.648)
Print Penetration X Near Atlantic 0.318** 0.407*
(0.131) (0.222)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.0731 -0.00538
(0.0825) (0.0972)
Growth 1500 -0.0873 -0.153
(0.165) (0.173)
log(Population 1500) 0.110 0.136
(0.110) (0.124)p
Elevation -0.00267 -0.00198
(0.00845) (0.0119)
Medieval Fair -0.289** -0.415**
(0.139) (0.167)
Constant -0.191** -0.790*** -0.531 -0.905**
(0.0919) (0.237) (0.343) (0.439)
Observations 59 59 56 56
R-squared 0.201 0.503 0.376
Panel B: First Stage Regression
(2) (4a) (4b)
Dependent Variable: Print Penetration Print Penetration Print Penetration X
VARIABLES Near Atlantic
Distance from Mainz 1.583*** 1.703*** -0.0721
(0.230) (0.340) (0.134)
Distance from Mainz X Near Atlantic -0.0762 1.344***
(0.533) (0.210)
Near Atlantic 0.0353 1.454***
(0.668) (0.264)
log(# cities in cluster) -0.0975 0.0824
(0.179) (0.0705)
growth1500 0.00502 0.161
(0.269) (0.106)
Growth 1500 0.309 -0.0734
(0.254) (0.100)p
Elevation 0.0286 0.00197
(0.0281) (0.0111)
Medieval Fair 0.474 0.0618
(0.337) (0.133)
Constant 1.271*** -0.0389 0.141
(0.258) (0.930) (0.367)
Observations 59 56 56
R-squared 0.453 0.510 0.938
F stat 47.17 16.39 25.39
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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lands, and North Italy. But, noteworthily urban clustering had no significant effect on chances
of a city becoming impersonal (Column 2b and 4b). The observation is in line with expecta-
tion, as cities like London or Hamburg were not parts of urban clusters and turned impersonal
nonetheless. The Medieval fair dummy holds large negative effect (statistically significant in
column 2a and 4a, and not significant in column 2b) in all cases (as has been the trend in pre-
vious regressions) except Column 2b, where in Column 2b presence of medieval fairs increases
the probability of a city became impersonal, which reflects the trends in the summary statis-
tics (Table 3.3) where impersonal cities were on an average more likely to hold medieval fairs.
Given the mixed effects of medieval fairs in the results, I conclude it is better not to provide a
definitive conjecture on the effect of medieval fairs on economic institutions, and this may be a
topic of future research.
Appendix Tables E.7 (considering number of printing cities within 50km from a city
(PrintCity50kma) as a proxy for printing), E.8 (considering different thresholds for distance
from port and level of clustering), E.9 and E.10 (considering a limited sample of 50 largest cities
in the fifteenth century), E.11 and E.12 (considering a limited sample of cities without code R3
or U3) report robustness checks, and the results remain principally unchanged.
When considering the number of printing cities within 50km from a city a as a proxy for
printing (PrintCity50kma), its interaction with Closeness to the Sea (Appendix Table E.7
Columns 7 and 8) has no significant effect. The observation can be attributed to the fact that
the maximum number of printing cities within 50km of a relationship-based city was 3 (see
appendix Figure 3.11), and for a restricted sample of only disruptive cities (dNearAtlantic =
1), the maximum number was 2. So, it may be the lack of observation of relationship-based
cities that is driving the result. The fact that, all cities enjoying disruptive trade at the Atlantic
coast and also having a large number of printing cities around them were non-relationship-based
cities, gives strength to the claim that there was indeed an interaction between the two factors.
Robustness: Is aggregate printing a good measure?
Measuring the aggregate number of books being printing around a city provides an estimate of
the fifteenth-century printing penetration in the city, which was found to significantly predict
institutional reforms in cities closer to the sea, especially on the Atlantic coast. But, printing
included all kinds of topics, from religion to art to economy. The soundness of the empirical
strategy hinges upon the assumption that printing towns did indeed print books that wrote about
new trading practices that helped in reliable impersonal exchange. To test the hypothesis, I
collect data on books printed until the fifteenth century from USTC catalog, which classifies
early printed books in 37 categories. I consider nine categories of books that can be expected
to include books with new ideas and techniques or help individuals in impersonal exchange.
The categories are: Academic dissertations, science and mathematics, philosophy and morals,
economics (treatises, regulation of guilds) and news books (sensational literature, events, wars)
that can be expected to print material with new ideas; and educational books (ABCs, how to
write letters, grammars), dictionaries (vocabularies, foreign language instruction), etiquette and
courtesy (civil conversation and sumptuary) and travels (topography, maps and navigational
manuals) that can be expected to print material teaching about other cultures and traditions. I
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Figure 3.11: The two way plot of cities between variables PrintCity50kma and SeaPortClosenessa for differ-
ent types of institutions.
call the categories- trade friendly categories. Other categories are either related to religion, arts,
politics or are industry specific. All the major cities, except Caen, producing books in the trade
friendly categories of USTC database were already included in the GW database. I focus on the
121 printing cities of the GW database and develop a new Printing Index for each of the large
city a and a printing city b (PrintIndexU9ab ) considering the number of books printed in the
9 trade-oriented USTC categories (BU9b ), instead of all the books printed in the GW database
(Bb).
There is a strong correlation (Figure 3.12) between PrintPentra, and PrintPentrU9a ,
i.e., cities which were having a higher printing penetration were also having a high print-
ing penetration for book printing in the nine trade-oriented categories. Considering the ra-
tio (TradeCatSharea) between the PrintIndexU9a and total number of categorized books
in the USTC catalogue PrintIndexUa , there seems to be no correlation between the original
PrintPentra variable and TradeCatSharea (Figure 3.13), showing no systematic bias for or
against the 9 USTC categories in minor or major printing towns. These observations suggest
that more printing in the fifteenth century was associated with more printing in all categories
and that PrintPentra is a reasonable variable to measure production of ideas (in general) in a
given city, which is exogenously affected by Distance from Mainz.
In appendix Table E.13 I replicate the regressions in Table 3.6, with variable PrintPentrU9a
(which includes only trade friendly books), instead of variable PrintPentra (which in-
cluded all categories of books). The coefficients of trade friendly printing penetration variable
PrintPentrU9a in Table E.13 are larger than PrintPentra in Table 3.6, which is expected as
printing in trade friendly categories should be more related to market impersonalization in the
sixteenth century than printing in all categories. While these coefficients confirm the general
argument, the variable PrintPentra presents a more unbiased variable to test the hypotheses,
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Figure 3.12: The two way plot of cities between variables PrintPentra and PrintPentrU9a for different types of
institutions.
and distance from Mainz is a more appropriate instrument for PrintPentra because printing
only in trade friendly topics may also be demand driven and not just supply driven.
Figure 3.14 shows some additional variation in the content of printing and hints towards the
fact that cities with higher rates of printing and close to the Atlantic Coast had a higher share
of printing in the 9 USTC categories, which is reasonable as closeness to the Atlantic Coast
increased interest in long-distance trade in the fifteenth century Europe and in books that helped
in such long-distance trade and travel.
3.5 Conclusion: Emergence of Impersonal Exchange
In this chapter, I explored how impersonal exchange emerges in relationship-based economies,
like in the merchant guild dominated economy of medieval Europe. I collected and analyzed
city-level data of early modern Europe to answer the following questions. Firstly, why did
the relationship-based merchant guild system decline in the Low Countries and England, and
why did impersonal market-based exchange emerge? I argued that the opportunity for beneficial
long-distance trade with merchants, who were attracted to the growing Atlantic coast, motivated
merchants to trade with relatively unfamiliar partners. Moreover, higher availability of printed
books in the Low Countries and England, especially of trade-related books, increased informa-
tion access, accelerated diffusion of Hindu-Arabic numbers, and popularized business practices
like double-entry bookkeeping. Also, the integrated postal network of Europe expanded the ra-
dius of private communication for all merchants in major European cities. These improvements
in trade, information and communication increased the confidence of merchants in impersonal
exchange, and under the right utility and reliability conditions, impersonal exchange emerged.
Secondly, why did the transition happen only during the sixteenth century? I argued that
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Figure 3.13: The two way plot of cities between variables PrintPentra and TradeCatSharea for different types
of institutions.
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because (i) trade on the Atlantic coast, (ii) the inter-European Postal Network and (iii) the
movable-type printing press, were innovations of the late fifteenth century, the transition only
began in the late fifteenth and the early sixteenth century.
Thirdly, why did not other regions also transition to an impersonal system, even if they faced
similar initial conditions? I argued that no other region other than Northwestern Europe won the
double lottery of high printing penetration and booming trade at the Atlantic coast, and winning
of both the lotteries was necessary for the emergence of impersonal exchange.
The chapter looked at early modern Europe, and explored the challenges that are associated
with emergence of impersonal exchange in traditional societies where economic exchange is
embedded in social relations (Polanyi 1944, Granovetter 1973, Coleman 1988, Greif 1994, Burt
1995, 2001, Padgett & Powell 2012). Societies that are embedded in social relations exhibit
considerable institutional (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2013, 2014) and cultural persistence
(Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1994, Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2016, Nunn & Wantchekon
2011), and two notable explanations of persistence have been proposed in the literature. The
cultural approach (Weber 1905, McCloskey 2016, Mokyr 2016, Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti
1994, Tabellini 2008b, Greif & Tabellini 2017, Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2008a) looks at the
differences in people’s initial attitudes and shows that these initial attitudes lead to divergent
outcomes, where people either stick to or go beyond exchange with familiar contacts. In this
chapter, I showed how horizontal diffusion of information and trust enhancing practices can in-
crease reliability in impersonal exchange even in relationship-based economies, and how under
right conditions it can eventually lead to the emergence of impersonal exchange. The institu-
tional approach (North 1990, Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson 2005, Greif 2006, Ogilvie 2011,
Gelderblom 2013, Rothstein 2011b) has considered the role of quality of institutions on long-
term development. The chapter explores how the interaction between information diffusion and
economic incentives can increase impersonal exchange, even in the absence of formal legal in-
stitutions, which may eventually lead to the development of impartial institutions that serve all
parties generally without favoring a particular few.
The chapter showed that network-based institutions like guilds were dominant historically,
in a world without formal and impartial legal institutions. The emergence of impersonal mar-
kets required a good incentive to go beyond networks and the presence of ample information
and reliability-enhancing business practices. While the study focused on the specific setting of
sixteenth-century Europe, future studies on similar shocks of information and incentives can
provide further evidence whether the hypothesis developed in this chapter about impersonal
markets holds true across other geographical and historical settings.
A lack of granular data on guilds and markets of medieval and early modern Europe at
a city level means several aspects of trade are not observed, and definitive claims cannot be
made about them. If I had better micro-data for the business organizations of the sixteenth
century, I could have studied the different effects of information and incentives at a within city
level. Future studies with more granular data can enlighten us further about transformations
in business organization of early modern Europe. Historically aware studies, that can look at
the interaction between incentives and information, and can also help us understand about our
globalizing and digitally connected modern world.
Chapter 4
How caste identity became salient in
India and influenced networking and
governance?
In India, the real cause of the weakness that cripples our spirit of freedom arises
from the impregnable social walls between the different castes. These check the
natural flow of fellow feeling among the people who live in our country. The law
of love and of mutual respect has been ignored for the sake of retaining an artificial
order. This only serves to promote a sense of degeneracy and of defeat. The people
of India in this way have built their own cage; but by trying to secure their freedom
from one another, they only succeed in keeping themselves eternally captive. -
Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941)
In the previous chapters, I studied how generalized trust evolves, and impersonal markets
emerged. We learned that relationship-based social systems like merchant guilds are persistent,
and resist change. So, even if the communication and commercial revolutions were individually
powerful influences over Europe, it was only under the combined influence of both that mer-
chant guilds declined, and cosmopolitan market-oriented cities like Amsterdam and Hamburg
emerged. In the previous chapters, the emphasis was on the importance of trust and information
in influencing the social structure of exchange. In this chapter1 we focus on another critical as-
pect of exchange - identity. While the previous chapter studied merchant guilds, in this chapter
we study another institution like guilds that is salient in India- the caste system. We shall see in
this chapter that castes are more than just relationships as they are an intrinsic part of people’s
social identities. In this chapter, we will examine how social identities of caste and cosmopoli-
tanism get transmitted across generations, and how institutions can influence their transmission
in the long run, and influence people’s networking patterns, and the quality of political economy
and governance.
Individuals have several identity attributes like appearance, gender, skill, lineage or belief.
1This chapter is joint work with Paola Sapienza of Kellogg School of Management and Luigi Zingales of Uni-
versity of Chicago Booth School of Business. The co-authors contributed to the research design, while I developed
the model, conducted the historical research and data collection, and analysis.
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Of these, some attributes become more salient socially than others. These salient attributes can
be a source of identity, and social groups may get formed along those attributes that individuals
identify with (Akerlof & Kranton 2000, Be´nabou & Tirole 2011). For example, if skin color
(race) is a salient identity attribute, then individuals may form social groups around and identify
with their skin color.
The political engagement of groups formed around the social identity of ethnicity has re-
ceived considerable attention by social scientists in the past few decades. A region with greater
ethnic fractionalization is associated with a poorer quality of government (La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1999), as fractionalization leads to lower public good generation
because ethnic groups may have different preferences (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly 1999). Such
differences get further amplified when there exists a greater inequality between different ethnic
groups in a country (Alesina, Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2016). Like ethnicity, when caste
fractionalization is high in India, it is associated with a greater acceptance of corrupt candi-
dates in politics (Banerjee & Pande 2007, Banerjee et al. 2014) who promise to pass on specific
benefits to voters’ caste groups, and with lower production of public goods (Banerjee, Iyer &
Somanathan 2005, Munshi & Rosenzweig 2015).
In most of these social identity-related studies, social identity is considered to be exoge-
nously determined. But, ethnic fractionalization or caste categorization can itself be an outcome
of politics. Some of the documented ways through which social identity can be altered are
through demographic engineering2 (Glaeser & Shleifer 2005, Friedman & Holden 2008) and
passing3 (Fanon 1967, Jafferlot 2003, Somanathan 2010, Caselli & Coleman 2013, Francis &
Tannuri-Pianto 2013, Cassan 2015). Institutions can also influence the salience of particular
identity, and even create some new ones (e.g., nationality). Starting with the seminal thesis
of Anderson (1991) on “Imagined Communities”, there is emerging literature (Glaeser 2005,
Blouin & Mukand 2018), which argues that social identity like nationality is endogenous, and
is constantly evolving4. While certain identity attributes can be made more (Anderson 1991,
Glaeser 2005) or less (Blouin & Mukand 2018) salient through deliberate institutional effort,
non-deliberate and seemingly “objective” classification of people in specific groups can also
socially construct an identity that people then cling on to. The colonial classification of Rwan-
2Engineering a change in the demographic makeup of a region is one way in which politics can influence
social identity. For example, Glaeser & Shleifer (2005) studied the “curly effect”, where politicians engineered
the demographic makeup of their constituency, through selectively targeted policies that favored a particular ethnic
group and drove others out. Gerrymandering is another method through which politicians can engineer winnable
constituencies, by selecting the demographic composition of their constituencies (Friedman & Holden 2008).
3Another way in which people’s social identity can be altered is through targeted identity - specific benefits
that induce people to pass (Caselli & Coleman 2013) to a social identity that receives such benefits. For example,
identification of people as black in Brazil (Francis & Tannuri-Pianto 2013), as agrarian castes in colonial India
(Cassan 2015) and as disadvantaged castes in India (Somanathan 2010) increased when these groups began receiving
specific benefits like reservation in government services. Historically, disadvantaged groups have attempted passing
as advantaged groups like whites in the United States (Fanon 1967) or as a “Sanskritized” (more Brahmin like)
caste in North India (Jafferlot 2003). But, when people pass from one racial or caste category to another, it does
not necessarily alter the overall salience of the racial or caste identity in the society. Passing changes merely the
preferred identity sub-group depending on the benefits different groups receive.
4Print-capitalism was associated with the promotion of the idea of nationhood, where nations were the “imagined
communities” that people shared, leading to a rise of nationalism (Anderson 1991). Recently, Blouin & Mukand
(2018) show how radio broadcasts in post-genocide Rwanda helped in reducing the salience of Hutu-Tutsi divisions.
Another way in which an identity can become salient is when politicians deliberately promote hate stories that spread
xenophobia against particular minority groups (Glaeser 2005).
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dans into Hutus and Tutsis (Mamdani 2014), or the measures of “blackness” like the “one drop
rule” in the United States (Fanon 1967, Hickman 1997), are some of the examples where the
institutions constructed new identities out of arbitrary criteria. One instance where anthropolo-
gists like Cohn (1984), Bayly (2001) and Dirks (2001) have elaborately documented the social
construction of identity is the colonial evolution of the concept of caste in India about which
this chapter will discuss in more significant detail.
In this chapter, we study how social identity can become salient, and look at its effects on
the demographically diverse, yet institutionally uniform country of India. We ask if India’s
colonial institutions could have rigidified the caste identity by making it more salient, and what
effects did they have on the general level of cosmopolitanism in the country, and on the nature
of networking and governance.
In section 2, we draw from the influential work of Akerlof & Kranton (2000) on identity
economics and use the Bisin & Verdier (2001) model of cultural transmission to study how the
social identity of caste and cosmopolitanism can get transmitted intergenerationally, and how in-
stitutions can shape people’s social identities and influence caste identity and cosmopolitanism
in the long run. Using tools such as the census, institutions can popularize common prescrip-
tion of positive or normative attributes that individuals from a given social identity (should)
have. Such global prescriptions can increase the conformity to the ideal caste prescriptions and
increase the domination of caste identity and marginalization of cosmopolitanism.
In section 3, we discuss the evolution of the concept of caste in India drawing from the work
of Dirks (2001), and in sections 4 and 5 we study the effect the 1901 British caste census of India
had on the salience of caste in India, and on the nature of out-of-caste networking. We exploit
the heterogeneity in the implementation of caste/social precedence tables in the 1901 census
of India and find that households in regions where district committees were formed in 1901
to implement detailed caste precedence tables, today (in 2011) have fewer out of community/-
caste relationships with political and public officials. These regions also have more households
that identify (and pass) as other backward castes, greater presence of caste-based parties, and
a poorer quality of government as measured using various proxies of educational and health
attainment, and infrastructure provision (section 6).
Our research contributes to several strands of the literature of identity formation, quality of
government and public policy for development.
1. Identity formation: Primarily, this research contributes to the literature on social con-
struction of identity (Verghese 2016, Lieberman & Singh 2017, Blouin & Mukand 2018).
Related papers such as Cassan (2015) and Lee (2015) have looked at the rise of passing
and identity politics when colonial bureaucrats categorized some castes undesirably, but
neither documents the colonial construction of caste as a category itself. We find that
institutions such as colonial bureaucracies can influence people’s identities and networks,
and these identities can then be persistent, and they impact how people engage with the
institutions themselves. The chapter unpacks the long-term impact of an important as-
pect of Indian colonial history: the colonial construction of the caste system (Dirks 2001)
and the impact it has had on contemporary India. A recent paper by Lieberman & Singh
(2017) conducted a cross-country analysis where they measured the effect of enumerat-
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ing ethnic cleavages (e.g., race, language, tribe and caste) on inter-ethnic violence. They
found significant effects at a global level, thus providing even greater evidence in support
of this research agenda that studies how categorization of individuals in social groups can
influence economic and political outcomes.
2. Quality of government: The chapter contributes to the literature that studies the determi-
nants of good governance (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1999, Rothstein
2011b). We find that when fractionalized identities like caste are made salient, it nega-
tively affects the quality of government. The novelty of our identification approach is
the usage of a historical shock of the 1901 census that made caste more salient in some
parts of India than others. In the literature, the salience of identity is assumed to be con-
stant, even though salience of identity can vary between regions. So, two regions which
are equally diverse or fractionalized can have different types politics depending on how
salient that identity is to the people in the region.
3. Relevance to policy: The policy impact of our research is straightforward- policymakers
need to be cautious when they develop policies that are specifically targeted for particular
identity groups, because such policies may (non-intentionally) make an identity attribute
salient and develop newer forms of fractionalization in the society. As partial policies can
create a rift within society, impartiality in government services has been prescribed as an
important aspect and determinant of good governance (Rothstein 2011b). Our research
can offer some caution to policymakers that they should be aware of the impact their
policies have on people’s sense of self and their identity.
4.1 Theory: Intergenerational transmission of social identity
In this section, we develop a model of intergenerational transmission of social identity drawing
from the works of Akerlof & Kranton (2000) and Bisin & Verdier (2001), on identity economics
and cultural transmission. In Akerlof and Kranton’s framework, individuals are associated with
social categories, C, and these social categories are associated with prescriptions P that indi-
cate the appropriate behaviour and attributes for individuals in different social categories. In this
framework individuals may have varying tastes, yet due to these prescriptions, they are incen-
tivized to 1) follow the prescriptions associated with their categories even if the prescriptions
are incongruent to their tastes and 2) punish those individuals who belong to their categories but
violate the prescriptions associated with it.
We combine the Akerlof & Kranton (2000) framework with the cultural transmission model
developed by Bisin & Verdier (2001), which considers the effects of vertical and horizontal
transmission of values. While vertical transmission of values occurs through parents, the hori-
zontal transmission of values can occur through peers, neighbors or the state.
4.1.1 The “ideal” prescription
We first reinterpret the Akerlof & Kranton (2000) prototype model in the context of the caste
system in India.
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• Activities: There are two possible activities, e.g., having a special meal (Activity one)
and having a regular meal (Activity two). There is a population of individuals each of
whom has a taste for either special or regular meal. If a person’s tastes (i) and actions
match, they earn a utility Vi. But, if a person with a taste for regular-meal (special-meal)
chooses special-meal (regular meal), they earn a utility zero.
• Categories: Individuals also belong to social categories e.g. “clean” and “non-clean”
castes. For simplicity, we assume all persons think of themselves and others as “clean”
castes.
• Prescriptions: Moreover, there exists an “ideal” behavioural prescription: a “clean”
caste individual has special-meal (in contrast to “non-clean” castes who have regular
meal). More generally, a behavioural prescription for being a “clean” caste can be adher-
ence to a particular lifestyle which includes a series of dos and do nots, such as dining
only with own caste’s members, having a particular occupation, and marrying only with
members of one’s caste.
• Internalized component: Individuals follow the prescriptions taught to them in child-
hood (either vertically through parents or horizontally through socialization), and a fol-
lower of the ‘ideal” prescription suffers a loss Is of their “clean” caste identity on having
regular-meal (s for self).
• Externalized component: In addition, there are identity externalities like in Akerlof &
Kranton (2000). If i and j are paired, and i has regular meal, it diminishes j’s “clean”
caste identity by an amount Io (o for other), if j follows the prescription of having special-
meal.
• Vigilantism: If i has regular-meal, j may act as a vigilante and respond, by punishing i
at a cost c and causing a loss to i of amount L. Such vigilantism will restore j’s identity
as j punished the prescription violator i5.
When a “clean” caste individual j with a taste for special-meal (caste-following) meets a
“clean” caste individual i with a taste for regular-meal (cosmopolitan), the following outcomes
are possible.
• Self enforcement: If i has high self-internalization of the prescription (Vcosmo < Is) i
self enforces themselves into having the special meal.
• No enforcement: If i has low self-internalization of the prescription such that they are
willing to be punished for having the regular-meal (Vcosmo   Is+L) then no enforcement
can force them into having special-meal.
5If individuals of different categories - “clean” and “non-clean” castes - make the society, and some fraction of
both adhere to the ideal prescriptions of special and regular meal respectively, then 1) if i and j are both of the same
categories, then j can punish i for violating the respective prescription, and 2) if i and j are of different categories,
then j can punish i for following the prescription exclusive to j’s caste. In both scenarios i’s that violate the ideal
prescriptions of their associated categories get punished by those j’s who strongly believe that i0s should follow i’s
own caste’s prescriptions.
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• Strong and weak social enforcement: Also, there exists an intermediary region (Is <
Vcosmo < Is+L) where vigilantism by j influences i’s decision. When j is more likely to
feel a large other-identity loss (Io > c) and act as a vigilante by levying a large punishment
on i, i chooses to have a special meal to avoid such punishment (strong enforcement). In
contrast, if the other-identity loss of j is small when compared to the cost of sanctioning
(Io < c), i chooses to have a regular meal in the absence of any punishment (weak
enforcement).
4.1.2 A model of cultural transmission
Given the setup, we now construct a society where individuals live for two periods as children
(first period) and parents (second period). Parents and children overlap for one period, and
parents decide whether to put effort into passing on their tastes to their children who learn
their tastes in their first period. Following the model of Bisin & Verdier (2001) on cultural
transmission, we assume that parents have imperfect empathy, i.e., they desire the welfare of
their children, but consider their child’s utility based on their tastes. So, for example, a parent
who has special-meal (regular-meal) assumes that if their child consumes regular-meal (special-
meal), the child’s utility will be zero.
Children acquire their tastes by two means. Firstly, these tastes can be taught (vertically)
by their parents. Secondly, these tastes can be acquired (horizontally) through socialization
with strangers (Boyd & Richerson 1988, Bisin & Verdier 2001, Mokyr 2016). At any time t, if
parents do not put any effort in teaching their taste i, then the probability that their child will
have the same tastes as them is proportional to the fraction of population with parent’s tastes
(qi(t)). In contrast if parents put effort into teaching their children their tastes at time t, then
it will cost the parents an amount  di(t)
2
2 , but children will acquire the taste of their parents
with probability di(t) through vertical transmission, or with probability (1 di(t))qi(t) through
horizontal transmission. If there are two types of parents i and j in the population, the rate of
change in the population of type i at any given time t is given as
dqi(t)
dt
= qi(t)qj(t)(1  dj(t))  qi(t)qj(t)(1  di(t)) = qi(t)qj(t)(di(t)  dj(t)) (4.1)
Three stationary points for equation 4.1 exist: qi = 0, qi = 1 and qi s.t. di = dj (see Bisin
& Verdier (2001) for more details on the dynamics). For simplicity we drop the time component
t, where all populations (qi) and efforts (di) are at a specific time t.
Parents in a given caste can be of two types: those who have tastes aligned with their pre-
scriptions (caste-following), and those who do not (cosmopolitan). Consider only one caste of
“clean” individuals where the prescription is for “clean” members to only have a special meal.
Let qcaste caste-following-parents have their tastes aligned with this caste prescription at time t,
while qcosmo = 1  qcaste cosmopolitan-parents have their tastes deviate from the prescription.
Cosmopolitan-parents do not follow prescriptions and have a taste for regular meal and have no
internalized disutility Is = 0 from having such a regular meal.
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Caste-following-parents’ problem
If children of caste-following-parents have tastes aligned with the prescriptions, their utility
(from caste-following-parent’s perspective) as adults comes from following their taste of hav-
ing a special-meal (Vcaste), minus the externalized disutility (Io) from meeting a cosmopolitan
(consuming regular-meal) with probability qcosmo6. Alternatively, if the externalized disutility
(Io) is greater than cost c of sanctioning a cosmopolitan (function F(Io > x) gives the prob-
ability with which Io > x), then the children will act as a vigilante to strongly sanction the
cosmopolitan, and so their maximum externalized disutility will be c. In contrast, if children
of caste-following-parents have tastes unaligned with the prescriptions (i.e., they have regular
meal), their utility from caste-following-parents’ perspective is negative, as its a sum of the in-
ternalized shame  Is that the parents perceive the children will have, and the sanction cost  L
that the children will have to endure as a cosmopolitan, if they come across a caste-following-
individual (with probability qcaste) whose disutility (Io) is greater than the cost of sanctioning
(c).
The net utility from making an effort7 dcaste at the cost of
 casted2caste
2 for a caste-following-
parent is expressed as
 ecaste = dcasteqcosmo(Vcaste+Is+qcasteLF(Io > c) qcosmomin(Io, c)) 
 casted2caste
2
(4.2)
As caste-following-parents maximize their utility the optimal d⇤caste is given to be (where
we assume  caste is s.t. d⇤caste < 1)
d⇤caste = max(qcosmo(Vcaste + Is + qcasteLF(Io > c)  qcosmomin(Io, c))/ caste, 0) (4.3)
Cosmopolitan-parents’ problem
If children of cosmopolitan-parents have tastes unaligned with the prescriptions, their utility
(from cosmopolitan-parent’s perspective) comes from following their taste of having regular
meal (Vcosmo) minus the sanction cost L that the children will have to endure as cosmopoli-
tans, every time they come across a caste-following-individual (with probability qcaste) whose
disutility (Io) is greater than the cost of sanctioning (c). The utility of children who follow the
6Because parents have imperfect empathy, they evaluate their child’s utility based on current conditions i.e.
qcosmo(t) in their period, and not in the period when their children are parents (qcosmo(t+ 1)). While a child as an
adult (parent) may have several meals and come across individuals of opposite tastes several times, for simplicity,
we condense having meals and meeting individuals of opposite tastes to one act each period.
7The utility for a caste-following-parent from putting an effort dcaste in teaching their tastes to their child is
given as Uecaste.
Uecaste = (Vcaste  qcosmomin(Io, c)(dcaste+(1 dcaste)qcaste)  (Is+ qcasteLF(Io > c))(1 dcaste)qcosmo
Similarly, the utility for a caste-following-parent from not putting an effort in teaching their tastes to their child is
given as Unecaste.
Unecaste = (Vcaste   qcosmomin(Io, c))qcaste   (Is + qcasteLF(Io > c))qcosmo
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prescription is zero from the perspective of cosmopolitan-parents as the utility of the children
from having a special meal (from parent’s perspective) is zero.
The net utility from making an effort8 dcosmo at the cost of
 cosmod2cosmo
2 for a cosmopolitan-
parent is expressed as
 ecosmo = dcosmoqcaste(Vcosmo   qcasteLF(Io > c)) 
 cosmod2cosmo
2
(4.4)
As cosmopolitan-parents maximize their utility the optimal d⇤cosmo is given to be (where we
assume  cosmo is s.t. d⇤cosmo < 1)
d⇤cosmo = max(qcaste(Vcosmo   qcasteLF(Io > c))/ cosmo, 0) (4.5)
4.1.3 Weak and strong vigilantism scenarios
The cultural transmission model provides the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Based on equation 4.1, the populations of caste-following-individuals (qcaste)
which satisfy the condition d⇤caste = d⇤cosmo, are stationary points, where optimal d⇤caste and
d⇤cosmo are given by equations 4.3 and 4.5. The stability of the stationary points is determined
by the functional form of d⇤caste and d⇤cosmo w.r.t qcaste.
Effort by cosmopolitan-parents d⇤cosmo is zero when all in the population are cosmopolitans
(qcaste = 0), and positive when the rest of the population is caste-following (qcaste = 1) if
Vcosmo > LF(Io > c). Similarly effort by caste-following-parents d⇤caste is zero when all in
the population are caste-following (qcaste = 1), and positive when the rest of the population is
cosmopolitan (qcaste = 0) ifmin(Io, c) < Vcaste + Is. We assume d⇤caste > 0 at qcaste = 0, i.e.
caste-following-parents have a positive utility in teaching their children to have special-meal, in
a society made of cosmopolitans (min(Io, c) < Vcaste + Is).
Consider a weak-vigilantism scenario when the expected loss in a caste-following society
(qcaste = 1) due to strong sanctioning by a vigilante (LF(Io > c)) is less than the utility gained
from having a regular-meal (Vcosmo) for cosmopolitans. At qcaste = 1, d⇤cosmo > d⇤caste = 0,
when LF(Io > c) < Vcosmo. So, the stationary point qcaste = 1 is not a stable equilibrium.
At qcaste = 0, we assumed d⇤caste > 0 i.e. d⇤caste > d⇤cosmo = 0, so the stationary point
qcaste = 0 is not a stable equilibrium either. Then, the two curves intersect at a unique value
q⇤caste, where d⇤caste = d⇤cosmo, and q⇤caste is a unique stable heterogeneous equilibrium where
both caste-following-individuals and cosmopolitans co-exist. Figure 4.1 plots this scenario.
8The utility for a cosmopolitan-parent from putting an effort dcosmo in teaching their tastes to their child is given
as Uecosmo.
Uecosmo = (Vcosmo   qcasteLF(Io > c))(dcosmo + (1  dcosmo)qcosmo)
Similarly, the utility for a cosmopolitan-parent from not putting an effort in teaching their tastes to their child is
given as Unecosmo.
Unecosmo = (Vcosmo   qcasteLF(Io > c))qcosmo
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Now, consider a strong-vigilantism scenario when the expected loss in a caste-following
society (qcaste = 1) due to strong sanctioning by a vigilante (LF(Io > c) is larger than the
utility gained from having a special meal (Vcosmo) for cosmopolitans. In the neighborhood of
qcaste = 1, d⇤caste > d⇤cosmo = 0, when LF(Io > c) > Vcosmo. So, the stationary point
qcaste = 1 is a stable equilibrium. In this scenario, the two curves d⇤cosmo and d⇤caste do not
necessarily intersect, and a stable heterogeneous equilibrium may not exist. Figure 4.2 plots this
scenario.
The weak and strong enforcement conditions provide three observations:
• Increasing loss due to sanctioning (L) reduces the possibility that the system will be in the
weak-vigilantism scenario, reduces the possibility that a stable heterogeneous equilibrium
necessarily exists, and increases the possibility of a homogeneous equilibrium made up
of caste-following-individuals (qcaste = 1).
• Increasing cost of vigilantism (c) increases the possibility that the system will be in the
weak-vigilantism scenario, increases the possibility that a stable heterogeneous equilib-
rium necessarily exists, and reduces the possibility of a homogeneous equilibrium made
up of caste-following-individuals (qcaste = 1).
• When a heterogeneous equilibrium exists, the population of cosmopolitans (qcosmo) de-
creases with increasing L and decreasing c.
As the loss due to sanctioning (L), and the cost of sanctioning (c) depend on the quality of
the rule of law in a state, these observations lead us to the following corollary
Corollary 4 As a state improves in protecting individuals from vigilantes by making it costly for
vigilantes to sanction individuals (increasing c), and by protecting individuals from the harm-
ful effects of vigilantism (decreasing L), the society is less likely to be in the homogeneous
caste-following equilibrium, and more likely to be the heterogeneous equilibrium, with a higher
population of cosmopolitans (qcosmo) who can co-exist with caste-following-individuals.
4.1.4 Popularization of “ideal” prescription
The census is one of the tools through which such “ideal” prescriptions get popularized by the
state, by providing parameters (adherence to “ideal” prescriptions) based on which individuals
can be categorized into groups. Note that these prescriptions do not need to be invented, but
simply be made more salient. If a state through a tool like the census makes “ideal” caste pre-
scriptions salient, children are more likely to come across the “ideal” prescriptions and become
their followers. We consider a simple setting where such promotion of “ideal” prescription i
by the state, creates a drift where dsqi children of the whole population always become caste-
following-individuals (more the followers of the ideal prescription (qi) the stronger the strength
(ds) of the “ideal” prescription). This drift alters the equation 4.1, as now we have
dqi
dt
= qiqj(1  dj   ds)  qiqj(1  di   ds) + qjqids = qiqj(di + ds   dj) (4.6)
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Figure 4.1: The figure plots the optimal effort by caste-following (d⇤caste) and cosmopolitan (d⇤cosmo) parents as
a function of the population of caste-following-individuals (qcaste), when LF(Io > c) < Vcosmo i.e. in weak-
vigilantism scenario. The population of caste-based-individuals in the heterogeneous equilibrium (q⇤caste) is increas-
ing in increasing L (which reduces d⇤cosmo) and decreasing c (which increases d⇤caste and decreases d⇤cosmo).
Figure 4.2: The figure plots the optimal effort by caste-following (d⇤caste) and cosmopolitan (d⇤cosmo) parents as
a function of the population of caste-following-individuals (qcaste), when LF(Io > c) > Vcosmo i.e. in strong-
vigilantism scenario. The population need not converge to a unique heterogeneous equilibrium q⇤caste, even though
a homogeneous equilibrium where qcaste = 1 always exists.
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In this scenario, the stationary points are qi = 0, qi = 1 and qi s.t. (dj di) = ds. In the case
of caste-following-individuals and cosmopolitans, at the stationary point d⇤caste + ds = d⇤cosmo.
The dynamics provides the following proposition
Proposition 4 Based on equation 4.6, the populations of caste-following-individuals (qcaste)
which satisfy the condition d⇤caste+ds = d⇤cosmo, are stationary points, where optimal d⇤caste and
d⇤cosmo are given by equations 4.3 and 4.5. The stability of the stationary points is determined
by the functional form of d⇤caste and d⇤cosmo w.r.t qcaste.
For a heterogeneous equilibrium to necessarily exist, 1) Vcosmo > LF(Io > c) + ds (weak-
vigilantism scenario) and 2)min(Io, c) > Vcaste + Is + ds. The new dynamics gives rise to the
following observations, which is plotted in Figure 4.3.
The presence of a drift (ds) towards becoming a caste-following-individual provides the
following observations:
• A drift (ds) due to the popularization of “ideal” prescription reduces the possibility that
the system will be in the weak-vigilantism scenario, reduces the possibility that a stable
heterogeneous equilibrium necessarily exists, and increases the possibility of a homoge-
neous equilibrium made up of caste-following-individuals (qcaste = 1).
• When a heterogeneous equilibrium exists, population of cosmopolitans (qcosmo) decreases
in increasing ds.
Corollary 5 If a state popularizes “ideal” caste prescriptions (ds > 0), the society is more
likely to be in the homogeneous caste-following equilibrium, and less likely to be the heteroge-
neous equilibrium, with a lower population of cosmopolitans (qcosmo) co-existing with caste-
following-individuals.
4.1.5 Effects of popularization of “ideal” prescriptions
Corollary 5 shows that the popularization of “ideal” prescription decreases the cosmopolitan
population and increases the domination by caste-following-individuals in the population. A
more homogenous population comprising of caste-following-individuals can lead to 1) an in-
creased within-caste networking, at the cost of out-of-caste networking (i.e., more relative
within-caste social capital), and 2) can increase the formation of social identity-based groups
(e.g., caste sabhas) where individuals can follow their caste prescriptions collectively (e.g.,
cooking a special meal), and collectively advance their special interests (e.g. by forming caste-
based parties).
In such caste-based societies, the willingness and capacity of the state to reduce vigilantism
(Corollary 4) may be lower, which further hinders the co-existence of cosmopolitan popula-
tions. In section 2.2.5 on identity, parochialism, and honesty of the second chapter, we saw
how identity specific benefits to identity-based and partial traders can reduce the scope in which
impersonal exchange can emerge (Corollary 3). As caste identity becomes more salient, and
cosmopolitanism declines, it may hinder impersonal exchange and the emergence of impersonal
institutions (Proposition 2).
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Figure 4.3: The figure plots the optimal effort by caste-following (d⇤caste) and cosmopolitan (d⇤cosmo) parents as
a function of the population of caste-following-individuals (qcaste), for weak (Vcosmo > LF(Io > c) + ds) and
strong-vigilantism (Vcosmo < LF(Io > c) + ds) scenarios, where popularization of “ideal” prescription creates
a drift (ds). The population of caste-based-individuals in the heterogeneous equilibrium (q⇤caste) is increasing in
increasing ds, and under strong vigilantism scenario the possibility of a stable heterogeneous equilibrium reduces,
even though a homogeneous equilibrium where qcaste = 1 always exists.
In the next sections, we will see how the notion of caste evolved in India, and how especially
British censuses like that of 1901 played a role in increasing the organization of society along
caste lines.
1. Census and caste prescriptions: The 1901 census of India especially attempted to rank
castes on a social precedence table based on criteria determined by prescriptions of the
1901 census director Herbert Risley and on deliberation with district committees of “na-
tive gentlemen”. The prescriptions for higher social precedence often included an implicit
criterion of similarity of castes to Brahmin and Rajput ideals (the highest priestly and war-
rior castes). For example, the castes of Jats and Kurmis were denied a higher Kshatriya
(warrior caste) status in the social precedence in the 1901 United Provinces provincial
census, on the basis that they allowed widow remarriage, unlike the “twice” born castes
where widow remarriage was prohibited.
2. Emphasis on Sanskritic heritage: Such formalization of prescriptions gave rise to caste
groups whose primary goal was to emphasize and promote their Sanskritic heritage and
to raise their social precedence by petitioning to the government officers. Discussing the
impact of the 1901 caste ranking on castes, a 1904 author from Allahabad, Kumar Cheda
Singh Varma, wrote in the book “Kshatriyas and would-be Kshatriyas”:
About three years ago the Census Commissioner in India (The Hon. Mr. H
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H. Risley, C.S , C.S.I.) directed that, for the Census of India, 1901, a scheme
should be drawn up classifying the various Hindu castes under the four groups
of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Sudras ; and assigning to each caste in
these groups its proper position according to the order of social precedence The
members of certain castes which have, hitherto, in an undefined sort of way,
been striving to rise in the social scale eagerly seized the opportunity thus af-
forded them of having their pretensions to a higher status placed on record and,
if possible, stamped with the hallmark of official recognition. In the contro-
versy that ensued no subject was more warmly discussed, on both sides, than
the claims of certain castes to be considered “twice-born” and, in particular, to
belong to the Kshatriya order. Among the numerous aspirants to Kshatriyanic
honours, who claim equality with the descendants of the Kshatriyas of old, are
found the Khatris, the Kayasthas, the Jats, and the Kurmis.
3. Caste-based organization: This trend where intermediary castes such as Ahirs (who
emphasized a Sanskritic name Yadavas) in North India asserted their higher status by
forming caste groups (e.g., Ahir Yadav KshatriyaMahasabha in 1910) has been associated
with the phenomenon of Sanskritization (Jafferlot 2003), where castes form groups and
attempt to enhance their status by accepting Sanskritic ideals (such as vegetarianism)9.
Such organization along caste lines by intermediary castes like Yadavas has ultimately
led to the formation of caste-based parties like the Rashtriya Janata Dal and Samajwadi
Party.
4.2 History: Evolution of the term caste
Caste in India is a complex classification scheme. The term is significant in modern social,
economic and political discourse in India. The term’s etymological roots lie in Portuguese, and
the term is related to indigenous classification schemes like Jati, Qaum and Varna. Could the
colonial state have made this identity salient?
4.2.1 Qaum and Varna: Pre Colonial India
The Mughal administrative book Ain-I-Akbari written around 1590 makes reference of ethnic
clans called Qaums (Jatis), when listing the ethnicity of local landlords called zamindars10.
Qaums holding these positions of power included Muslim clans like Sayyids, traditional warrior
clans such as Rajputs, priestly groups of Brahmins, administrative classes like Kayasthas, and
agrarian classes such as Ahirs and Kunbis. Habib et al. (2013) discussed the origins of influence
9The 1901 census had a note on the Sanskritization of some Kurmi castes of Bihar
The Awadhiya or Ayodhya Kurmis pride of Bihar and the Kanaujia Kurmis of the United Provinces
pride themselves on prohibiting the remarriage of widows and are endeavoring to establish a shadowy
title to be recognized as some variety of Kshatriya. But although the Awadhias have achieved complete
practical separation from the main body of Kurmis, no one accepts them as Kshatriyas or Rajputs.
10The power of zamindars has been speculated to be anywhere between tax collectors to influential overlords
(see Habib et al. (2013)).
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of these different Qaums, and presented zamindari Qaums to be in competition with each other,
vying for domination over land. He also discussed the existence of a market where zamindari
rights could be sold and bought by potentially wealthy individuals.
In another volume of the same book, Ain-I-Akbari also discussed the Hindu philosophy and
mentioned the ritualistic social classification of Hindu society called the Varna system. In this
system the society is divided into four hierarchical Varnas (groups), where Brahmins (priests)
are at the top, followed by Kshatryas (warriors), Vaishyas (businessmen) and Shudras (laborers
and artisans), followed by a fifth group ofMalecchas (out-castes, that included foreigners). Each
of these Varnas had strict codes of occupation, diet and lifestyle and the intermingling between
Varnas was regulated. Moreover, while this classification has been claimed to be nonhereditary
in earliest Hindu scriptures, this book presents Varna as a hereditary social order. So, Mughal era
presents two forms of classification, the first was the observed social grouping of Qaums/Jatis,
and the second was the ritualistic hierarchical scheme of Varna.
4.2.2 Caste and Colonial Era
Sanskrit theological texts like the Manusmriti (which translates as “recollections of Manu11”
and can be interpreted as the law of Manu), written between 200 BC and 300 AD, propounded
a Hindu society based on a rigid Varna order where member of each Varna followed their re-
spective duties. But, the significance of texts like Manusmriti in ancient and medieval India is
doubted (Buxbaum 1968) as local Hindu laws have mostly been customary (Lariviere 1989).
Although the significance of the Manusmriti in pre-British India is doubtful, its significance
with the beginning of the British rule is clear. It was one of the first Sanskrit books to be trans-
lated into English in the late eighteenth century, and it shaped the view of earliest British and
other Orientalists.
When the British East India Company gained a foothold in India in the second half of the
eighteenth century (beginning with Bengal), the company struggled with administering a diverse
and alien country like India. So, the colonial administrators instituted standard personal laws
in 1772 for Muslims on the basis of the Quran, and in parallel for the Hindus on the basis of
“the Shastra” (Hastings 1772). The colonial administrators took these Sanskrit texts literally
and sought uniformity in the Hindu laws even though the Hindu laws were customary12.
The British, inspired by these texts, conceptualized the existing Indian society to be divided
on the basis of “castes” (a loanword they took from the Portuguese), which was imagined to be
11Manu is believed to be the progenitor of humanity in Hindu texts, similar to Adam in Abrahamic traditions.
12Lariviere (1989) reflecting on the complex system of Dharmashastras highlighted its customary nature and the
inability of the British to grasp it:
The dharmashastras was not internally consistent, nor was it uniformly applicable to all Hindus.
What the British did not understand was that no legal system claiming to be based on a fixed set of
texts (in this case the Veda via the interpretations of the dharmashastras) could remain viable without
a means to adapt the dictates of those texts to the ever-changing needs of society. This adaptation had
been done for centuries by the commentators and digest writers. ...This situation was anathema to the
British responsible for the administration of justice in India, and it was the motive behind Hastings’s
decision to commission the composition of A Code of Gentoo Laws, Ordinations of the Pundits. It
remained a central concern of the British administrators to eliminate the inconsistency and uncertainty
they saw in the indigenous legal systems in India.
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based on the ritualistic Varna hierarchical order, where the different Jatis/Qaums were the sev-
eral sub-Varnas. With time, the British became more acquainted with Indian society especially
by conducting local surveys. Through the surveys they began to discover the inconsistencies in
their long-held view that caste was a detailed Varna order (Samarendra 2011). Census officer
from North-Western Provinces, F.S. Growse, wrote in 1872:
Impartially judged by either standard, the authority of the Code [Manusmriti] will
be found materially shaken. Its theories of origin are as devoid of Vedic confirma-
tion as its pictures of existent society are irreconcilable with the testimony of all
independent literature, whatever the age in which it was produced. If such a clearly
defined four-fold division ever existed, how happens it that one-half13 of the divi-
sion remains in full force to the present day, while the other moiety has sunk into
absolute oblivion.
Although a clear mapping of castes into Varna was difficult, this did not deter the British
from exploring the construct of caste further. The census officers reported the difficulties in
collection of this data, as the “ignorant” respondents would often reply their caste as their oc-
cupation, or their sub-group, or their clan or some other social identity marker (Risley, 1901).
Nonetheless, each of the decadal census operations (from 1872 to 1931) had extensive collec-
tions of data on caste. Here’s how the classification of castes evolved in British censuses until
1901:
1. The first All-India census of 1871-72 suffered from many inconsistencies with the clas-
sification of caste. For example, while the provincial census officer F.S. Growse in
North Western Province attempted to classify them occupationally into Brahmins, Ra-
jputs, Baniyas (trading caste) and “Other Castes” (and pointed at the incompatibility of
Varna system), in provinces of Bengal, Central Province, and Madras regions, they were
classified into 13, 11 and 17 occupational groups (Samarendra 2011).
2. Given these inconsistencies in the 1871-72 census, the 1881 census sought consistency
and required castes to be classified into an even broader classification of Brahmins, Ra-
jputs, and Other Hindus.
3. The 1891 census sought a greater degree of granularity, and the chief census commis-
sioner, J A Baines, sought to classify castes into 49 occupational groups like “Military”,
“Priests”, “Barbers”, “Potters” and “Miscellaneous Vagrants” and 11 racial/ethnic groups
like “Musalmans Foreign Races”, “Eurasians” and “Africans” (Census, 1891, p. 188).
4.2.3 Risley’s 1901 Census: A laboratory of identity
Until the 1891 census, the classification of caste was principally occupational. When the initial
classification of castes into Varnas (in 1871-72 and 1881) and then into broader occupational
groups (in 1891) failed, this paved the way for a racial and ethnographic approach in 1901.
13The one-half of Varna order that Growse believed still existed in India, were the Brahmins (priests) and the
Kshatryas (the ruling class). But, it is worth pondering whether such an exclusive and regulated priestly and ruling
class was unique only to India, or a common feature of most pre-modern societies.
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The most extensive ethnographic work on caste was undertaken by Herbert Risley, who under-
took detailed ethnographic and anthropometric studies of different caste groups in Bengal that
resulted in his book The Tribes and Castes of Bengal published in 1891. He came up with a
racial theory of caste system where he proposed that the upper castes belong to the Aryan races,
while the lower castes were indigenous. He was appointed as the chief commissioner of the
1901 census, and hoping to come up with a grand positivist theory of caste, he was not only
interested in enumerating and understanding different castes of India, but also in (uniquely14)
ascribing social precedence to them. One of the motivations of Herbert Risley for ascribing
social precedence to castes was his notorious and later discredited hypothesis:
The social position of a caste varies inversely as its nasal index.
The census operations of 1901, headed by Mr. Herbert Risley, attempted to identify, as well
as classify castes in a hierarchy on the basis of native “public opinion”. But, the head of census
operations in Bengal, E.A. Gait, wrote how the Hindus as a body in Bengal seemed indifferent
to such social precedences. He wrote in his provincial report:
The test laid down by the Census Commissioner for fixing the scale of social prece-
dence is not the rank assigned by the pedantry of pandits, but “Hindu public opinion
at the present day.” It is very difficult to say precisely what constitutes Hindu public
opinion. The Hindus as a body are strangely indifferent to the circumstances of
castes that do not clash with their own. Those of good position know very well
from whom they can take water and those whose touch defiles, but they neither
know nor care much regarding their relative position. The lower castes are even
more ignorant of the rank of the higher ones. Where the relative position of two
castes is disputed, the persons interested invariably support the claims of their own
community.
As the census administration was interested in classifying castes in hierarchies, caste-based
associations sprang up especially after 1901. These associations were lobbying and political
action groups, that attempted to negotiate their status in these tables and organize their commu-
nities. E.A. Gait, census officer of Bengal, writing about social precedence tables wrote:
The discussion of the relative rank of the different castes aroused an extraordinary
amount of ill-feeling and jealousy between some of the castes whose position is
disputed, and in more than one instance the committees appointed to report on the
subject professed their inability to come to a decision. In some cases, it is very
difficult to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion on the evidence available. More-
over, where the relative rank of the castes concerned is very nearly equal, there
is nothing to be gained by attempting to adjudicate between them, while to do so
would undoubtedly cause much mortification to the community whose claims were
over-ruled ; the decision would not be accepted as authoritative, and far from extin-
guishing, it would add fresh fuel to the fires of acrimonious argumentation.
14In censuses from 1911 castes were only enlisted alphabetically, making 1901 censuses in this sense unique.
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While Bengal province developed these social precedence based tables, not all of the
provinces of British India (including Princely states) adopted these social precedence tables,
and the implementation varied considerably. We use this variation as a source of identification
in our empirical model about which we discuss in the next section.
4.3 Empirical Strategy
Herbert Risley’s 1901 social precedence table was heterogeneously applied across Indian
provinces. In this section we shall 1) examine the ex-ante similarities between these hetero-
geneous regions, 2) discuss a potential instrument variable - distance from Bengal (Calcutta) -
that predicts this heterogeneous application, and 3) examine the ex-post effects of this hetero-
geneous application on caste sabhas in subsequent decades in the different regions. We shall
follow this discussion, with studying the differences across these regions in modern day India,
on networking characteristics of households, and in the quality of public goods provision today.
Risley’s classification was adopted only in some regions of India, where district committees
were formed to deliberate a detailed ranking of different castes. In other provinces, either no
ranking of castes happened, or else the provincial census officers provided a sketchy social
precedence table, that involved little or no deliberation (in other words the ranking was largely
internal and did not engage with the general public). So, there were two types of regions in the
1901 census:
1. Risley’s Treatment Group: In the Census regions of Bengal, Northwestern Provinces
and Oudh, Central Provinces, Berar, Madras, Gwalior, Rajputana Agency, Ajmer Mer-
wara and Baroda, social precedence tables with a detailed ranking of castes were formed,
with the help of district committees (Table F.1a). These regions are shown in Figure 4.4.
These provinces will be called the treated regions.
2. The Non-Treatment Group: In other provinces of British India, such detailed caste
classification based on district committees was not undertaken. In the Census regions
of Assam, Central India Agency, Bombay, Hyderabad, Kashmir, and Cochin a social
precedence table was developed, but they were formed without a detailed and explicit
consultation with any district committees, or their classification was vague/not detailed
(Table F.1b). In the Census regions of Mysore, Travancore, Punjab, and Coorg, no social
precedence table was formed (Table F.1c).
4.3.1 Adoption of Risley’s classification
What deterred some provinces from undertaking a classification based on social precedence?
The historical provinces in the treated region were not different from the other historical
provinces on a range of observed characteristics like educational attainment, and agricultural
labor share, the data for which was collected from the national and provincial census of 1901.
Table 4.1a shows the historical provincial level statistics for treated and untreated regions, while
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Figure 4.4: Regions where a district committee was formed to ascertain in detail social precedence of caste.
Table 4.1b shows characteristics of the historical districts lying in the treated and untreated re-
gions. As observed, the two regions have no significant difference in observed characteristics
that are predictive of backwardness.
Were there pre-colonial differences between the treated and untreated regions in the makeup
of dominant castes? The Mughal administrative book Ain-I-Akbari written around 1590, con-
tains information on Qaum (caste) of Zamindars (landlords) in different subprovinces that were
under Akbar’s direct or indirect rule. A dummy variable was created to label if a historical
subprovince had any “lower” caste (as ascribed by the British in 1901) as a Zamindari Qaum.
Only the historical location of the capitals of these subprovinces was known (as located by
Schwartzberg Atlas, p. 147) and the boundaries were unknown. Hence these historical provinces
were grouped in the treated or untreated regions depending on which region their capital be-
longed in. These capitals were only located in the 13 Northern British provinces of India. Table
4.1c shows the differences between treated and untreated regions, and there existed no statisti-
cally significant difference between the two regions.
4.3.2 Distance from Bengal (Calcutta)
What exogenous factors motivated the formation of district committees in 1901? Bengal’s caste
classification scheme was so detailed because Herbert Risley spent several years studying the
Bengali society while working on his book Castes and Tribes of Bengal, 1891, before becoming
the 1901 census director. So, census collectors in Bengal had a more detailed framework to base
their system of social precedence on, in comparison to regions such as Punjab or Mysore.
It is noteworthy that provinces that were close to Bengal like Madras and Northwestern
Provinces and Oudh adopted the social precedence tables similar to Risley’s. In contrast,
provinces like Punjab, Mysore, Bombay, and Travancore - that did not adopt such a caste prece-
dence table - were distant from the Bengal province. One of the reasons why adjacent regions
could adopt Risley’s classification could be the shared names of castes due to linguistic simi-
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Table 4.1a: Summary statistic at province level with differences between treated (which established district com-
mittees to rank caste) and untreated regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated
Summary Statistic at Provincial Level
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean Diff
Literacy Male 9.81 8.5 5.45 3.8 22.4 19 8.98 10.55 -1.57
1901 (%) (2.48)
English Male Education 0.68 0.63 0.43 0.09 1.65 19 0.63 0.72 -0.09
1901 (%) (0.2)
Agricultural Labor share 62.13 58.6 11.75 46.1 84.2 19 62.59 61.71 0.88
1901 (%) (5.42)
Industrial labor share 16.24 16.2 5.7 7.8 32.4 19 15.44 16.96 -1.52
1901 (%) (2.55)
Indirect British Rule 0.47 0 0.51 0 1 19 0.33 0.6 -0.267
(Dummy) (0.23)
Density 215.8 165.5 151.9 36 596 18 233.1 201.9 31.23
1901: per sq mile (71.76)
Table 4.1b: Summary statistic at district level with differences between treated (which established district com-
mittees to rank caste) and untreated regions. Robust standard errors clustered at 19 (18 for Industrial labor share)
historical province level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated
Summary Statistic at Historical District Level
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean Diff
Literacy Male 8.19 6.6 5.41 1.2 36 275 7.97 8.57 -0.6
1901 (%) (1.98)
English Male Education 0.61 0.3 1.43 0 14.1 274 0.6 0.61 -0.01
1901 (%) (0.28)
Agricultural Labor share 65.2 66.85 14.72 3.2 95.6 266 66.59 62.58 4.01
1901 (%) (4.94)
Industrial labor share 14.98 14.1 6.99 0.2 43.4 251 14.8 15.26 -0.45
1901 (%) (2)
Table 4.1c: Dummy variable for whether a Mughal subprovince during Akbar’s reign had zamindars (landlords)
that were not considered high caste by the British. If two or more Mughal subprovinces had capital enclosed in
the same modern district, they is considered as a single composite subprovince (source Ain-I-Akbari, early 16th c.,
Schwartzberg Atlas of South Asia). See F.2 for details. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated
Summary Statistic at Mughal District Level
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean Diff
“Low” Caste Mughal 0.67 1 0.47 0 1 73 0.66 0.71 -0.05
Zamindars (0.130)
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Table 4.2: Summary statistic of land distance from Kolkata and the city at which the province’s census was printed
(assumed to be the administrative center) with differences between treated (which established district committees to
rank caste) and untreated regions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated
Summary Statistic at Provincial Level
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean Diff
Land transport dist 1741 1656 644 0 2453 19 1106 1742 -636**
from Calcutta (in km) (263)
larities between adjacent regions. For example, the sub-province of Bihar in Bengal shared the
Hindi language with the other adjacent Hindi speaking regions, and the sub-province of Orissa
in Bengal shared the Oriya language with a handful of districts of the adjacent state of Madras.
In the Northern British province of Punjab, census officer H.A. Rose explained his decision not
to have a social precedence table by writing:
We know far too little of the complex organization of the Punjab castes to be able,
at present to classify them in any systematic or instructive way. The complications
within the castes have their natural counterpart in the chaotic and uncertain relations
between the different castes.
To incorporate the spatial closeness of these provinces to Bengal, we measure the land trans-
port distance around 1901 (using highway maps around that period) between the Kolkata and
the city where the census report of the respective city was printed, which was in most cases
also the administrative center of the linguistic region. Table 4.2 shows that treated region was
closer on an average by more than 600 km when compared to the untreated regions. To use
this variable as an instrument variable, we normalize this variable by dividing it by the largest
distance (between Kolkata and Trivandrum in Travancore).
4.4 Risley’s classification and salience of caste identity
4.4.1 Salience of the word “caste”
If the 1901 caste censuses were indeed a historical shock on the salience of caste in India,
we should observe that before the 1901 census the number of mentions of the word “caste”
was not significantly different in the census documents of the treated and untreated regions.
Additionally, for this measure to be relevant, we should observe that the mention of the word
“caste” in the 1901 census was higher in the treated regions. Also, we should observe that the
mentions of other identity markers like “religion” and “tribe”, and other general/related words
like “census”, “India” and “population” were similar across regions.
The word count analysis in Table 4.3 shows that in 1891, mention of identity-related words
(including “caste”) and other general related words was similar in the treated and untreated re-
gions. Across time, the pattern for the mention of words for “religion”, “tribe” and common
words like “census”, “population”, “India” and “ the ” did not vary across the treated and un-
treated regions, in the years 1891, 1901 and 1911.
While the mention of “caste” (see Figure 4.5) per page was similar in the two regions in
1891, but it markedly increased in the treated region in 1901 (about twice) and in 1911 (about
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Figure 4.5: Total mentions of word “caste” per page in 1891, 1901 and 1911 provincial censuses across treated and
untreated regions.
1.5 times but not statistically significant). The mention of the word “language” per page also
increased in in 1901 (about 1.5 times) in the treated region, although it was similar across regions
in 1911.
4.4.2 Immediate consequences: Census petitioning
What were the consequences of Risley’s caste classifications? In the section 4.1 we empha-
sized how the state - by making the ideal prescriptions associated with a social category (like
castes) common knowledge - can make social adherence to ideal prescriptions more common
(see Figure 4.3). Risley’s district committees were ranking castes on social precedence in 1901
often in accordance with the prescriptions of Sanskritic ideals. Such Sanskritic prescriptions
gave rise to several caste groups in British provinces of Bengal, Berar, Madras and the United
Provinces (Lee 2015) that petitioned to level up in the precedence table and especially desired
to be recognized as Brahmins or Kshyatriyas, often touting their Sanskritic credentials.
The provincial census officers provided rich details in their reports describing the disputes
and their resolution. What did some of these disputes look like? The 1901 Bengal census
report enlists some of the grievances put forth by different caste groups. Babhans claimed in
Bihar that they were Brahmins who were landholders. Baidyas claimed in Bengal to be placed
next to Brahmans above Rajputs of Bihar and above Kayasthas. Kayasthas in Bengal claimed
to be Kshtriyas above Vaidyas. Chasi Kaibarttas (class 4 of Bengal) claimed to be different
from Jaliya Kaibarttas (class 6 of Bengal). They claimed themselves as Mahisya which was
respectable as Kshatriyas and Vaisyas. Jugis (class 5 of Bengal) claimed they were Brahmin
ascetics. Awadhiya Kurmis (Class 3 Bihar) claimed to be Kshatriyas and a separate caste from
other Kurmis. Some Pods (Class 6 of Bengal) claimed to be Kshatriyas and different from other
fishing pods. Rajbansis claimed to be Kshatriyas but they were clubbed as Class 6 of Bengal.
CHAPTER 4. INDIAN CASTE SYSTEM 109
Table 4.3: The tables report the number of times a word is mentioned per page in the OCR scanned files obtained via
the Hathi Trust, and the University of Chicago, of provincial census documents of 1891, 1901 and 1911. The word
per page is measure is the ratio between the total number of times a word gets mentioned in the document and the
total number of pages in the scanned document. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated
Summary Statistic at 1891 provincial census document level
WORD mean median sd min max N mean mean Diff
# “caste” per page 0.95 0.85 0.57 0.23 1.92 14 1.09 0.84 0.25
(0.31)
# “religion” per page 0.36 0.36 0.14 0.17 0.62 14 0.36 0.36 0.01
(0.07)
# “tribe” per page 0.31 0.20 0.27 0.07 1.08 14 0.31 0.31 0
(0.14)
# “language” per page 0.20 0.13 0.20 0.02 0.73 14 0.17 0.22 -0.05
(0.10)
# “census” per page 1.13 0.95 0.76 0.27 3.06 14 1.20 1.08 0.12
(0.40)
# “India” per page 0.37 0.34 0.16 0.14 0.67 14 0.37 0.37 0
(0.08)
# “population” per page 0.96 0.83 0.52 0.33 2.39 14 1.21 0.77 0.44
(0.29)
# “ the ” per page 17.61 14.83 12.58 4.69 40.72 14 17.37 17.79 -0.42
(6.59)
# of pages 630.29 589 227.32 345 1111 14 608.33 646.75 -38.42
(116.13)
Summary Statistic at 1901 provincial census document level
WORD mean median sd min max N mean mean Diff
# “caste” per page 1.74 1.31 1.22 0.66 4.83 19 2.33 1.21 1.11*
(0.53)
# “religion” per page 0.49 0.45 0.24 0.14 1.30 19 0.49 0.50 -0.01
(0.11)
# “tribe” per page 0.43 0.38 0.23 0.03 0.93 19 0.47 0.39 0.08
(0.11)
# “language” per page 0.41 0.34 0.18 0.21 0.84 19 0.48 0.34 0.15*
(0.08)
# “census” per page 0.79 0.68 0.45 0.27 2.27 19 0.70 0.87 -0.18
(0.2)
# “India” per page 0.44 0.37 0.26 0.18 1.33 19 0.42 0.45 -0.03
(0.12)
# “population” per page 1.35 1.36 0.52 0.73 2.99 19 1.34 1.36 -0.02
(0.24)
# “ the ” per page 22.33 23.75 8.39 7.81 41.71 19 24.61 20.27 4.34
(3.81)
# of pages 405.42 329 247.20 77 1119 19 381.67 426.80 -45.13
(114.03)
Summary Statistic at 1911 provincial census document level
WORD mean median sd min max N mean mean Diff
# “caste” per page 2.13 2.25 1.01 0.71 3.78 16 2.62 1.83 0.78
(0.50)
# “religion” per page 0.64 0.65 0.16 0.38 0.94 16 0.65 0.63 0.02
(0.09)
# “tribe” per page 0.39 0.34 0.21 0.14 0.80 16 0.38 0.40 -0.01
(0.12)
# “language” per page 0.38 0.37 0.15 0.15 0.74 16 0.40 0.37 0.02
(0.07)
# “census” per page 1.04 1.06 0.42 0.49 1.73 16 0.95 1.09 -0.14
(0.19)
# “India” per page 0.81 0.82 0.26 0.31 1.24 16 0.88 0.76 0.12
(0.14)
# “population” per page 1.77 1.69 0.75 0.82 3.48 16 1.83 1.74 0.09
(0.38)
# “ the ” per page 31.05 35.25 11.95 8.28 47.64 16 35.08 28.62 6.45
(5.12)
# of pages 331.4 301 147.59 65 629 16 393.17 295.20 97.97
(72.33)
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Sadgops claimed to be Vaishyas but were clubbed with Goalas (Class 4 of Bengal). Shahas
(Class 5 of Bengal) claimed to be Kshtriyas and Vishya by profession who got degraded due to
drinking. Census officer classed them a rich and progressive caste but not elevated in “Hindu
public opinion”.
In contrast, census areas that did not have a social precedence table did not mention such
caste petitioning. Consequently, caste associations “sprung up to contest their assigned position
in the official hierarchy, holding meetings, writing petitions” to contest their assigned positions
in the census (Dirks 2001). Dirks (2001) points at the archival records from Madras presidency,
where the conflict between “upper and lower castes... rose dramatically in the early decades of
the twentieth century... in wake of the politicisation of caste around the census”.
Due to the acrimonious nature of the 1901 census’s social precedence table, from 1911 the
ranking of castes was abandoned. The census officer of Bengal’s 1911 census, L.S.S. O’Malley
wrote:
No part of the census aroused so much excitement as the return of the castes... The
feeling on the subject [object of the census was to “fix the relative status of different
castes”] was very largely the result of castes having been classified in the last census
report in order of social precedence. This “warrant of precedence” gave rise to
considerable agitation at the time and proved a legacy of trouble. The agitation
was renewed when the census operations of 1911 were instituted. Hundreds of
petitions were received from different castes- their weight alone amounts to 1.5
mounds- requesting that they might be known by new names, by placed higher in
the order of precedence, e recognized as Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, etc. Many castes were
aggrieved at the position assigned them and complained that it lowered them in
public estimation. The Subarnabaniks, in particular, were offended at being placed
low down in the list, whereas in 1891 they were grouped with other Bania castes
among Vaisyas. Others thought it a suitable opportunity to advance new claims. It
was impossible to comply with these requests, as it was decided from the outset
that there should be no classification of castes by status.
Mentioning the politicised nature of caste census since 1901 (even without the social prece-
dence tables), 1931 census commissioner and anthropologist, J.H. Hutton, in his census report,
lamented:
All subsequent census officers in India must have cursed the day when it occurred
to Sir Herbert Risley, no doubt in order to test his admirable theory of the rela-
tive nasal index, to attempt to draw up a list of castes according to their rank in
society. He failed, but the results of his attempt are almost as troublesome as if
he had succeeded, for every census gives rise to a pestiferous deluge of represen-
tations, accompanied by highly problematical histories, asking for recognition of
some alleged fact or hypothesis of which the census as a department is not legally
competent to judge and of which its recognition, is accorded, would be socially
valueless.
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He also pointed that:
As on the occasion of each successive census since 1901, a certain amount of criti-
cism has been directed at the census for taking any note at all of the fact of caste. It
has been alleged that the mere act of labelling persons as belonging to a caste tends
to perpetuate the system...
J.H. Hutton’s comments from 1931 are backed by petitioning data collected by Lee (2015)
see Table 4.4. The level of petitioning in treated provinces was consistently and considerably
higher than petitioning in untreated provinces until 1931 (the last British census), and no peti-
tions were made in untreated provinces in 1901. Figure 4.6 highlights this difference.
It is important to note that given the politicization of caste censuses in colonial India, India
after independence abandoned conducting caste censuses altogether and hence the 1901 caste
census of India was a unique exercise that elaborately placed different castes on social prece-
dence tables in some parts of India.
4.4.3 Modern consequences: Networking patterns
Could there be long-lasting effects of the unique caste classification of 1901? As the caste
ranking exercise of 1901 was unique and affected how local populations perceived the census,
do people in the treated regions give a greater salience to caste today? To test this, we compare
the caste networking characteristics of modern households that belong in the treated region to
those that do not.
Out of Caste networks
If caste is more salient in the treated region, we should expect people’s social networks to be
more inward and caste-based, and to be less cosmopolitan i.e. have fewer out of caste acquain-
tances (Burt 2001). To gauge local networking characteristics, we look at the Indian Human
Development Survey (2011-12) (Desai & Vanneman 2015) of 42,152 households in 372 dis-
tricts (out of 641) of India. The survey asks households a variety of questions about their so-
cioeconomic status, their caste and - of interest to us - their acquaintances within and outside
their caste/community. The survey asks if a household has acquaintances outside of communi-
ty/caste with 11 different professions (which are elected officers, local politicians, government
employees, other officers, inspectors, other police, military personnel, doctors, health workers,
teachers and school workers). If a household says yes to x out of the 11 professions, then the
average number of noncaste networks it has is x. Table 4.5a shows the summary statistic and
differences between the number of out of caste networks.
Table 4.5a shows the significant differences across households in treated and untreated re-
gions, when it comes to having acquaintance with professionals outside of their caste. On an
average, a household has acquaintance with approximately 2 out of 11 out-of-caste professionals
in the treated region, while this number is approximately 3 out of 11 in the untreated region.
Table 4.5b reports the difference between households in treated and non treated regions on
acquaintance with professionals outside of community/caste. As fewer professional acquain-
tances, in general, may drive acquaintance with professionals outside of community/caste, we
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Table 4.4: Number of caste petitions in each of the British provinces as compiled by Lee (2015). Bengal province
was split into Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa in 1905. Central Provinces was merged with Berar in 1903.
1901 1911 1921 1931 Total
Treated 3 4.67 5.44 8.56 21.67
Baroda 0 3 3 9 15
Bengal 10 15 16 15 56
Bihar and Orissa 3 5 8 8 24
Central Provinces 2 7 0 8 16
Madras 5 3 7 11 26
Rajputana Agency 0 2 4 4 10
United Provinces 7 7 11 22 47
Ajmer Merwara 0 0 0 0 0
Gwalior 0 0 0 0 0
Untreated 0 1.4 1.9 4 7.3
Bombay 0 3 4 3 10
Central India Agency 0 1 2 9 12
Hyderabad 0 0 0 11 11
Mysore 0 0 5 8 13
Punjab 0 10 6 4 20
Travancore 0 0 2 5 7
Assam 0 0 0 0 0
Coorg 0 0 0 0 0
Kashmir 0 0 0 0 0
Cochin 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 4.6: Average number of petitions in a treated and untreated province from 1901 to 1931. Source: Lee (2015)
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Table 4.5a: Summary statistic at household level with differences between treated (which established district com-
mittees to rank caste) and untreated regions. The IHDS survey asks if a household has acquaintances outside of
community/caste with 11 different professions. If a household says yes to x out of the 11 professions, then the
average size of non caste networks it has is x. Robust standard errors clustered at 19 historical province level in
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated Diff
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean
# Non Caste Networks 2.47 2 2.68 0 11 41112 2.04 2.97 -0.93***
(0.26)
control for the number of acquaintances the household has with professionals within family/-
caste/community in Columns 2 to 6.
When controlling for within caste household networks, households in districts with 1901
caste committees have 0.68 fewer acquaintances with professionals outside of caste/commu-
nity. This is a sizable reduction, as the mean acquaintance levels with professionals outside of
relatives/caste/community is 2.47.
When distance from Kolkata is used as an instrumental variable, there is a close 1 to 1 cor-
respondence between the distance from Kolkata instrument variable and adoption of 1901 Caste
Committees and the estimate in the 2SLS column 3 in Table 4.5b does not change significantly
(0.57 percentage point) when compared to the OLS regression in Column 2 (0.68 percentage
point). When considering differences within states (Column 4 and 6) and within the same caste
(Column 5 and 6), similar differences persist between the treated and untreated regions.
Passing as Other Backward Caste
Table 4.6 describes the demographic characteristics of the IHDS survey households. In modern
India castes have been classified into Upper Castes and Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Within
the upper castes, Brahmins make a clearly identifiable group, while after the 1979-1983 Mandal
Commission, Upper Castes have been further classified into Forward Castes and Other Back-
ward Castes (OBC). While Brahmins (due to their historical ritual dominance), and Scheduled
Castes and Tribes (due to their historical backwardness) are clearly identifiable, there exists
some ambiguity and dispute among Upper Castes on which castes should get identified as For-
ward Castes and OBCs.
Table 4.6 shows that the clearly identifiable caste classifications like Brahmins, Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Muslims and Hindus (overall) have a similar share in the treated and
untreated regions. Also, the combined population of the more ambiguous Forward caste and
OBCs classification make half of the sample in both the regions.
The classification of OBCs was conducted to provide targeted benefits to these castes in
government jobs and college admissions. So, it creates incentives for the castes that belong to
the ambiguous Upper Caste group to pass as OBC (Caselli & Coleman 2013). If caste is more
salient in our treated region, we should find more households of a given caste passing as OBCs
in the treated region, as they are more likely to agitate for such OBC benefits.
Table 4.6 shows that households in the treated region are less likely to be notified as Forward
caste, and more likely to be identified as OBC. When considering a sample of castes that are
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Table 4.5b: Networking differences between households in treated and non-treated regions, based on IHDS house-
hold survey. The IHDS survey asks if a household has acquaintances outside of community/caste with 11 different
professions. If a household says yes to x out of the 11 professions, then the average size of non caste networks it
has is x. A corresponding questions asks if the household has acquaintances within family/community/caste in the
same 11 professions. The 2SLS regression uses as IV the land transport distance from Calcutta of the city where the
provincial census was printed; measured by looking at the traditional train route for these cities to Kolkata around
1901 (using Schwartzberg Atlas of South Asia). The F test value is 18.96. Within caste regression considers castes
that have more than or equal to 10 unique observations. Robust standard errors clustered at 19 historical province
level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS OLS OLS OLS
VARIABLES # Non Caste Networks
Treated region -0.93*** -0.68*** -0.57** -0.64*** -0.60*** -0.72***
(0.26) (0.23) (0.23) (0.21) (0.19) (0.2)
# Caste Networks 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.67*** 0.66*** 0.65***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
State FE Yes Yes
Caste FE Yes Yes
Constant 2.97*** 1.74*** 1.68*** 1.91*** 1.73*** 2.50***
(0.24) (0.21) (0.21) (0.07) (0.19) (0.17)
Observations 41,112 41,092 41,092 41,092 28,025 28,025
R-squared 0.03 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.4 0.42
Table 4.5c: Networking differences between households in treated and non-treated regions, based on IHDS house-
hold survey. The IHDS survey asks if a household has acquaintances outside of community/caste with 11 different
professions. A corresponding questions asks if the household has acquaintances within family/community/caste in
the same 11 professions. This table reports differences in networking with political officials. Robust standard errors
clustered at 19 historical province level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
mean Treated Untreated (1) (2) (3)
Acq. with out of community/caste X Difference
X =
Elected official 0.13 0.09 0.18 -0.09** -0.08** -0.09**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Local Politicians 0.12 0.10 0.16 -0.06* -0.06** -0.07**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Control: Acq. within community/caste X No Yes Yes
IV No No Yes
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Table 4.6: Summary statistic at household level with differences between treated (which established district commit-
tees to rank caste) and untreated regions. Forward and Other Backward Caste (OBC) are intermediary castes below
Brahmins, and above Schedule castes and tribes, where OBCs receive affirmative action. Hybrid caste refers to
castes wfahere > 10 percent of respondents were OBCs and Forward castes i.e. their status varied by region.Robust
standard errors clustered at 19 historical province level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) Treated Untreated Diff Within
Hybrid
VARIABLES mean sd Obs mean mean caste
Forward Caste 0.17 0.37 6946 0.12 0.22 -0.09** -0.10*
(0.04) (0.05)
Other Backward Class 0.34 0.47 14089 0.38 0.29 0.1 0.22**
(0.06) (0.08)
Brahman .052 0.22 2158 0.05 .05 0.00
(0.02)
Scheduled Caste 0.21 0.41 8921 0.21 0.22 0.00
(0.04)
Scheduled Tribes 0.08 0.28 3445 0.08 0.09 0.01
(0.04)
Hindus 0.86 0.35 35559 0.85 0.86 0.01
(0.03)
Muslims 0.12 0.32 4836 0.10 0.13 0.03
(0.04)
“Hybrid” (i.e. which are classified both as Forward and OBC castes in different regions), and
comparing households of the same caste in the treated and untreated region, we find that house-
holds (within the same Hybrid caste) are more likely to be classified as OBCs in the treated
region, hinting towards a greater instance of passing.
4.5 1901 and today’s Quality of Government
In the previous section we found that the 1901 census was associated with an increase in the
salience of caste in India, and led to 1) increased the number of petitions between 1901 and
1931, 2) fewer out of caste acquaintances today and 3) more households passing as castes that
benefit from affirmative action. These trends highlight an increasing role of caste identity in
the government and political sphere. For example, decomposition of acquaintances by different
professions shows that the treated regions have significantly lower out of caste acquaintances
with elected officials and local politicians (see Table 4.5c).
Rothstein (2011b) developed a theory that argued that more impartial states have a better
quality of government. As the caste censuses of 1901 increased the salience of caste in poli-
tics, do these treated regions also have a poorer quality of government, as Rothstein (2011b)
proposed?
The quality of government literature has attempted to measure the efficiency of governments
and their outcomes using a range of proxy variables (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer &
Vishny 1999, Rothstein 2011b). Prior literature such as Alesina, Baqir & Easterly (1999) study-
ing ethnic fractionalization have especially emphasized how fractionalization leads to lower
production of public goods. If caste is more salient in the treated region of India, does it lead to
more influence of caste-based politics? It is worth noting that explicitly lower caste-based par-
ties (Varshney 2000) of India15 are predominantly active in the treated region with Uttar Pradesh
15Varshney (2000) lists the following parties as explicitly lower caste-based parties: Janata Dal (various versions
in Bihar and Karnataka), Rashtriya Janata Dal, RJD (Bihar), Samajwadi Party, SP (Uttar Pradesh), Bahujan Sama-
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Table 4.7a: Quality of government variables used by La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1999) relating
to efficiency and output of public goods.
Variable: Output of Public Goods Related IHDS 2011 variable for India
Log of Infant mortality (< 1 year) Birth History survey
Log of School Attainment (avg. years of schooling) Individual school attainment
Illiteracy Rate (15 years or above) Individual literacy
Infrastructure Quality (Communication and Transport) Household and village access to
Electricity, Water, Sanitation, Road & Phone
(erstwhile British province of United Provinces), Bihar and Orissa (previously part of the British
province of Bengal) and Tamil Nadu (previously part of the British province of Madras) being
the prominent regions with influential explicitly lower caste-based parties.
Does such caste-based nature of politics in the treated region lead to a lower production of
public goods today due to a greater salience of caste? The regional (state and local) governments
play a large role in determining the quality of public goods such as electricity, healthcare, and
education in India. Table 4.7a shows the different variables used by La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
Shleifer & Vishny (1999) to measure the quality of government, and the related data on public
goods and efficiency available at the sub-national level on India, that can be used to measure
within India differences in the quality of government.
Table 4.7b reports the summary statistics on infrastructure quality and the differences be-
tween treated and untreated regions. The differences between the regions on water, electricity,
sanitation and communication infrastructure appear to be large, and the treated regions have sig-
nificantly worse infrastructure quality on these parameters. Both regions seem to have similar
or statistically insignificant differences in access to pakka (proper) roads and bus facilities.
Table 4.7c reports the summary statistics on educational outcomes and the differences be-
tween treated and untreated regions. The differences between the regions on school attainment
and literacy rate are large and significant. The same is true for health outcomes where infant
mortality rate for children is significantly higher in the treated region. The treated region has
significantly worse health and educational outcomes, based on these parameters.
So, the overall quality of public good provision in the treated region is worse.
4.6 Conclusion
Caste has been a persistent feature of Indian society that has evolved over time and is associ-
ated with multiple related concepts such as Quam, Jati, and Varna. The colonial rule was an
important period in giving rise to the caste system as we know today (Dirks 2001), and one of
the ways through which the colonial rule altered the meaning and salience of caste was through
the caste-based colonial censuses - especially the census of 1901.
jwadi Party, BSP (Uttar Pradesh), Janata Party (disbanded), All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, AIADMK
(Tamil Nadu), Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, DMK (Tamil Nadu), Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam,
MDMK (Tamil Nadu), Paattali Makkall Katchi, PMK (Tamil Nadu), Biju Janata Dal, BJD (Orissa), and Republican
Party of India, RPI (Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh). Treated regions are mentioned in italics.
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Table 4.7b: Summary statistic on infrastructure quality at household or village level with differences between treated
and untreated regions. Robust standard errors clustered at 19 historical province level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated Diff
Infrastructure Quality
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean
Access to indoor piped 0.31 0 0.46 0 1 41427 0.22 0.42 -0.21***
drinking water (0.07)
Average hours of piped 1.88 0 4.31 0 24 41427 1.31 2.54 -1.24**
water (0.53)
Access to electricity 0.87 1 0.33 0 1 41420 0.81 0.94 -0.13**
(0.05)
Avg. hours of electricity 13.24 14 8.18 0 24 41422 11.71 15.02 -3.31**
(1.56)
Household toilet 0.56 1 0.5 0 1 41830 0.48 0.65 -0.17**
(0.07)
Drainage 0.71 1 0.45 0 1 1382 0.63 0.81 -0.18**
village (0.08)
Telephone 0.08 0 0.27 0 1 41555 0.06 0.11 -0.05**
(0.03)
Cell Phone 0.80 1 0.43 0 1 41559 0.76 0.86 -0.10**
(0.04)
Pakka Road 0.87 1 0.34 0 1 1382 0.87 0.87 -0.00
villages (0.05)
Bus facility 0.62 1 0.49 0 1 1383 0.55 0.70 -0.15
villages (0.09)
Table 4.7c: Summary statistic on educational attainment at individual level (for those aged 15 or above) and infant
mortality at birth history level, with differences between treated and untreated regions. Robust standard errors
clustered at 19 historical province level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Treated Untreated Diff
Education Outcomes
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean
Avg. years of education 6.40 7 5.07 0 16 145160 5.94 6.90 -0.89***
(0.31)
Literate 0.70 1 0.46 0 1 145197 0.67 0.74 -0.06**
(0.28)
Health Outcomes
VARIABLES mean median sd min max N mean mean
Infant mortality (<1 year) 0.06 0 0.24 0 1 109964 0.08 0.04 0.03**
(0.01)
Infant mortality (<1 month) 0.05 0 0.21 0 1 109964 0.06 0.03 0.03**
(0.01)
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We developed a model for intergenerational transmission of social identity, where a state’s
popularization of ideal prescriptions for social categories through enumerating exercises such
as the census (also see Lieberman & Singh (2017)), increases conformity to such ideal prescrip-
tions, leading to myriad long-term consequences including a decline of cosmopolitanism, and
the rise of caste-based organization of society. The 1901 census classification of India was an
exercise that ranked castes on the basis of prescribed Sanskritic ideals of twice-born castes. Our
empirical analysis showed that the regions that underwent this unique caste ranking and clas-
sification in 1901, were ex-ante similar on observable characteristics such as education, labor
share and pre-colonial caste elites (Tables 4.1a, 4.1b and 4.1c), but were geographically closer to
Bengal (Table 4.2) - the hub for the 1901 caste-based censuses. These regions immediately saw
a rise in caste-based petitioning and agitation in the 1901 census and the subsequent censuses
(Figure 4.6).
Today the regions that had such caste classification have a significantly lower level of out of
caste acquaintances with professionals (Table 4.5a), especially politicians and elected officials
(Table 4.5b), and have similar demographic characteristics, except for the intermediary castes,
which today are more likely to pass as Other Backward Castes (Table 4.6), a caste classification
which helps castes receive affirmative action. Moreover, today these regions have a greater
presence of caste-based parties and also have a poorer infrastructure quality (Table 4.7b) and
educational and health outcomes (Table 4.7c), each of which is an important component in
measuring the quality of the government.
The evidence presented in the chapter is suggestive of the role caste censuses played in
making the social construct of caste salient in modern India. By studying the unique setting of
the 1901 caste census, we were able to identify a scenario where such social construction of
identity could be causally tested. As caste related data only became common around the 1901
census, it is challenging to develop direct measures of salience of caste in the pre-1901 era.
An absence of caste petitioning before 1901 suggests that the political salience of caste indeed
was limited before 1901. Also, we collected data about the Mughal period and showed that the
regions that were affected by the 1901 caste census were not different historically from other
regions of India. In future, using techniques such as textual analysis, we would like to develop
better measures of salience of caste identity before and after our treatment period. We would
also like to include more variables that can measure the salience of caste identity in modern
India.
Chapter 5
Conclusion: Persistence and Change
Research in the past decade has shown that history can cast a long shadow on a society
(Michalopoulos & Papaioannou 2017). The positive experience of being a city republic (Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales 2016), or the negative experience of being exposed to slave trade (Nunn &
Wantchekon 2011) can have long-term consequences on civic capital and trust. In light of such
persistence, it becomes important to ask- when can societies break from the past, and what are
the exact mechanisms that are resisting such a change.
In the second chapter, I theoretically scrutinized a classical question that relates to how
societies organize: How honesty and trust evolves among strangers? I found that under a narrow
but identifiable set of conditions trust and honesty between strangers can emerge. These narrow
conditions include:
• a high benefit from engaging with strangers (corollary 1),
• a threshold adoption of sticky (w < wˆ) standardized business routines that reduced par-
tiality in business practices (corollary 2),
• some degree of aversion to risk and making losses (  > 0), and
• an absence of strong identities and prescriptions that promote in-group favoritism (corol-
lary 3).
If the above conditions hold, and benefits that relationship-based institutions can provide are not
too high (proposition 2), impersonal institutions can emerge. Cycles of trust, dishonesty, dis-
trust, and honesty can regulate the reputation of strangers in the market, and sustain impersonal
exchange.
In the third chapter, I focused on one of the most transformative periods of human history-
the fifteenth and sixteenth-century Europe. During this period, the European economy under-
went significant changes (Mokyr 2016, McCloskey 2016), and entered a path towards modern
economic growth, driven by growing markets and cities, especially in Northwestern Europe. In
the Northwestern European region, merchant guilds declined even though such guilds persisted
in other parts of Europe until much later (eighteenth and even nineteenth century). Drawing
from social network literature, I propose an explanation of a central puzzle in history: How
merchant guild networks declined in Northwestern Europe?
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I show that merchant guilds could persist and be dominant for so long because such
relationship-based social systems were a good alternative in the absence of credible systems
of impersonal exchange. But, when the incentives for entering in impersonal exchanges with
unknown traders increased (due to rise of long-distance trade at the Atlantic coast), and there
was more information and techniques available to new traders about how to conduct trade (due
to the rise of the printing press), merchant guilds declined and impersonal markets emerged. I
find that Northwestern European region had geographically favorable conditions, that enabled
both - easy access to the Atlantic coast and higher levels of printing penetration due to the
region’s closeness to Mainz.
In the fourth chapter, I turned the focus on the modern Indian caste system. The caste system
in India is not just a network of relationships, but also a source of social identity for people. With
Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, I studied: How caste identity became salient in India and
influenced networking and governance? We study the impact of the 1901 caste censuses on the
modern day patterns of networking and quality of government.
We first developed a model of intergenerational transmission of social identity of caste and
cosmopolitanism, drawing from the influential research by Akerlof & Kranton (2000) and Bisin
& Verdier (2001) on identity economics and cultural transmission. The model predicts that
caste-based organization of society will increase, and cosmopolitanism will go down if the
state popularized ’ideal” prescriptions of caste. We find that the popularization of “ideal” pre-
scriptions of caste, through the caste censuses in 1901, gave rise to caste organizations that
petitioned for a higher caste status in subsequent decades. The regions where these castes cen-
suses occurred in 1901, today have a higher salience of caste identity. This salience of caste
identity manifests in the form of lower levels of out-of-caste networks with professionals, and
higher rates of passing into castes that benefit from affirmative action. These regions also have
a greater presence of caste-based parties and lower levels of public goods generation. While the
first two chapters focused on how traditional social systems decline, this chapter showed how
social identities could persist through the reinvention of identity and the influence of institutions.
Overall, drawing from the history of the social organization in Europe and India, I make
theoretical contributions to topics such as trust (chapter 2), social networks (chapter 3) and
social identity (chapter 4). I show how traditional organization of society in the form of guilds
and caste can persist (chapters 3 and 4), evolve (chapter 4) and decline (chapters 2 and 3), and
how alternative impersonal systems of organizing society can emerge historically (chapters 2
and 3).
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Appendix A
Literature Review: Generalized Trust
Trust has become an important area of study in social sciences. Sociologist Edward Banfield
wrote his pioneering book Moral Basis of Backward Society in 1958 and described a Hobbesian
lack of social trust in southern Italy towards people outside of strict family circles. He attributed
the region’s present-day underdevelopment to the “amoral familism”, that made people cheat
non-family members, expecting others to do the same. Contrastingly, Tocqueville in his book
Democracy in America (1840) (Tocqueville 1862) gave a flattering description of civic culture in
the United States noting, “Each American knows when to sacrifice some of his private interests
to save the rest”. Emphasizing the importance of civic culture he wrote “science of association
is the mother of science; the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made”.
Among economists, Arrow (1969) was among the first to identify the value of trust, and he
wrote “norms of social behaviour, including ethical and moral codes” may compensate for mar-
ket failure and “in the absence of trust many opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation
would have to be, foregone.” Over the last few decades, a considerable macroeconomic litera-
ture has emerged that shows trust has economic significance (Knack & Keefer 1997, La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1997, Zak & Knack 2001) and levels of trust are different
across groups and regions, which are persistent (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1994, Uslaner
2002, Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2016, Tabellini 2008a, Buggle & Durante 2017, Nunn &
Wantchekon 2011) and only gradually change (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002, Giavazzi, Petkov &
Schiantarelli 2014).
A.1 Trust: Theoretical and Empirical literature
Drawing upon influential sociological research being conducted on social capital (Granovetter
1973, 1985, Coleman 1988), in 1990s two influential sociological works, Putnam, Leonardi &
Nanetti (1994) and Fukuyama (1995), emphasized the role of trust on economic development.
But, some economists (e.g., Solow (1995)) pointed at the problems in measuring trust as a
macroeconomic variable. Some empirical papers (Knack & Keefer 1997, La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1997, Zak & Knack 2001) began to measure trust using the inter-
national World Values Survey (WVS), that asked respondents “Generally speaking, would you
say that most people can be trusted, or that you can not be too careful in dealing with people?”
The greater the proportion of people in a country answering yes to the question, the greater the
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general trust in the country was considered to be. A country’s level of trust was found to be
correlated with its economic growth (Knack & Keefer 1997), and with efficiency in large orga-
nizations (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1997). Zak & Knack (2001) developed
a moral hazard model, where the ability to trust in an investment broker increased investment
and income growth and showed that trust and factors that could affect trust (like formal and
informal institutions and social homogeneity) were correlated with income growth.
There were also efforts by theorists to define trust. An extensive literature in sociology and
management (surveyed by Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer (1998)) attempted to understand
trust between relationships. Mayer, Davis & Schoorman (1995) focused on the aspect of vul-
nerability that trusting someone entails in social exchanges. Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994)
made the distinction between impersonal vs. relationship-based trust, and compared Japan and
USA to argue that Japanese society relied more on relationship-based trust, while the United
States had higher levels of generalized trust. Gambetta et al. (2000) considered trust to be a
subjective probability and Dasgupta (2000) theorized reputation for honesty as a sought after
but a fragile commodity. Dasgupta also argued that expectations regarding honest and dishonest
conduct could be self-fulfilling affecting trust, while Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti (1994) found
that generalized trust was persistent, and linked high present-day generalized trust in North Italy
to persistent civic norms that had developed in the region because of the existence of medieval
city republics.
Persistence of trust (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1994) sparked the interest of researchers
in its origins. Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) using individual-level General Social Survey (GSS)
data of US localities, found that generalized trust was lower in individuals who had a history
of traumatic experience, who belonged to historically discriminated groups, who were econom-
ically and educationally unsuccessful, or who were living in neighborhoods that were racially
mixed or had high-income inequality. Alesina & La Ferrara (2002) found no significant effect
of religion or ethnic origin on trust. Uslaner (2002) argued that trusting others was a persistent
moral value in individuals that was passed on by parents and was highly correlated with charity
and voluntary work. He argued that trusting attitude was unaffected by personal experience or
membership to civic groups (unlike Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti (1994) who proposed that civic
groups generated trust). Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2006), using GSS data found a strong pos-
itive correlation between generalized trust of US immigrants and the level of generalized trust
(measured by WVS) in their country of origin, hinting towards persistence. Guiso, Sapienza &
Zingales (2016) found strong empirical evidence of historical persistence of trust attitude, as city
republic experience during medieval era in North Italy was strongly and positively correlated to
present levels of trust and social capital in the region, as proposed by Putnam, Leonardi &
Nanetti (1994). Tabellini (2008a) also found evidence of persistence, with higher levels of trust
found in second generation US immigrants originating from countries with more democratic
institutions over a century ago. Nunn & Wantchekon (2011) similarly found that experience of
slavery had a persistent effect on distrust in Africa. Buggle & Durante (2017) similarly showed
that annual variability of weather conditions during 1500- 1750 stimulated trust in Europe.
Tabellini (2008b) developed a theoretical model to explain the persistence and found that
impersonal values supporting trust between socially distant individuals could persist by creating
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a strong incentive for parents to invest in such value education, and by generating institutions
that support such values ((Alesina & La Ferrara 2002) found a high social distance to be a barrier
to trust). Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2008a) developed a model complementary to the value-
based model of Tabellini (2008b), showing that beliefs regarding the honesty of others could
be persistent and transferred between generations. Giavazzi, Petkov & Schiantarelli (2014)
using GSS data studied the persistence of trust attitude (and other cultural traits) among US
immigrants in detail, and found that trust attitude brought by first generation US immigrants
did not persist (unlike some other cultural traits) among fourth generation US immigrants, but
second generation US immigrants showed some persistence.
So, a body of evidence suggests that values and beliefs regarding trust passed down by par-
ents do persist among individuals (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1994, Uslaner 2002, Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales 2016, Tabellini 2008a, Buggle & Durante 2017, Nunn & Wantchekon
2011), but values and beliefs themselves can gradually change depending on individual expe-
riences (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002, Giavazzi, Petkov & Schiantarelli 2014). Dohmen, Falk,
Huffman & Sunde (2012) looking at German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) data find similar
results where risk and trust attitudes of children was affected by the attitude of parents as well
as the prevailing attitude in the region.
A.2 Trust: Experimental literature
During the time a large body of empirical and theoretical literature was emerging, experimental
literature was also emerging that highlighted the nature of trust at a micro level. Berg, Dickhaut
& McCabe (1995) developed the influential investment game, which has become a standard in
literature as a means to understand and model (Zak & Knack 2001, Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales
2008a) trust and honesty (trustworthiness). In the game, an investor decides to invest a particular
amount with a trustee which gets multiplied, and the trustee decides how much of money to
return to the investor. An investor that invests a larger amount is considered more trusting,
while a trustee that returns a larger amount is considered more honest, where the standard Nash
equilibrium outcome is for the investor not to invest, and for the trustee to not return. The
origins of the investment game can be traced to other stage games, like dictator game, ultimatum
game, prisoner’s dilemma game, trust game (Kreps 1996), centipede game (Rosenthal 1981) and
exchange game (Fehr, Kirchsteiger & Riedl 1993) each of which have been used by researchers
to understand behaviour that does not match the standard rational framework of economics.
The experimental literature (starting with Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995)) has found that
unlike the standard game theory equilibrium, investors do invest and trustees do return. But,
it is not necessarily clear if trusting and honest conduct reflects social preferences such as al-
truism or a norm of reciprocity (Cox 2004), and if the social preferences are components of
trust or separate from it. So, researchers have explored the preferences that underpin individ-
ual behaviour to understand trust. Influential set of papers (on inequity aversion by Fehr &
Schmidt (1999)); on altruistic punishment by Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000, 2002); on altruism by Fehr
& Fischbacher (2003); on betrayal aversion by Bohnet & Zeckhauser (2004); on reciprocity by
Falk & Fischbacher (2006)) developed robust theories of fairness, altruism and reciprocity, and
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explored the behavioural underpinnings of trust. A classic paper by Fehr & Schmidt (1999)
argued that inequity aversion could explain cooperation as individuals get motivated to inflict
costly punishment to free riders. Exploring biological underpinnings of trust, Kosfeld, Hein-
richs, Zak, Fischbacher & Fehr (2005) found that higher oxytocin increases trusting attitude.
Another influential paper Henrich et al. (2001) looked at 15 small-scale societies and showed
that in the sampled societies individuals showed other-regarding preferences and deviated from
the standard “homo-economicus” model.
The social preference-based framework is important for understanding human behaviour,
and it poses a question whether surveys like WVS measure trust or other preferences. But, the
behaviour-based theories do not convincingly explain why there exists considerable heterogene-
ity in trusting behaviour across societies and their determinants as measured in WVS surveys
or trust games (Johnson & Mislin 2011). The body of literature (surveyed by Fehr (2009)) has
nonetheless convincingly shown that social preferences of individuals (which may or may not
be universal) are an important component of what gets observed as trusting or honest conduct,
and a narrow focus on economic preferences or beliefs is not enough to understand the topic,
but more work needs to be done to understand how heterogeneity emerges in preferences and
beliefs across societies and groups.
Appendix B
Simulations of Emergence of Trust
In this section I look at the conditions needed for the evolution to an impersonal equilibrium,
using simulation. In the following example, a population of 10,000 agents had 1,000 exchanges,
with a randomly paired agent in each exchange. Of all agents, 5,000 were agents with honest
attitude (pH = 0.5), of which a tiny fraction of 100 were honest and impersonal (pHI = 0.01).
Payoffs were set at c = 0.5,m = 0.05 and h = 0.1. Impersonal traders became relationship-
based on being cheated with probability ks = 1, and relationship-based traders became im-
personal traders on being cooperated with probability ko = 1. Agents imitate another agent
of different attitude with a probability equal to the product of a timescale constant w = 0.1,
and the difference in fitness of paired agents (calculated in variable fitness, and Mode = 0).
S = 100 iterations of the simulation are run, and the average population of trusting (HI-type)
agents (variable meantrust), and of dishonest (D-type) agents (variable meandishonesty) is
calculated over time. Figure B.1 presents the results of the simulation of variation of HI-type
and D-type agents.
Note that in the theoretical model (section 2.1) agents consider the average relative fitness
of the types and not just the relative fitness of the imitated agent. In a simulation model where
average fitness is considered (Mode = 1), results exactly match theoretical predictions, as
is evident in Figure B.2, which notes 10 simulations (S = 10). When initial population is
pH(0) = 0.49 and pHI(0) = 0.01, because the initial population of honest agents is below the
necessary threshold, as theoretically expected according to the threshold condition in Corollary
2, the final equilibrium outcome is pHI = 0, i.e., no honest and impersonal agents exist in the
system.
If the rate of imitation is increased (w = 0.5), while other parameters stay equal, then
the impersonal equilibrium is reached sooner, and the cyclic pattern of trust and dishonesty as
discussed in section 2.2.3 is visible in Figure B.3.
If relationship-based payoff is increased to, for example m = 0.2, while other parameters
stay equal, then even a population completely dominated by HT-type agents pH = pHT = 0.99
cannot sustain trust as is evident from Figure B.4. This observation is in line with the utility
condition in Corollary 1. Similarly, no trust emerged when initial population of agents with
honest attitude was 4,000, i.e., pH = 0.4 (all else being equal or at a higher w = 0.5), as a
critical threshold was not reached.
A simulation exercise incorporating trust anchors (so that pA > 0) shows that impersonal
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Figure B.1: Y-axis represents number of dishonest (D-
type) and honest and trusting (HI-type) agents over time.
The individual trends show results of 100 simulations,
while thick Black line shows average population of HI-
type honest and trusting agents overtime, while thick Red
line shows average population of D-type dishonest agents.
The simulations match theoretical expectations. c =
0.5,m = 0.05, h = 0.1, w = 0.1, ks = 1, ko = 1. Total
population is 10,000, pH(0) = 0.5 and pHI(0) = 0.01.
Mode = 0.
Figure B.2: Y-axis represents number of dishonest (D-
type) and honest and trusting (HI-type) agents over time
whenMode = 1. The individual trends show results of 10
simulations, while thick Black line shows average popula-
tion of HI-type honest and trusting agents overtime, while
thick Red line shows average population of D-type dishon-
est agents. The simulations match theoretical expectations
of equilibrium pHI = 0.5 and pD = 0.25. c = 0.5,m =
0.05, h = 0.1, w = 0.1, ks = 1, ko = 1. Total popula-
tion is 10,000, pH(0) = 0.51 and pHI(0) = 0.01.
Figure B.3: Y-axis represents number of dishonest (D-
type) and honest and trusting (HI-type) agents over time.
The individual trends show results of 10 simulations,
where thick Black line shows population of HI-type hon-
est and trusting agents overtime for one particular iter-
ation, while thick Red line shows population of D-type
dishonest agents of the same iteration. The simulations
match theoretical expectations. c = 0.5,m = 0.05,
h = 0.1, w = 0.5, ks = 1, ko = 1. Total population
is 10,000, pH(0) = 0.5 and pHI(0) = 0.01. Mode = 0.
Figure B.4: Y-axis represents number of dishonest (D-
type) and honest and trusting (HI-type) agents over time.
The individual trends show results of 10 simulations,
while thick Black line shows average population of HI-
type honest and trusting agents overtime, while thick
Red line shows average population of D-type dishonest
agents. The simulations match theoretical expectations
that pHI = 0 as the utility condition in Corollary 1 is
not satisfied. c = 0.5,m = 0.2, h = 0.1, w = 0.1, ks =
1, ko = 1. Total population is 10,000, pH(0) = 0.99 and
pHI(0) = 0.99. Mode = 0.
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Figure B.5: Y-axis represents number of dishonest (D-type) and honest and trusting (HI-type) agents over time in
presence of 10 trust anchors. The individual trends show results of 10 simulations. The simulations match theoretical
expectations. c = 0.5,m = 0.05, h = 0.1, w = 0.5, ks = 1, ko = 1. Total population is 10,000, pH(0) = 0.4 and
pHI(0) = 0.01, and there are 10 trust anchors. Mode = 0
equilibrium can emerge at a lower threshold in the presence of a small fraction of unconditional
cooperators (trust anchors). If there were 10 unconditional cooperators in a population of 10,000
in our simulation model, and there were 4,000 honest agents (pH = 0.4) impersonal exchange
can still emerge especially when imitation rate (w = 0.5) is high, as shown in Figure B.5.
The following MATLAB code was implemented to perform the above simulations.
% Cooperation Emergence Case
% Initializing constants
p = 10000; % total population
N = 1000; % number of rounds
S = 100; % number of simulation iterations
w = 0.1; % constant regulating the rate of imitation
c = 0.5;
m = 0.05;
h = 0.1;
k_s = 1;
k_o = 1;
p_H = 5000; % initial population of H-type agents
p_HI = 100; % initial population of HI-type agents
p_A= 0; % number of trust anchors (unconditional cooperators)
trust = zeros(S,N); %Number of HI-type at a given time
dishonesty = zeros(S,N); %Number of D-type at a given time
mode = 0; % mode = 1 for average type fitness, 0 for partner fitness
%simulation
for u = 1:S
% Initializing variables
attitude = 3*ones(p,N); % can take values 1: H, 2: D, 3: A
attitude(1:p_H,1) = 1;
attitude(p_H+1:p-p_A,1) = 2;
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orientation = 4*ones(p,N); % can take values 1: HI, 2: HR, 3: D, 4: A
orientation(1:p_HI,1) = 1;
orientation(p_HI+1:p_H,1) = 2;
orientation(p_H+1:p-p_A,1) = 3;
fitness = zeros(p,N); %Matrix recording the fitness of each agent in
each interaction
imitation = randi(p,p,N); %A matrix of which agent imitates which
random agent in a given period
count = zeros(3,N); %Number of H, D, A type attitude at a given time
sumfitness = zeros(3,N); %sum of fitness of H, D, A type attitude at
a given time
meanfitness = zeros(3,N); %mean fitness of H, D, A type attitude at
a given time
for t = 1:N-1
% Interaction
pairedagent = zeros(p,1); %Matrix recording the paired agents in
a given interaction
r = randperm(p); % randomly permute all p agents, first 1:p/2
agents will be paired to remaining p/2+1:end agents, in that
order
pair1 = r(1:floor(p/2));
pair2 = r(floor(p/2)+1:end);
pairedagent(pair1) = pair2;
pairedagent(pair2) = pair1;
for i = 1:p
if (orientation(i,t) == 1 && or((attitude(pairedagent(i),t) ==
1),(attitude(pairedagent(i),t) == 3)))
fitness(i,t) = c;
sumfitness(1,t)=sumfitness(1,t)+c;
orientation(i,t+1) = 1;
else if (orientation(i,t) == 1 && attitude(pairedagent(i),t)
== 2)
fitness(i,t) = -h;
sumfitness(1,t)=sumfitness(1,t)-h;
if (rand <= k_s) % with probability k_s
orientation(i,t+1) = 2;
else
orientation(i,t+1) = 1;
end
else if (orientation(i,t) == 2 &&
or((orientation(pairedagent(i),t) ==
1),(orientation(pairedagent(i),t) == 4)))
fitness(i,t) = c;
sumfitness(1,t)=sumfitness(1,t)+c;
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if (rand <= k_o) % with probability k_o
orientation(i,t+1) = 1;
else
orientation(i,t+1) = 2;
end
else if (orientation(i,t) == 2 &&
or((orientation(pairedagent(i),t) ==
2),(orientation(pairedagent(i),t) == 3)))
fitness(i,t) = m;
sumfitness(1,t)=sumfitness(1,t)+m;
orientation(i,t+1) = 2;
else if (orientation(i,t) == 3 &&
or((orientation(pairedagent(i),t) ==
1),(orientation(pairedagent(i),t) == 4)))
fitness(i,t) = c+h;
sumfitness(2,t)=sumfitness(2,t)+c+h;
orientation(i,t+1) = 3;
else if (orientation(i,t) == 3 &&
or((orientation(pairedagent(i),t) ==
2),(orientation(pairedagent(i),t) == 3)))
fitness(i,t) = m;
sumfitness(2,t)=sumfitness(2,t)+m;
orientation(i,t+1) = 3;
else if (orientation(i,t) == 4 &&
or((attitude(pairedagent(i),t) ==
1),(attitude(pairedagent(i),t) == 3)))
fitness(i,t) = c;
sumfitness(3,t)=sumfitness(3,t)+c;
orientation(i,t+1) = 4;
else if (orientation(i,t) == 4 && attitude(pairedagent(i),t)
== 2)
fitness(i,t) = -h;
sumfitness(3,t)=sumfitness(3,t)-h;
orientation(i,t+1) = 4;
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
end
count(1,t) = sum(attitude(:,t) == 1);
count(2,t) = sum(attitude(:,t) == 2);
count(3,t) = sum(attitude(:,t) == 3);
meanfitness(1,t)=rdivide(sumfitness(1,t),count(1,t));
meanfitness(2,t)=rdivide(sumfitness(2,t),count(2,t));
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meanfitness(3,t)=rdivide(sumfitness(3,t),count(3,t));
% Imitation
if mode == 0
for i = 1:p
if ((fitness(imitation(i,t),t) > fitness(i,t)) &&
and(attitude(i,t)˜=3,attitude(imitation(i,t),t)˜=3) &&
(rand <= w*(fitness(imitation(i,t),t) - fitness(i,t))))
attitude(i,t+1) = attitude(imitation(i,t),t);
orientation(i,t+1) = orientation(imitation(i,t),t);
else
attitude(i,t+1) = attitude(i,t);
end
end
else
for i = 1:p
if ((meanfitness((attitude(imitation(i,t),t)),t) >
meanfitness((attitude(i,t)),t)) &&
and(attitude(i,t)˜=3,attitude(imitation(i,t),t)˜=3) &&
(rand <= w*(meanfitness((attitude(imitation(i,t),t)),t)
- meanfitness((attitude(i,t)),t))))
attitude(i,t+1) = attitude(imitation(i,t),t);
if attitude(i,t+1) ˜= attitude(i,t);
orientation(i,t+1) = orientation(imitation(i,t),t);
end
else
attitude(i,t+1) = attitude(i,t);
end
end
end
end
trust(u,:) = sum(orientation == 1);
dishonesty(u,:) = sum(orientation == 3);
end
meantrust = mean(trust);
meandishonesty = mean(dishonesty);
Appendix C
Proofs on Existence of Genrealized
Trust
C.1 Proof of Stationarity and Stability in Proposition 1
Given the dynamics in Equations 2.3 and 2.4 , si is a stationary point s.t.
dpH(t)
dt = 0 and
dpHI(t)
dt = 0. So:
s1 = (pH = 1, pHI = 1);
s2 2 S2 = (pH 2 [0, 1], pHI = 0);
s3 =
 
pH = 1  kohks(c m) kom ,
pHI = 1  (ko+ks)hks(c m) kom
!
where pHI > 0 if kskHI+ko >
h+m
c .
A stationary point si is stable if system of Equations 2.3 and 2.4 F (pH , pHI) =
"
dpH(t)
dt
dpHI(t)
dt
#
at si has Jacobian matrix JF (pH ,pHI)(si) with Trace tr(JF (pH ,pHI)(si)) < 0 and Determinant
det(JF (pH ,pHI)(si))   0.
It is found:
• At point s1 for JF (pH ,pHI)(s1)1, det(JF (pH ,pHI)(S1)) < 0. So s1 is unstable equilibrium.
• At points s2 2 S2 for JF (pH ,pHI)(s2)2, det(JF (pH ,pHI)(s2)) = 0. So s2 is stable but
not asymptotically stable if tr(JF (pH ,pHI)(s2)) < 0. tr(JF (pH ,pHI)(s2)) < 0 if at s2
pH < pcrH = (
ks
ks+ko
). So, points with pH > pcrH in S2 are unstable.
• At point s3 for JF (pH ,pHI)(s3)3, det(JF (pH ,pHI)(s3)) > 0 and tr(JF (pH ,pHI)(s3)) < 0
when w < ksc (ks+ko)mh(c fHI(c m)) where fHI =
pHI
pH
. So, s3 is a stable equilibrium when w is
small.
1JF (pH ,pHI )(s1) =

wh 0
(ko + ks) + wh  ko
 
2JF (pH ,pHI )(s2) =

0 wpD(cpH   (m+ h))
0 kopH   kspD
 
3JF (pH ,pHI )(s3) =

wpDpHIc  wpHpHI(c m)
(ks + ko)pHI + fHIwpDpHIc  kopHI   fHIwpDpHI(c m)
 
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Ruler removes monopoly of merchant guilds only if merchant guild elites cannot block such
transition by raising relationship-based payoff (m). As merchant guild elites can at most set
m  mmax, so when Corollary 1 and 2 are satisfied for m = mmax, then transition can occur
without being blocked by merchant guild elites. Corollary 1 and 2 are necessary conditions for
ruler to remove monopoly of merchant guilds, which are true if pH(0) >
(1+ m)(mmax+h)
c+ mmmax+(1+ m)h
and c > (1+ m) m h + m
max (Region 1 of Figure 2.5). In all other conditions, elites can block
such a transition by settingm 2 [mmin,mmax). When ruler has not removed monopoly, which
is true if pH(0)  (1+ m)(m
max+h)
c+ mmmax+(1+ m)h
or c  (1+ m) m h +mmax, then loss from being cheated
hi =  h. If merchant guild elites set m = mmin, traders will not transition if pH(0) 
(1+ m)(mmin+ h)
c+ mmmin+(1+ m) h
and c  (1+ m)  m h + mmin (Region 3 of Figure 2.5). If there exists a
region which lies outside of Region 1 and 3 (Region 2 of Figure 2.5), then in the region merchant
guild elites setm 2 (mmin,mmax). The above proves Proposition 2
C.3 Trust Anchors
In presence of trust anchors i.e. impersonal and impartial institutions that exchange honestly
and impersonally (e.g. bishops in North Italy (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales 2016)) regardless
of past experience in society such that kopHR(t)✏ traders are always acting as HI-type traders
where ✏! 0, evolutionary and behavioural dynamics is given as:
dpH(t)
dt
=  dpD(t)
dt
= wpD(t)pHI(t)(pH(t)c
 (c m)pHI(t)  (m+ h))
(C.1)
dpHI(t)
dt
= kopHR(t)(pHI(t) + ✏)  kspHI(t)pD(t) +
pHI(t)
pH(t)
dpH(t)
dt
(C.2)
Finding stationary points Soi s.t.
dpH(t)
dt = 0 and
dpHI(t)
dt = 0 where S
o is stable if system of
equation [5] and [6] F o(pH , pHI) =
"
dpH(t)
dt
dpHI(t)
dt
#
at Soi has Jacobian matrix JF o(pH ,pHI)(S
o
i )
with Trace tr(JF o(pH ,pHI)(S
o
i )) < 0 and Determinant det(JF o(pH ,pHI)(S
o
i ))   0.
So there exist two sets of stable equilibria:
1. pH = 0 represents an asymptotic equilibrium.
2. pH = 1  kohks(c m) kom and pH = 1 
(ko+ks)h
ks(c m) kom represents an asymptotic equilibrium
if w < wˆ distinct from (i) if ksko+ks >
h+m
c .
3. If pH(0) > h+mc and pHI(0)! 0 when ksko+ks > h+mc and w < wˆ the system converges
to the asymptotic equilibrium (2) and (1) otherwise.
Appendix D
Case Study: A tale of two cities -
Hamburg and Lu¨beck
The cities of Hamburg and Lu¨beck have an interwoven and eventful history1. Whereas Lu¨beck
offers an example of how dominant cities may become unattractive and decline when they end
up serving the interests of a privileged few and refuse to change, Hamburg serves as a tale of how
cities can reinvent themselves by changing with the times. The cities, in the north of Germany,
are just 65 kilometres (40 miles) apart. Yet, given the shape of the Jutland peninsula, Hamburg
lies on the Atlantic coast, while Lu¨beck lies on the Baltic (see Figure 3.3).
Both Hamburg and Lu¨beck were members of the medieval Hanseatic League. This league
was a federation of merchant guilds - an association of wholesale traders that had a privileged
regional monopoly over trade - that traded across northern Europe. These guilds were the dom-
inant way of doing trade across medieval Europe.
Within the Hanseatic League, Hamburg and Lu¨beck were sprawling cities. While Lu¨beck
served as the chief Baltic entrepoˆt of Europe, Hamburg provided the Hanseatic League with
access to the Atlantic. Between the two cities lay the elaborate Elbe river and canal system to
facilitate the transport of goods. Lu¨beck prided itself on being the Queen of the Hanseatic until
the fifteenth century, while Hamburg was its smaller, allied partner.
Times became rocky for the Hanseatic system in the fifteenth century. This was in part
due to the rise of the Dutch, who were once beneficiaries of trade with the Hanseatic but were
now the league’s seafaring competitors. Before the arrival of the Dutch, almost all trade to
and from the Baltic passed through Lu¨beck. Likewise, Hamburg benefited from being the sole
major Atlantic port of the Hanseatic. The link between Lu¨beck and Hamburg was a crucial route
for trade in the north. But, the Dutch began to trade with the Baltic by navigating around the
Jutland peninsula and through the Sound (Øresund). Thus, the Dutch soon began to reach the
Baltic shores without the need to visit Hamburg or Lu¨beck. This competition from the Dutch
disrupted the two cities centuries-old domination over trade between the Atlantic and the Baltic.
How did the two cities respond? Differently. Lu¨beck responded to this competition with
the Dutch by giving more privileges to its own merchants and by leading a persistent attempt to
disrupt the Dutch trade through the Sound (which included taking part in the Dano Hanseatic
1Originally published in Promarket blog of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of
Business
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War of 1426-35 and the Dutch Hanseatic War of 1438-41). In contrast, while Hamburg initially
was an ally to Lu¨beck in its resistance to the Dutch (including in the two wars), it eventually
began to diverge from its partner in the sixteenth century. Hamburg opened trade to all locals
and non-locals, and instead of resisting this rising Dutch trade, it adapted itself perfectly to the
changing situation and moved toward an open system of trade that welcomed diverse merchants
(Dollinger (1970), p. 355). Thus, Hamburg internally reformed, and the centuries-old privileges
that a few of its merchants enjoyed declined, especially in the sixteenth century. This made a
difference.
Hamburg over time became integrated with the Atlantic trading system to its west, and
expanded as a major Atlantic entrepoˆt of northern Europe. Traders from around Europe could
trade in Hamburg, and this attracted more merchants and more trade. And what about Lu¨beck?
While the traditional traders held onto their privileges in the city, Lu¨beck as a whole declined
slowly but persistently, especially after the sixteenth century.
Dollinger (1970) (p. 372), recounting the decline of Lu¨beck in his classic book The German
Hansa, wrote:
The spirit of conservatism, which seems to have been particularly strong in Lu¨beck,
was one of the main causes of Hanseatic weakness in and after the fifteenth century.
As foreign competition intensified, the only remedy proposed was an even stricter
regulation of trade. In striving to limit the business operations of foreigners in her
domain, the Hansa hindered the activities of her own merchants, forbidding them
to go into partnership with foreigners or to trade on credit.
This contrasts with Hamburg, about which Dollinger (1970) (p. 356) wrote:
To a large extent the greatness of Hamburg was the work of foreign merchants.
They came in large numbers and they stayed. The town did all it could to facilitate
their business. Foreigners were authorized to trade freely among themselves and to
enter into partnerships with Hamburg merchants.
One can make a simpler argument that Lu¨beck could not compete with Hamburg in the
Atlantic trade era, simply because it was not an Atlantic city. Yet, the story seems to be more
nuanced. It is indeed true that not being directly on the Atlantic coast was a hurdle for Lu¨beck
that Hamburg did not have. Geographical differences must have played a role in the institutional
divergence between Lu¨beck and Hamburg. Conditions were more favourable for Hamburg to
develop open markets of the kind that had developed in its Atlantic neighbourhood, like in
Amsterdam and Antwerp.
Yet, it was the closed and protective nature of trade in Lu¨beck that was key to its decline2.
Lu¨beck ceased to be an attractive destination for new merchants, as it protected its existing
merchants from foreigners and as competition increased from trade through the Sound. It is not
as if Lu¨beck could not have competed or cooperated with Hamburg (and with the Danes who
controlled the Sound) and remained a key player in the emerging Atlantic trading system.
2see Lindberg (2009) for a look at the political economy of Lu¨beck.
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After all, Lu¨beck was the larger and the richer of the two cities, it was the chief Baltic
entrepoˆt that had elaborate waterways to the Atlantic, and in the fifteenth century it was still the
Queen of the Hansa with significant political clout. It could have welcomed traders from the
Atlantic and the Baltic, and remained an international trading hub, instead of ceding influence
to its close and smaller neighbour, Hamburg. Yet, Lu¨beck chose to use its clout to protect its
own privileged merchants in a vain attempt to stifle unguilded Dutch and English competition
(Ogilvie (2011) p. 87).
It also continued using its clout to restrict trade of Dutch merchants through the Sound
(e.g., in 1470), but failed in its attempts, as other Hanseatic towns (especially on the eastern
and western flank) refused to cooperate (Bes, Frankot & Brand (2007), p. 5). Hence, Lu¨beck
attempted to conserve the old ways of Baltic trade via privileged monopolies and restrictions,
while Hamburg repealed the monopolies of its local merchant guild, and permitted non-locals
to trade freely among themselves and form partnerships with locals (Ogilvie (2011) p. 87).
While historical anecdotes should not be used as conclusive evidence, they can serve as
cautionary tales. In this case, Lu¨beck serves as an example of how dominant cities may become
unattractive and decline when they end up serving the interests of a privileged few and refuse to
change. In contrast, Hamburg serves as a tale of how cities can reinvent themselves by changing
with the times and by investing in pro-market institutions that make them attractive centres for
trade and commerce for a broad and diverse base of potential traders.
Appendix E
Data on Cities of Europe
E.1 50 largest European (excluding Russian) cities in the four-
teenth, fifteenth and sixteenth century
Table E.1: Largest European cities in 1400. Source: Bairoch, Batou & Chevre (1988).
City Population (,000)
1400
Rank 1400
PARIS 275 1
BRUGGE 125 2
GENOV A 100 3
GRANADA 100 3
V ENEZIA 100 3
PRAHA 95 6
MILANO 90 7
SEV ILLA 70 8
GENT 56 9
FIRENZE 55 10
LISBOA 55 10
BOLOGNA 45 12
LONDON 45 12
NAPOLI 45 12
TOLEDO 45 12
SALONIKA 42 16
CORDOBA 40 17
FERRARA 40 17
KOELN 40 17
MALAGA 40 17
TOURNAI 40 17
BARCELONA 38 22
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V ALENCIA 36 23
ATHINAI 35 24
CREMONA 35 24
ROUEN 35 24
V ERONA 35 24
PADOV A 34 28
LY ON 33 29
ROMA 33 29
AQUILA 30 31
AV IGNON 30 31
BELGRADE 30 31
BORDEAUX 30 31
LIEGE 30 31
ORLEANS 30 31
BRESCIA 27 37
BURGOS 27 37
PALERMO 27 37
BRUXELLES 26 40
ALMERIA 25 41
ANGERS 25 41
LUEBECK 25 41
MANTUA 25 41
METZ 25 41
PIACENZA 25 41
TIRGOV ISTE 25 41
ERFURT 24 48
LUCCA 23 49
PISA 23 49
V ALENCIENNES 23 49
Table E.2: Largest European cities in 1500. Source: Bairoch, Batou & Chevre (1988).
City Population (,000)
1500
Rank 1500
PARIS 225 1
NAPOLI 125 2
MILANO 100 3
V ENEZIA 100 3
GRANADA 70 5
PRAHA 70 5
LISBOA 65 7
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TOURS 60 8
GENOV A 58 9
FIRENZE 55 10
GENT 55 10
PALERMO 55 10
ROMA 55 10
BOLOGNA 50 14
BORDEAUX 50 14
LONDON 50 14
LY ON 50 14
ORLEANS 50 14
SKOPJE 50 14
TIRGOV ISTE 50 14
V ERONA 50 14
BRESCIA 49 22
KOELN 45 23
MARSEILLE 45 23
SEV ILLA 45 23
FERRARA 42 26
MALAGA 42 26
V ALENCIA 42 26
CREMONA 40 29
ROUEN 40 29
NUERNBERG 38 31
BRUGGE 35 32
CORDOBA 35 32
TOURNAI 35 32
BRUXELLES 33 35
BOURGES 32 36
POZNAN 32 36
TOLEDO 32 36
ALMERIA 30 39
ANTWERPEN 30 39
AUGSBURG 30 39
BELGRADE 30 39
GDANSK 30 39
LUCCA 30 39
PLOV DIV 30 39
TOULOUSE 30 39
V ALLADOLID 30 39
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PADOV A 29 48
LILLE 26 49
CAEN 25 50
LUEBECK 25 50
MANTUA 25 50
MECHELEN 25 50
MESSINA 25 50
MURCIA 25 50
PIACENZA 25 50
PLASENCIA 25 50
WROCLAW 25 50
Table E.3: Largest European cities in 1600. Source: Bairoch, Batou & Chevre (1988).
City Population (,000)
1600
Rank 1600
PARIS 300 1
NAPOLI 275 2
LONDON 200 3
V ENEZIA 151 4
SEV ILLA 135 5
LISBOA 130 6
MILANO 120 7
PALERMO 105 8
PRAHA 100 9
ROMA 100 9
GDANSK 80 11
TOLEDO 80 11
FIRENZE 76 13
ROUEN 70 14
GRANADA 69 15
MADRID 65 16
TOURS 65 16
V ALENCIA 65 16
BOLOGNA 63 19
GENOV A 63 19
BELGRADE 55 21
SKOPJE 55 21
AMSTERDAM 54 23
BRUXELLES 50 24
MESSINA 50 24
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SALONIKA 50 24
WIEN 50 24
ANTWERPEN 47 28
AUGSBURG 45 29
MARSEILLE 45 29
SARAJEV O 45 29
V ERONA 45 29
LEIDEN 44 33
V ALLADOLID 41 34
BORDEAUX 40 35
HAMBURG 40 35
KOBENHAV N 40 35
KOELN 40 35
MAGDEBURG 40 35
NUERNBERG 40 35
ORLEANS 40 35
TOULOUSE 40 35
WROCLAW 40 35
HAARLEM 39 44
BRESCIA 36 45
CREMONA 36 45
LY ON 35 47
ATHINAI 33 48
FERRARA 33 48
JEREZ   DE  
LA  FRONTERA
33 48
LILLE 33 48
PADOV A 33 48
PIACENZA 33 48
RENNES 33 48
E.2 Type of Institution by city
Table E.4: Economic Institutions in European cities
City Note Code
ALMERIA Spanish cities were feudal in character and cities began re-
ceiving merchant guild permissions only in late medieval
period. Alemeria was not granted a Consulado (merchant
guild) and thus lost out in patronage to other Spanish cities
(Smith (1940), p. 15).
R2
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AMSTERDAM Amsterdam rose during the sixteenth century and did not
have a major local merchant guild barring some areas
of commerce, and prohibited alien merchant guilds from
gaining monopoly privileges (Ogilvie (2011), p. 32).
I2
ANGERS No specific information on the city. French cities re-
sisted any guild reform until at least the eighteenth century.
Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had some par-
tial reform during the eighteenth century. (Horn (2015), p.
224).
R3
ANTWERPEN In Antwerp, merchant guilds began to decline around 1500,
with a shift away from dominance by the merchant guild
towards one in which individual merchants could con-
duct trade without the restrictions often imposed by guilds.
(Ogilvie (2011), p. 32)
I2
AQUILA Feudal rights were were being enjoyed by elites at least
until the eighteenth century in Aquila (Epstein (2004), p.
328).
R2
ATHINAI No specific information on nature of institutions in Athens,
but given that ruling Ottoman empire had a system of
granting privileges (Ogilvie 2011), it is assumed economic
organization in Ottoman influenced Athens was similar.
R3
AUGSBURG Augsburg was dominated by Fuggers who continued their
influence throughout the sixteenth century albeit some
anti monopoly dissent caused by Martin Luther inspired
writings. In an edict in 1525 Charles V weighed in on
monopoly issue in favor of the merchant companies, argu-
ing that private interest and the common good were com-
patible (Ha¨berlein 2012).
R1
AV IGNON No specific information on the city. French cities re-
sisted any guild reform until at least the eighteenth century.
Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had some par-
tial reform during the eighteenth century (Horn (2015), p.
224).
R3
BARCELONA In Catalonia (Barcelona) merchant guilds enjoyed privi-
leges in early modern period (Ogilvie (2011), pp. 33-34
).
R1
BELGRADE Belgrade had merchant guilds during the sixteenth-
seventeenth century. Merchant colonies of Bosnian
merchants blocked the settlement of Ragusan merchant
colonies in Belgrade and other Hungarian and Slavonian
towns (Ogilvie (2011), p. 124).
R1
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BOLOGNA Silk and hemp merchant guilds continued to enjoy mer-
chant guild monopolies in the eighteenth century Bologna
(Ogilvie (2011), p. 113).
R1
BORDEAUX No specific information on the city. French cities re-
sisted any guild reform until at least the eighteenth century.
Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had some par-
tial reform during the eighteenth century (Horn (2015), p.
224).
R3
BOURGES No specific information on the city. French cities re-
sisted any guild reform until at least the eighteenth century.
Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had some par-
tial reform during the eighteenth century (Horn (2015), p.
224).
R3
BRESCIA In regions of Bergamo and Brescia, in the sixteenth cen-
tury, strategic considerations led Venice to make signifi-
cant concessions of autonomy that freed such communities
from direct dominion by the cities (Epstein (2004), p. 301).
U1
BRUGGE In Bruges, merchant guilds continued their privileges only
until the mid sixteenth century (Ogilvie (2011), p. 12).
I2
BRUXELLES Antwerp emerged as a major trading market for traders of
the region Ogilvie (2011). No evidence exists such that in-
dividual merchant guilds successfully blocked locals from
doing trade through Antwerp. The closeness of Belgian
cities hindered them from enforcing exclusive privilege
(Ogilvie (2011), pp. 31-32).
U2
BURGOS In Spain, local merchant guilds such as those of Burgos
and Bilbao used staple privileges to impose costs on for-
eign traders throughout the early modern period (Ogilvie
(2011), p. 70-71).
R1
CAEN Along with records of persistent guild system in Caen un-
til at least the eighteenth century Europe (Horn (2015), p.
224), there are accounts about Caen Butcher guilds, where
workers complained that guild masters taxed them unfairly
(Kwass (2006), pp. 136-137).
R1
CORDOBA No specific information on the city. But, Andalusian mer-
chant guilds used their privileges to guard their interests in
the eighteenth century (Stein & Stein (2014), p. 95-96).
R3
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CREMONA No specific account of the city. In 1593 Milanese Lom-
bardy, representatives of the village areas managed to
have the privileged allocation of raw silk suspended, even
though cities maintained their monopoly over most of the
activities (Epstein (2004), p. 308).
U3
ERFURT No specific information on the city, but Erfurt was acquir-
ing landed territories (Epstein (2004), p. 209) pointing
towards a possibility of extending powers of urban elites
which in line with the general trend of cities extending their
commercial privileges (see Chapter 9 on Germany, Epstein
(2004)).
R3
FERRARA No specific information on Ferrara, but Papal states were
unable or unwilling to grant rural communities autonomy
at cost of weakening the Bolognese oligarchy (Epstein
(2004), p. 315).
R3
FIRENZE In the sixteenth century, Florence had a high level of politi-
cal centralism, which led to hollowing out of region’s urban
network (Epstein (2004), pp. 295-296) (Lucca and Pisa),
and merchant guild privileges persisted (Ogilvie (2011),
pp. 33-34).
R1
GDANSK In the sixteenth century, Gdansk excluded foreign mer-
chants from trading without the agreement of existing
burghers. (Ogilvie (2011), p. 55)
R1
GENOV A Genoa allowed all citizens to trade freely, and had liberal
requirements for earning citizenship (Ogilvie (2011), p.
53)
I1
GENT Antwerp emerged as a major trading market for traders of
the region Ogilvie (2011). No evidence exists such that in-
dividual merchant guilds successfully blocked locals from
doing trade through Antwerp. The closeness of Belgian
cities hindered them from enforcing exclusive privilege
(Ogilvie (2011), pp. 31-32).
U2
GRANADA No specific information on the city. But, Andalusian mer-
chant guilds used their privileges to guard their interests in
the eighteenth century. (Stein & Stein (2014), pp. 95-96)
R3
HAARLEM After 1581, new Dutch republic refused to grant privileges
to merchants, and literature does not mention Haarlem and
Leiden (unlike Dordrich and Middleberg) relying on staple
rights (Ogilvie (2011), p. 183). No explicit mention of the
city removing monopoly privileges.
U3
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HAMBURG Hamburg removed monopoly privileges of local merchant
guilds while other cities of the German Hansa, continued
with such privileges (Ogilvie (2011), p. 87).
I2
JEREZ  
DE   LA  
FRONTERA
No specific information on the city. But, Andalusian mer-
chant guilds used their privileges to guard their interests in
the eighteenth century (Stein & Stein (2014), pp. 95-96).
R3
KOBENHAV NThere is a record of establishment of a merchant guild in
Copenhagen in 1742 (Andersen (2011), p. 61).
R1
KOELN Until the early nineteenth century, Cologne merchant
guilds maintained monopoly privileges, and used the privi-
leges to block non-local merchants from trading in the hin-
terlands (Ogilvie (2011), p. 69).
R1
LEIDEN After 1581, new Dutch republic refused to grant privileges
to merchants, and literature does not mention Haarlem and
Leiden (unlike Dordrich and Middleberg) relying on staple
rights (Ogilvie (2011), p. 183). No explicit mention of the
city removing monopoly privileges.
U3
LIEGE Antwerp emerged as a major trading market for traders of
the region Ogilvie (2011). No evidence exists such that in-
dividual merchant guilds successfully blocked locals from
doing trade through Antwerp. The closeness of Belgian
cities hindered them from enforcing exclusive privilege
(Ogilvie (2011), pp. 31-32).
U2
LILLE Merchant guild existed until the eighteenth century in
Lille; in the eighteenth century, merchant guilds of Lille
worked to restrict independence of rural brokers in the tex-
tile industry (Ogilvie (2011), p. 37).
R1
LISBOA Portuguese merchants enjoyed monopolies over transat-
lantic and European trade, unlike English and Dutch mer-
chants (Ogilvie (2011), p. 37).
R1
LONDON The London livery companies (guilds of merchants and
craftsmen) found it increasingly difficult to enforce their
economic privileges as the sixteenth century progressed
(Ogilvie (2011), pp. 32-33).
I2
LUCCA In the sixteenth century, Florence had a high level of politi-
cal centralism, which led to hollowing out of region’s urban
network (Epstein (2004), pp. 295-296) (Lucca and Pisa),
and merchant guild privileges persisted (Ogilvie (2011),
pp. 33-34).
R1
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LUEBECK In the sixteenth century, Lu¨beck, to tackle increasing Dutch
and English competition, tightened the monopoly of its lo-
cal merchant guild (Ogilvie (2011), p. 87).
R1
LY ON Weaving, finishing and marketing in silk industry of Lyon
was controlled until 1789 (Ogilvie (2011), p. 415). French
cities resisted any guild reform until at least the eighteenth
century. Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had
some partial reform during the eighteenth century (Horn
(2015), p. 224).
R1
MADRID Merchant guilds enjoyed privileges in the seventeenth cen-
tury in Madrid (Herr (2015), p. 168). Epstein (2004) called
it a “parasitic city”.
R1
MAGDEBURGMagdeburg law was an elaborate system of city privileges
that emerged in Magdeburg, and spread across Germany
and Eastern Europe. No evidence of Magdeburg laws
changing in the sixteenth century.
R3
MALAGA In 1667, Malaga sought permission to trade with the At-
lantic (Smith (1940), p. 92). Andalusian merchant guilds
used their privileges to guard their interests in the eigh-
teenth century (Stein & Stein (2014), pp. 95-96).
R1
MANTUA In the sixteenth century Mantua increased its centralization
and control over countryside (Epstein (2004), p. 311).
R1
MARSEILLE No specific information on the city. French cities re-
sisted any guild reform until at least the eighteenth century.
Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had some par-
tial reform during the eighteenth century (Horn (2015), p.
224).
R3
MECHELEN Antwerp emerged as a major trading market for traders of
the region Ogilvie (2011). No evidence exists such that in-
dividual merchant guilds successfully blocked locals from
doing trade through Antwerp. The closeness of Belgian
cities hindered them from enforcing exclusive privilege
(Ogilvie (2011), pp. 31-32).
U2
MESSINA Primarily an agrarian society, Sicilian cities began to grant
guilds late, and their significance only increased in early
modern period (Epstein 2003). No specific mention of the
city.
R3
METZ Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had some partial
guild reform but only in 1762 (Horn (2015), p. 224).
R1
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MILANO In 1593 Milanese Lombardy, representatives of the village
areas managed to have the privileged allocation of raw silk
suspended, even though cities maintained their monopoly
over most of the activities. (Epstein (2004), p. 308).
U1
MURCIA Privileged guilds of Madrid set factories in the allied cities
of Murcia (Herr (2015), p. 168).
R1
NAPOLI Naples resembled a feudal state with significant privileges
to nobles and elites (see Chapter 14 on Kingdom of Naples,
Epstein (2004)).
R1
NUERNBERG Nuremberg was called a “city without guilds” because the
city councils dominated by powerful international dealers
and merchant-entrepreneurs, regulated activities of craft
guilds (Soly 2008).
R1
ORLEANS Orleans received new privileged guilds in the seventeenth
century (Horn (2015), p. 224).
R1
PADOV A In Venetian republic while Padova continued to maintain
its position in wool production (Epstein (2004), p. 315),
but during the second half of the sixteenth century rural
representatives were able to negotiate concessions for tax
allocation and collection (Epstein (2004), p. 301).
U1
PALERMO Primarily an agrarian society, Sicilian cities began to grant
guilds late, and their significance only increased in early
modern period (Epstein 2003). No specific mention of the
city.
R3
PARIS Paris expanded its guild system in the seventeenth century,
and partial reforms only happened in 1762 (Horn (2015),
p. 224).
R1
PIACENZA In the sixteenth century, Farnese duchy increased its cen-
tralization and control over countryside which meant large
part of the state territory lost to urban jurisdiction (Epstein
(2004), p. 312).
R1
PISA In the sixteenth century, Florence had a high level of politi-
cal centralism, which led to hollowing out of region’s urban
network (Epstein (2004), pp. 295-296) (Lucca and Pisa),
and merchant guild privileges persisted (Ogilvie (2011),
pp. 33-34).
R1
PLASENCIA No specific information on the city. Spanish cities began
receiving merchant guild permissions only in late medieval
period (Smith 1940) and cities without such charters lost
out.
R3
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PLOV DIV Bribes and guild concessions were common in Bulgaria,
(Lampe & Jackson (1982), p. 145) until 1878 emerged as
an independent state.
R3
POZNAN Merchant guilds enjoyed monopoly in the seventeenth cen-
tury Poznan, which they defended aggressively against lo-
cal Jews and foreigners (Ogilvie (2011), p. 82).
R1
PRAHA James (1893) records a 1856 celebration of merchant
guilds of Prague.
R1
RENNES Rennes received new privileged guilds in the seventeenth
century (Horn (2015), p. 224).
R1
ROMA Early modern Rome had merchant guilds which charged
admission fees that added to the wealth requirement of
joining the guilds (Ogilvie (2011), p. 60).
R1
ROUEN Rouen, Nancy, Metz, Roussillon and Paris had some partial
guild reform but only in 1762 (Horn (2015), p. 224).
R1
SALONIKA No specific information on nature of institutions in Sa-
lonika, but given that ruling Ottoman empire had a system
of granting privileges (Ogilvie 2011), it is assumed eco-
nomic organization in Ottoman influenced Salonika was
similar.
R3
SARAJEV O Sarajevo had merchant guilds during the sixteenth-
seventeenth century. Merchant colonies of Bosnian
merchants blocked the settlement of Ragusan merchant
colonies in Sarajevo and other Hungarian and Slavonian
towns (Ogilvie (2011), p. 124).
R1
SEV ILLA In the sixteenth century, Seville restricted naturalization,
and thus permission to trade as a long-distance merchant,
to men who were subjects of the Holy Roman empire or
one of its allies, or those who could prove twenty years res-
idence in Castile and fulfil a property requirement (Ogilvie
(2011), p. 54).
R1
SKOPJE Skopje (Molna´r 2007) and other Ottoman Balkan cities
have been documented to have merchant colonies in the
sixteenth century that held commercial privileges (Ogilvie
(2011), p. 10).
R1
TIRGOV ISTE Targoviste was an important town of Wallachia which in
the sixteenth century enjoyed commercial privileges even
when some new settlements in Wallachia did not enjoy the
same generous privileges as older ones (Ra˘dvan 2009).
R1
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TOLEDO In Toledo, during the sixteenth century, craft guilds be-
came even more powerful and autonomous extending con-
trol over previously unregulated manufacture. No informa-
tion specific to merchant guilds (Epstein (2004), p. 288).
R1
TOULOUSE In Languedoc (Toulouse) marketing and finishing of proto-
industrial woollens were monopolized by the merchant
guilds of Clermont-de-Lodeve and other towns into the
later eighteenth century (Ogilvie (2006), p. 415).
R1
TOURNAI Antwerp emerged as a major trading market for traders of
the region Ogilvie (2011). No evidence exists such that in-
dividual merchant guilds successfully blocked locals from
doing trade through Antwerp. The closeness of Belgian
cities hindered them from enforcing exclusive privilege
(Ogilvie (2011), p. 31-32).
U2
TOURS Tours received new privileged guilds in the seventeenth
century (Horn (2015), p. 224).
R1
V ALENCIA In Valencia, merchant guilds were existent in the eigh-
teenth century, as a guild court was established in 1762
(Smith (1940), p. 13).
R1
V ALENCIENNESIn Valenciennes and Cambresis cities retained control of
the linen proto-industry until the late eighteenth century
(Ogilvie (2006), p. 414).
R1
V ALLADOLID From the late fifteenth century, Burgos received exclusive
rights to trade at the expense of cities like Valladolid (Smith
(1940), p. 69).
R1
V ENEZIA In Venice while non-citizens (a large majority) (Ogilvie
(2011), p. 53) were excluded from trade in the sixteenth
century; during the second half of the sixteenth century ru-
ral representatives were able to negotiate concessions for
tax allocation and collection (Epstein (2004), p. 301).
U1
V ERONA No specific mention of merchant guilds of Verona, but dur-
ing the second half of the sixteenth century rural represen-
tatives of Venetian republic were able to negotiate conces-
sions for tax allocation and collection (Epstein (2004), p.
301).
U3
WIEN It was in the eighteenth century that Congress of Vienna de-
cided to remove city staple rights privileges (ART XXV).
R1
WROCLAW In early modern period, Silesia (Wroclaw) had merchant
guilds/privileged merchant companies in proto-industrial
sectors (Ogilvie (2011), pp. 33-34).
R1
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E.3 Urban Agglomeration
Table E.5: City Clusters based on Hierarchal Clustering based on average distance (UPGMA)
City Cluster Name Number of Cities
ALMERIA East Andalusia 9
AMSTERDAM Netherlands 12
ANGERS Western France 6
ANTWERPEN Belgium 22
AQUILA Roman 5
ATHINAI 1
AUGSBURG 4
AVIGNON Southern France 7
BARCELONA 1
BELGRADE 1
BOLOGNA Florence 10
BORDEAUX 2
BOURGES Central France 3
BRESCIA Milan 14
BRUGGE Belgium 22
BRUXELLES Belgium 22
BURGOS 1
CAEN Northern France 5
CORDOBA West Andalusia 18
CREMONA Milan 14
ERFURT Western Germany 8
FERRARA Florence 10
FIRENZE Florence 10
GDANSK 3
GENOVA 10
GENT Belgium 22
GRANADA East Andalusia 9
HAARLEM Netherlands 12
HAMBURG Northern Germany 4
JEREZ-DE-LA-
FRONTERA
2
KOBENHAVN 1
KOELN Eastern Germany 4
LEIDEN Netherlands 12
LIEGE Eastern Germany 4
LILLE Belgium 22
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LISBOA 3
LONDON 2
LUCCA Florence 10
LUEBECK Northern Germany 4
LYON 2
MADRID Spanish 10
MAGDEBURG Western Germany 8
MALAGA West Andalusia 18
MANTUA Milan 14
MARSEILLE Southern France 7
MECHELEN Belgium 22
MESSINA 15
METZ 4
MILANO Milan 14
MURCIA 2
NAPOLI 3
NUERNBERG 3
ORLEANS Central France 3
PADOVA Venice 6
PALERMO 3
PARIS 5
PIACENZA Milan 14
PISA Florence 10
PLASENCIA 3
PLOVDIV 3
POZNAN Poland 4
PRAHA 4
RENNES 2
ROMA Roman 5
ROUEN Northern France 5
SALONIKA 1
SARAJEVO 1
SEVILLA West Andalusia 18
SKOPJE 3
TIRGOVISTE 2
TOLEDO 5
TOULOUSE 3
TOURNAI Belgium 22
TOURS Western France 6
VALENCIA 4
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VALENCIENNES Belgium 22
VALLADOLID Spanish 10
VENEZIA Venice 6
VERONA Venice 6
WIEN 3
WROCLAW Poland 4
E.4 Appendix Figures
E.5 Robustness Tests: Tables
Appendix Tables E.6 (multinomial regression), E.7 (considering number of printing cities within
50km from a city (PrintCity50kma) as a proxy for printing), E.8 (considering different thresh-
olds for distance from port and level of clustering), E.9 and E.10 (considering a limited sample
of 50 largest cities in the fifteenth century), E.11 and E.12 (considering a limited sample of cities
without code R3 or U3) report robustness checks from section 3.4.7
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Table E.7: The table replicates Table 3.6 with an alternate the 15th century printing variable: Number of the 15th
century printing cities within 50 km distance from the observed city. Dependent variable is the 16th century nature
of economic institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
# Print Cities in 50km 0.223*** 0.205*** 0.167*** 0.152***
(0.0386) (0.0484) (0.0515) (0.0463)
1 Print City in 50km -0.0649 -0.0914 -0.119 0.0528
(0.127) (0.153) (0.171) (0.150)
2 Print Cities in 50km 0.364 0.293 0.356 0.163
(0.348) (0.361) (0.299) (0.217)
3 Print Cities in 50km 0.489* 0.447 0.474* 0.322
(0.282) (0.282) (0.249) (0.240)
4 Print Cities in 50km 1.114*** 1.093*** 0.897*** 0.862***
(0.253) (0.258) (0.255) (0.129)
5 Print Cities in 50km 1.114*** 1.085*** 0.769** 0.796***
(0.253) (0.305) (0.334) (0.160)
6 Print Cities in 50km 0.864*** 0.869*** 0.410 0.434
(0.104) (0.252) (0.336) (0.372)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.0183 0.00226 0.0406 0.0312 0.0366 0.0606
(0.0969) (0.0953) (0.0869) (0.0880) (0.0885) (0.0743)
Growth 1500 0.0512 -0.0200 -0.00243 -0.0252 -0.0187 0.0687
(0.187) (0.189) (0.163) (0.148) (0.165) (0.142)
log(Population 1500) -0.0386 0.0135 0.0517 0.0681 0.0653 0.0488
(0.102) (0.0962) (0.108) (0.0945) (0.114) (0.0972)p
Elevation -0.00858 -0.00585 -0.000316 0.00343 -0.000737 0.00360
(0.0117) (0.0114) (0.00816) (0.00847) (0.00812) (0.00932)
Near Atlantic 0.540** 0.582** 0.471 0.412
(0.255) (0.272) (0.373) (0.285)
# Prt. Cities in 50km X Near Atl. 0.0374
(0.108)
0 Prt. City in 50km X Near Atl. 0.124
(0.566)
1 Prt. Cities in 50km X Near Atl. -0.492
(0.316)
2 Prt. Cities in 50km X Near Atl. 1.511***
(0.354)
3 Prt. Cities in 50km X Near Atl. 1.323***
(0.398)
4 Prt. Cities in 50km X Near Atl. 0.0484
(0.572)
5 Prt. Cities in 50km X Near Atl. 0
(0)
6 Prt. Cities in 50km X Near Atl. 0
(0)
Medieval Fair 0.0682 0.106 -0.0868 -0.0778 -0.0865 -0.153
(0.168) (0.167) (0.161) (0.168) (0.163) (0.161)
Constant 0.0421 0.136 0.204 0.117 -0.225 -0.234 -0.242 -0.189
(0.0815) (0.104) (0.391) (0.388) (0.350) (0.332) (0.363) (0.311)
Observations 59 59 56 56 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.345 0.401 0.347 0.400 0.449 0.506 0.451 0.655
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure E.2: European postal routes in 1563 according to the travelogue of Giovanni da L’Herba. Sketch in: Joseph
Rbsam (1854-1927)’s L’Union postale, revue de l’Union Postale Universelle, Bern 1900, image source: Wikimedia.
Table E.9: The table replicates Table 3.4 considering a limited sample of only the largest cities of fifteenth cen-
tury Europe (see Table E.2). Dependent variable is 16th century nature of economic institutions in a given city as
described in section 3.4.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Print Penetration 0.123*** 0.137*** -0.0785* -0.0775* 0.111**
(0.0443) (0.0416) (0.0466) (0.0446) (0.0468)
Closeness Port 0.0256** -0.0289** -0.0264** 0.0212
(0.0110) (0.0109) (0.0123) (0.0189)
Print Penetration X Closeness Port 0.0181*** 0.0171***
(0.00540) (0.00593)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.212* 0.226*
(0.122) (0.132)
Growth 1500 -0.000366 -0.00215
(0.191) (0.210)
log(Population 1500) -0.00634 -0.0168
(0.148) (0.153)p
Elevation 0.00567 0.00126
(0.0141) (0.0150)
Medieval Fair -0.0689 0.00444
(0.159) (0.167)
Constant -0.0773 -0.444** 0.224* -0.147 -0.666
(0.0891) (0.179) (0.112) (0.613) (0.605)
Observations 57 57 57 53 53
R-squared 0.101 0.185 0.280 0.352 0.274
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure E.3: An illustration of different notations used for Hindu-Arabic numbers in printed books and woodblocks
in Germany, from Hill (1915) (p. 92).
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Table E.10: The table replicates Table 3.6 considering a limited sample of only the largest cities of the fifteenth
century Europe (see Table E.2) within 150km of sea port. Dependent variable is the 16th century nature of economic
institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
Print Penetration 0.198*** 0.178** 0.210*** 0.149**
(0.0579) (0.0724) (0.0639) (0.0542)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.197 0.230 0.126
(0.206) (0.174) (0.174)
Growth 1500 0.00338 0.0279 -0.123
(0.323) (0.244) (0.231)
log(Population 1500) -0.0435 0.0831 0.144
(0.208) (0.185) (0.179)p
Elevation -0.00760 0.00710 0.00467
(0.0156) (0.0137) (0.0156)
Near Atlantic 0.685** -0.742
(0.268) (0.540)
Near Atlantic X Print Penetration 0.471**
(0.224)
Medieval Fair -0.0401 -0.334** -0.338**
(0.213) (0.161) (0.149)
Constant -0.177 -0.299 -1.076 -0.857
(0.115) (0.943) (0.804) (0.810)
Observations 41 39 39 39
R-squared 0.188 0.235 0.399 0.493
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure E.4: Average population of the Atlantic and Mediterranean port cities in the sample across time (1200-1850).
The average population of the sampled cities do not represent the general population trends of all the Atlantic and
Mediterranean port cities.
Table E.11: The table replicates Table 3.4 considering a limited sample excluding those cities that are coded as
R3 or U3 (see Table 3.2). Dependent variable is the 16th century nature of economic institutions in a given city as
described in section 3.4.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Print Penetration 0.123** 0.136*** -0.0770 -0.0747 0.122**
(0.0486) (0.0431) (0.0501) (0.0498) (0.0483)
Closeness Port 0.0378*** -0.0228 -0.0233 0.0334**
(0.0124) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0149)
Print Penetration X Closeness Port 0.0186*** 0.0176***
(0.00587) (0.00523)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.192* 0.201*
(0.100) (0.104)
Growth 1500 0.0864 0.100
(0.151) (0.164)
log(Population 1500) -0.0900 -0.0946
(0.0994) (0.112)p
Elevation 0.00124 0.000284
(0.0122) (0.0130)
Medieval Fair -0.0293 0.0298
(0.178) (0.181)
Constant -0.0629 -0.580*** 0.127 0.136 -0.526
(0.120) (0.193) (0.144) (0.512) (0.526)
Observations 59 59 59 55 55
R-squared 0.067 0.219 0.287 0.348 0.290
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table E.12: The table replicates Table 3.6 considering a limited sample excluding those cities within 150km of
sea port, that are coded as R3 or U3 (see Table 3.2). Dependent variable is the 16th century nature of economic
institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
Print Penetration 0.210*** 0.238*** 0.257*** 0.161**
(0.0690) (0.0700) (0.0670) (0.0708)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.153 0.120 0.0740
(0.130) (0.107) (0.105)
Growth 1500 0.104 0.0537 -0.0852
(0.245) (0.176) (0.185)
log(Population 1500) -0.202 -0.0670 0.0723
(0.136) (0.116) (0.128)p
Elevation -0.0266 -0.0107 -0.00741
(0.0183) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Near Atlantic 0.862*** -0.557
(0.277) (0.533)
Near Atlantic X Print Penetration 0.460**
(0.201)
Medieval Fair 0.0157 -0.287 -0.326*
(0.242) (0.207) (0.184)
Constant -0.205 0.257 -0.417 -0.515
(0.175) (0.539) (0.445) (0.437)
Observations 42 40 40 40
R-squared 0.129 0.236 0.474 0.529
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
APPENDIX E. DATA ON CITIES OF EUROPE 175
Table E.13: The table replicates Table 3.6 with an alternate the 15th century printing variable: PrintU9 Penetration.
PrintU9 Penetration is a measure of level of diffusion of printed books in the 15th century in a given city, from the
121 printing cities in the 9 trade friendly categories of the USTC catalog (see section 3.4.7). Dependent variable is
the 16th century nature of economic institutions in a given city as described in section 3.4.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
PrintU9 Penetration 0.277*** 0.254*** 0.232*** 0.152***
(0.0476) (0.0508) (0.0480) (0.0424)
log(# cities in cluster) 0.0967 0.0935 0.0629
(0.0978) (0.0822) (0.0747)
Growth 1500 0.0427 -0.0281 -0.123
(0.194) (0.159) (0.145)
log(Population 1500) -0.0509 0.0603 0.139
(0.109) (0.109) (0.109)p
Elevation -0.0101 7.66e-05 -0.00136
(0.0115) (0.00877) (0.00818)
Near Atlantic 0.610*** -0.139
(0.201) (0.257)
Near Atlantic X PrintU9 Penetration 0.267**
(0.112)
Medieval Fair -0.112 -0.266* -0.259*
(0.155) (0.141) (0.131)
Constant -0.317*** -0.160 -0.648* -0.662*
(0.0883) (0.369) (0.363) (0.339)
Observations 59 56 56 56
R-squared 0.351 0.377 0.513 0.568
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Appendix F
Data on Indian castes and censuses
F.1 Risley’s District Committees
Table F.1a: British Provinces where district committees were formed
Census Region Note District Com-
mittee
Bengal Bengal was the British province where 1901 cen-
sus commissioner Herbert Risley, conducted his
earlier ethnographic studies and forwarded his so-
cial precedence scheme used on Bengal to other
provinces as a template. To come up with a so-
cial precedence census officer E.A. Gait employed
“committees”, and arbitrated several points of dis-
puted precedence, although he did not undertake a
social precedence classification for the tribal re-
gions of the province. The provincial census was
printed in Calcutta.
1
Northwestern Provinces
and Oudh
In the adjacent British province of NWP and
Oudh, census officer R. Burn writes “District Of-
ficers were then asked to appoint representative
committees” to determine social precedence. Cen-
sus officer notes that castes were given an or-
der based on Mr. Risley’s scheme and based on
the preexisting caste studies of orientalist William
Crooke in the province, who wrote the book The
Tribes and Tribes of the Northwestern Provinces
and Oudh in 1896 (as a followup book to Mr. Ris-
ley’s book on Bengal). The provincial census was
printed in Allahabad.
1
176
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Central Provinces In the adjacent British province of Central
Provinces, census report had a detailed caste
precedence table formed in correspondence with
district officials. Census officer R. V. Russell
wrote, “the materials, so far as the castes of the
Central Provinces are concerned, have been ob-
tained from the replies to a short set of ques-
tions, selected from those on which the Ethno-
graphic Survey of Bengal was conducted, and
which were circulated to District Officers last
year.” The provincial census was printed in Nag-
pur.
1
Berar In the British province of Berar, adjacent to Cen-
tral Provinces, a detailed social precedence ta-
ble was formed and “The Deputy Commissioners
were addressed, and with their help committees
were formed to advise on the arrangements of var-
ious castes found in their districts in the order of
their social precedence.”, headed by census officer
Ardaseer Dinshawji Chinoy. The provincial cen-
sus was printed in Allahabad.
1
Madras In the southern British province of Madras,
which bordered Bengal, detailed social prece-
dence schemes specific to different lingual groups
was developed. Census officer wrote “I drew
up the table in accordance with the information
available, neither extenuating anything nor setting
down aught in malice, and committees of native
gentlemen formed for the purpose in every district
have criticised and amended the original draft, but
I am well aware that the task has been a most del-
icate one”. The provincial census was printed in
Madras.
1
Gwalior Princely state of Gwalior, enclosed within NWP
and Central Provinces, developed a detailed social
precedence table. Census officer J. W. D. John-
stone wrote, “Subsidiary Table I is an attempt to
classify the castes of this State according to so-
cial precedence, but though the groups have been
formed after consultation with various local au-
thorities, it is not claimed that the arrangement
precludes all dispute.”. The table was developed
with consultation with census officer of Central
India Agency. The provincial census was printed
in Lucknow.
1
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Rajputana Agency In the princely Rajputana Agency, a detailed so-
cial precedence table was developed based on
the consultation with different Durbars (princely
states) after multiple stages of revision, headed
by census officer Captain A. D. Bannerman. The
provincial census was printed in Lucknow.
1
Ajmer Merwara In the British province of Ajmer Merwara, en-
closed within Rajputana Agency, a detailed caste
precedence table was developed assisted by “a
Committee of Native gentlemen”, headed by cen-
sus officer K. C. Bramley. The provincial census
was printed in Ajmer.
1
Baroda In the Princely state of Baroda, enclosed within
the Bombay Presidency, an “Order of social
precedence was framed from the replies received
through the Ethnographic Committees appointed
in that behalf”, headed by Jamshedji Ardeshir
Dalal. The provincial census was printed in Bom-
bay.
1
Table F.1b: British Provinces where district committees were not formed to form detailed caste precedence tables
Census Region Note District Com-
mittee
Assam In the British province of Assam, adjacent to Ben-
gal, a detailed social precedence table has been
provided. But, there seems mixed evidence on
the degree of district-level consultation. The cen-
sus officer B. C. Allen writes “Within each table I
have arranged the castes in the rank which as far
as I can ascertain, is assigned to them by popular
opinion. This is a point upon which I desire to
lay some stress. I have made no attempt to go be-
hind general opinion, or to consider the grounds
upon which they are based.” On the other hand,
the officer did consult local officers, and refers to
“Kamrup committee” on whose recommendation
it altered the social precedence of a caste “Saloi”.
Also the census officer received memorials from
caste groups, requesting to be levelled upwards in
the caste precedence table, pointing towards a sat-
isfactorily detailed consultation. The provincial
census was printed in Guwahati.
0 or 1
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Central India Agency In the princely Agency of Central India Agency
adjacent to Central Provinces, a detailed caste
precedence table was adopted, by following the
classification “devised by the Census Superinten-
dent of the North-West Provinces”. The census
officer, Captain C. Eckford Luard, wrote “it has
been almost impossible to reconcile the different
positions given to the castes and tribes by differ-
ent states. All I could do was to arrange them as
near the average position as possible noting where
there were any great variations in the place as-
signed.” Thus, while a classification scheme ex-
isted, it lacked the detailed revision carried out
in the Rajputana Agency, or district-based assess-
ment of Northwestern Provinces and Oudh. The
provincial census was printed in Lucknow.
0 or 1
Bombay The census officer of British province of Bombay,
R.E. Enthoven showed inhibition in classification
of caste and wrote, “In 1881 an attempt to group
the castes by social precedence led to widespread
discontent and to numerous representations of an
embittered character. It is undesirable to provoke
for a second time the hostile feeling then aroused
in connection with this difficult question of so-
cial precedence between caste and caste, nor can
the Provincial Superintendent claim the knowl-
edge, even it he assumes the powers, of former na-
tive rulers in dealing with such matters.” Thus “to
avoid friction and discontent” “a scheme of clas-
sification on very broad lines” was adopted and
“instructions were issued to committees to act on
this principle”. The provincial census was printed
in Bombay.
0
Hyderabad The census officer of the Southern princely state
of Hyderabad, Mirza Mehdy Khan, provides a
social precedence table, but there is no mention
of any consultation with committees to come up
with this social precedence, arguably because the
census officer is not a British officer. More-
over, castes classification in the province has lit-
tle resemblance with Risley’s detailed classifica-
tion scheme where castes were put into different
classes, and in Hyderabad the many castes were
first put in super-caste groups like “Ausala” (arti-
sans) and ranked like a long list of broadly occupa-
tional groups. The provincial census was printed
in Hyderabad.
0
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Kashmir The census officer of the Northern princely
state of Kashmir, Khan Bahadur Munshi Gholam
Ahmed Khan, provided a vague social precedence
table, but castes mentioned in this table include
occupational groups like “Tailors”, “Goldsmiths”,
and “Carpenters”, who are classed as “Shudras”,
preceded by Brahmins, Kshatriyas or Rajputs and
“Vaishyas”. While the census officer says, “the
castes and sub-castes, therefore, recorded in the
following pages of this chapter are mainly based
upon the materials supplied to me by the reports
of the District Officers”, but, there seems to be no
detail on how the social precedence table was de-
veloped, and if proper consultation like in Bengal
or United Provinces was conducted. The officer
says the reports were “not quite up to mark and
lacked in many points, which could not, but, be
cleared owing to the shortness of time at my dis-
posal.” The provincial census was printed in La-
hore.
0
Cochin The census officer of the Southern princely state
of Cochin, M. Sankara Mennon, provides a de-
tailed census precedence table, but there is no
record of consultation with district committees,
and the census table seems to be developed by
the census officer himself, although he mentions
the consultation with a priest to ascertain the posi-
tion of a Brahmin subcaste in the table. It seems,
Mr. Mennon not being a British census officer un-
dertook the classification himself. The provincial
census was printed in Ernakulam.
0
Table F.1c: British Provinces where no caste precedence tables were developed
Census Region Note District Com-
mittee
Mysore The census officer in the Southern princely state
of Mysore, T. Ananda Row,, wrote “No attempt
is made to group or arrange the Castes according
to any scheme of social precedence”. The offi-
cer points towards the complication of the caste
system and the general desire to not generate “the
extensive dissatisfaction, which such a classifica-
tion would even otherwise produce” as some of
the reasons to not not apply the classification. The
provincial census was printed in Bangalore.
0
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Travancore The census officer in the Southern princely state
of Travancore, N. Subramanya Aiyar, wrote
“Viewed... from the standpoint of either scien-
tific accuracy or public policy, the formulation of
a scale of well-recognized social precedence for
the Travancore castes has to be given up for the
present.” He pointed at the attempts to gain feed-
back from 111 “competent” persons regarding so-
cial precedence, out of which only 6 felt prepared
to offer views on precedence. The provincial cen-
sus was printed in Trivandrum.
0
Punjab In the Northern British province of Punjab, cen-
sus officer H.A. Rose wrote “The attempt to clas-
sify castes in the order of their social precedence
was, as will be seen from the foregoing pages,
doomed to failure from the outset. We know far
too little of the complex organization of the Pun-
jab castes to be able, at present to classify them
in any systematic or instructive way. The compli-
cations within the castes have their natural coun-
terpart in the chaotic and uncertain relations be-
tween the different castes.” The provincial census
was printed in Simla.
0
Coorg In the small British province of Coorg adjacent to
Madras, census officer W. Francis provides no so-
cial precedence table, and mentions “most of the
Coorg castes are referred to in the Madras report”.
The provincial census was printed in Madras.
0
F.2 Mughal Provinces, and their Zamindari Qaums
Table F.2: Mughal Provinces in 1605 and their Zamindari Qaums
Sarkar Zamindar Lower Caste Enclosed
Modern Dis-
trict
British district British
province
Agra, Agra Various (Rajput,
Jat, Lodh, Brah-
min, Ahir, Sayyid,
Shaikhzada,
Chishti)
Ahir, Jat, Lodh Agra Agra United
Provinces
Ahmada´ba´d,
Gujarat
Various (Rajput,
Koli)
Koli Gandhinagar Mahi Kantha Bombay
Ahoms Ahoms Ahom Ahom Sivasagar Sibsagar Assam
Ajme’r, Ajmer KachhwA´hah,
AfghA´n, ChauhA´n
None Ajmer Ajmer Mer-
wara
Ajmer Mer-
wara
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Allaha´ba´d Al-
lahabad
Various (Brahman,
Bhar tribe, Rajput,
Kayath, Rahmatul-
lahi)
Bhar Fatehpur Fatehpur United
Provinces
Alwar, Agra Various (Rajput,
Meo, Jat, Muslim
clans)
Jat, Meo Alwar Alwar Rajputana
Agency
Bada´on, Delhi Various (Tyagi,
Rajput, Kayastha,
Shaikhzada, Kahor)
Kahar Budaun Budaun United
Provinces
Baglana,
Baglana
Rajput None Nashik Nasik Bombay
Bahraich,
Oudh
Rajput None Bahraich Bahraich United
Provinces
Bahro´ch
(Broach)
South, Gu-
jarat
Various (Rajput,
Gwalia)
Gwalia Bharuch Broach Bombay
Baroda,
South, Gu-
jarat
Rajput None Vadodara Baroda Baroda
Ba´sim, Berar Rajput None Washim Basim Berar
Baria´lah
(Pita´lwa´ri),
Berar
Rajput None Jalgaon Khandesh
Agency
Bombay
Baya´nwa´n,
Agra
Various (Ahir,
Gurjar,Mina, Jat,
Rajput, Brahman,
Marwari)
Ahir, Gujar,
Mina, Jat
Shivpuri Isagarh Gwalior
Behar, Bihar Various (Brah-
man, Kayath,
Rajput, Afghan,
Shaikhzada)
None Nalanda Patna Bengal
Bena´res
(East), Alla-
habad
Various (Brah-
man, Rajput)
None Varanasi Banares United
Provinces
Bhadrak, Ben-
gal
Various (Khandait,
Kayath)
None Bhadrak Balasore Bengal
Bhathkhora
(South), Alla-
habad
Rewa Baghelkhand Central India
Agency
Bı´ja’garh,
Malwa
Various (Rajput,
Bhil, Brahman,
Kahar and others)
Bhil, Kahar Barwani Bhopawar Central India
Agency
Bikane’r,
Ajmer
Rajput (Bhati) None Bikaner Bikaner Rajputana
Agency
Cha´mpane’r,
Gujarat
Various (Rajput) None Vadodara Baroda Baroda
Champa´ran,
Bihar
Gopalganj Saran Bengal
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Chana´dah
(Chana’r)
South, Alla-
habad
Siddique, Faruqui,
Ansari
None Varanasi Banares United
Provinces
Chanda,
Gondwana
Gond Gond Sagar Saugor Central
Provinces
Chande’ri,
Malwa
Various (Bagri,
Khatri, Ahir,
Brahman, Rajput,
Kayath, and other
tribes)
Ahir Ashoknagar Isagarh Gwalior
Chı´to´r, Ajmer Rajput None Chittaurgarh Mewar Rajputana
Agency
Da´nde’s, Dan-
des
Koli, Ahir, Gond Ahir, Gond,
Koli
Burhanpur Nimar Central
Provinces
Delhi, Delhi Various (Rajput,
Ahir, Jat, Afghani,
Brahman, Gujar,
Shaikhzada etc)
Ahir, Gujar, Jat Delhi West Delhi Punjab
Deogarh,
Gondwana
Gond Gond Chhindwara Chindwara Central
Provinces
Ga´gro´n,
Malwa
Jhalawar Jhalawar Rajputana
Agency
Garha Madla,
Gondwana
Gond Gond Mandla Mandla Central
Provinces
Ga´wil, Berar Amravati Amraoti and
Ellichpur
Berar
Gha´zı´pu´r
(East), Alla-
habad
Various (Rajput,
Brahman, Kayath)
None Ghazipur Ghazipur United
Provinces
Ghora´gha´t,
Bengal
Various Dakshin Dina-
jpur
Dinajpur Bengal
Godhra´,
Gujarat
Various Panch Mahals Panch Mahals Bombay
Gorakhpu´r,
Oudh
Various (Rajput,
Bansi, Afghani)
Bansi Gorakhpur Gorakhpur United
Provinces
Gwa´lior, Agra Various (Rajput,
Gujar, Jat, Bagri,
Brahman)
Gurjar, Jat Morena Gwalior Gwalior
Ha´jipu´r, Bihar Vaishali Muzaffarpur Bengal
Hindı´ah,
Malwa
Various Harda Hoshangabad Central
Provinces
Hisa´r Fı´ro´zah
(Hissa´r), Delhi
Various (Jat, Jati
(Chamar), Rajput,
Afghan and others)
Jat, Jatav Hisar Hissar Punjab
I’rı´j, Agra Various (Rajput,
Brahman, Kayath,
Kunbi, Afghan)
Kunbi Jalaun Jalaun United
Provinces
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Jale’sar, Ben-
gal
Various (Khandait,
Rajputs, Brahman,
Bhanj Rajputs
(Bhaj))
None Baleshwar Balasore Bengal
Jaunpu´r
(NORTH),
Allahabad
Various (Rajput,
Sayyid, Rahmat-
tulah, Kurmi,
Brahman, Kayath,
Siddique Ansari,
Bachgoti)
Kurmi Jaunpur Jaunpur United
Provinces
Jodhpu´r,
Ajmer
Rajput None Jodhpur Marwar Rajputana
Agency
Ka´linjar
(South), Alla-
habad
Various (Rajput,
Gond, Khandel-
wal, Sayyid, Bhar,
Bagri, Rahmatul-
lah)
Bhar, Gond Banda Banda United
Provinces
Kallam
(Kalamb),
Berar
Gond Gond Yavatmal Wun Berar
Ka´lpi, Agra Various (Rajput,
Brahman, Kunbi,
Afghan, Turkman)
Kunbi Jalaun Jalaun United
Provinces
Kamra´j Kash-
mir
Various (Pandit,
Ahir, Akbari etc)
Ahir Srinagar Kashmir Kashmir
Kanauj, Agra Various (Rajput,
Brahman, Khar-
war, Shaikhzada,
Afghan)
Kharwar Kannauj Farukkhabad United
Provinces
Kanauj,
Malwa
Gond Gond Jabalpur Jubbalpore Central
Provinces
Kangra, Kan-
gra
Rajput None Kangra Kangra Punjab
Karrah
(West), Al-
lahabad
Various (Rajput,
Brahman, Kayath,
Afghani)
None Kaushambi Allahabad United
Provinces
Katak (Cut-
tack), Bengal
Various (Brahman,
Ahir, Khantait, Ra-
jput, Tenligha)
Ahir Cuttack Cuttack Bengal
Khaira´ba´d,
Oudh
Various (Brahman,
Rajput, Ahir, Ahin,
Bcchal)
Ahir Sitapur Sitapur United
Provinces
Kherlah,
Berar
Gond Gond Betul Betul Central
Provinces
Koch, Koch Koch Koch Koch Bihar Kuch Bihar Bengal
Kol (Koil),
Agra
Various (Ra-
jput, Brahman,
Gurjar, Jat,
Afghan, Sayyid,
Shaikhzada,
Badgujar)
Gurjar, Jat Aligarh Aligarh United
Provinces
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Korarah
(Corah) West,
Allahabad
Various(Afghan,
Lodhi, Rajput,
Brahman)
Lodh Allahabad Allahabad United
Provinces
Ko´trı´
Para´yah,
Malwa
Various (Rajput,
Kayath, Sondha
tribe of Rajput)
None Jhalawar Jhalawar Rajputana
Agency
Kuma´on,
Delhi
Various Almora Almore United
Provinces
Lakhnauti,
Bengal
KA´yaths and Brah-
mans
None Maldah Malda Bengal
Lucknow,
Oudh
Various (Ra-
jput, Brahman,
Ansari, Sayyid,
Kunbi, Shaikhzada,
Afghani, Bacchal)
Kunbi Lucknow Lucknow United
Provinces
Mada´ran,
Bengal
Various Hugli Hooghly Bengal
Mahkar,
Berar
Buldana Buldana Berar
Ma´ho´r, Berar Rajput None Yavatmal Wun Berar
Mandla´er,
Agra
Rajput None Karauli Karauli Rajputana
Agency
Mando Malwa Various Indore Indore Central India
Agency
Manikdrug,
Berar
Chandrapur Chanda Central
Provinces
Ma´nikpu´r, Al-
lahabad
Various (Brahman,
Rajput, Kayath,
Bawariya, Bach-
gori, Turkoman,
Khandelwal)
Baoria Kaushambi Allahabad United
Provinces
Maro´so´r,
Malwa
Various (Rajput,
Ahir, Gond)
Ahir, Gond Mandsaur Malwa
(Gwalior)
Gwalior
Marra´j Kash-
mir
Various (Pandits,
Thakors, Zinah)
Zinah (Ahir) Srinagar Kashmir Kashmir
Monghyr, Bi-
har
Munger Monghyr Bengal
Na´do´t (Non-
dod) NORTH,
Gujarat
Narmada Broach Bombay
Na´gor, Ajmer Various (Kush-
waha, Rajput
Muslim)
None Nagaur Marwar Rajputana
Agency
Narna´lah, Be-
rar
Gond Gond Akola Akola Berar
Na´rnol, Agra Various (Rajput,
Jat, Gond, Ahir,
Musalman,Muslim
Rajput)
Ahir, Gond, Jat Mahendragarh Hybrid Punjab
Narwar, Agra RajpU´t None Shivpuri Isagarh Gwalior
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Nazarba´r,
Malwa
Various Tapi Navsari Baroda
Oudh, Oudh Various (Brahman,
Kunbi, Rajput,
Ansari, Bachgoti)
Kunbi Faizabad Fyzaba United
Provinces
Pana´r, Berar Wardha Wardha Central
Provinces
Pa´thri, Berar Parbhani Parbhani Hyderabad
Pattan,
NORTH,
Gujarat
Various (Rajput,
Koli)
Koli Mahesana Kadi Baroda
Pinjarah, Ben-
gal
Various Dakshin Dina-
jpur
Dinajpur Bengal
Pu´rniyah,
Bengal
Purnia Purnea Bengal
Ra´isı´n, Malwa Rajput None Raisen Bhopal Central India
Agency
Ra´nghar
(Ra´mgarh),
Berar
Karimnagar Elgandal Hyderabad
Ranthamo´r,
Ajmer
Rajput None Sawai Mad-
hopur
Jaipur Rajputana
Agency
Re’wa´ri, Delhi Various (Rajput,
Ahir, Jat, Thathar
and others)
Ahir, Jat Rewari Gurgaon Punjab
Rohta´s, Bihar Various Rohtas Shahabad Bengal
Saha´r, Agra Various (Meo, Jat,
Ahir, Kushwaha
Rajput)
Ahir, Jat, Meo Mathura Muttra United
Provinces
Saha´ranpu´r,
Delhi
Various (Jat, Tyagi,
Brahman, Sayyid,
Ansari and others)
Jat Saharanpur Saharanpur United
Provinces
Sambhal,
Delhi
Various (Tyagi,
Rajput, Sayyids,
Khassiah, Jat, Ahir
and others)
Ahir, Jat Jyotiba Phule
Nagar
Moradabad United
Provinces
Sa´ran, Bihar Various Siwan Saran Bengal
Sa´rangpu´r,
Malwa
Various (Rajput,
Kayath, Kacchi)
Kacchi Shajapur Malwa
(Gwalior)
Gwalior
Sa´tga´on, Ben-
gal
Various Kolkata Calcutta Bengal
Sharı´fa´ba´d,
Bengal
Various Barddhaman Burdwan Bengal
Sirhind, Delhi Various (Rajput,
Brahman, Jat,
Shaikh and others)
Jat Fatehgarh
Sahib
Patiala Punjab
Sı´ro´hi, Ajmer Rajput, Afghan None Sirohi Sirohi Rajputana
Agency
So´rath, Gu-
jarat
Rajkot Kathiawar Bombay
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Sulaima´na´ba´d,
Bengal
Various Hugli Hooghly Bengal
Su´rat, Gujarat Various (Rajput) None Surat Surat Bombay
Ta´jpu´r, Ben-
gal
Various Uttar Dinajpur Dinajpur Bengal
Telinga´nah,
Berar
Nanded Nander Hyderabad
The Bet
Ja´landhar
Doa´b Lahore
Various (Rajput,
Afghan, Lodhi,
Bhatti and others)
Lodh Kapurthala Kapurthala Punjab
Tija´rah, Agra Various (Meo, Ra-
jput, Muslim Ra-
jput)
Meo Mewat Gurgaon Punjab
Tirhut, Bihar Various Muzaffarpur Muzaffarpur Bengal
Udne’r, Ben-
gal
Maldah Malda Bengal
Ujjain, Malwa Various (Rajput,
Jadon, Mehtar,
Soria other uniden-
tified tribes)
Mehtar Ujjain Malwa
(Gwalior)
Gwalior
